

6.

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7. Apêndice I – Tabelas

Tabela 1: Cotas e poder de voto dos membros do FMI.

Membro	COTAS		VOTOS	
	Milhões de SDRs	Percentual do total	Número de votos	Percentual do total
Estados Unidos	42.122,40	17,73	421.964,00	16,78
Japão	15.628,50	6,58	157.025,00	6,24
Alemanha	14.565,50	6,13	146.395,00	5,82
França	10.738,50	4,52	108.125,00	4,30
Reino Unido	10.738,50	4,52	108.125,00	4,30
China	9.525,90	4,01	95.999,00	3,82
Itália	7.882,30	3,32	79.563,00	3,16
Arábia Saudita	6.985,50	2,94	70.595,00	2,81
Canadá	6.369,20	2,68	64.432,00	2,56
Federação Russa	5.945,40	2,50	60.194,00	2,39
Índia	5.821,50	2,45	58.955,00	2,34
Holanda	5.162,40	2,17	52.364,00	2,08
Bélgica	4.605,20	1,94	46.792,00	1,86
Brasil	4.250,50	1,79	43.245,00	1,72
Espanha	4.023,40	1,69	40.974,00	1,63
México	3.625,70	1,53	36.997,00	1,47
Suíça	3.458,50	1,46	35.325,00	1,40
Coréia	3.366,40	1,42	34.404,00	1,37
Austrália	3.236,40	1,36	33.104,00	1,32
Todos os outros 168 membros	69.570,60	29,30	820.026,00	32,67
TOTAL	237.622,30	100,04	2.514.603,00	100,04

Fonte: FMI, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx#2>, acesso e atualização dos dados pela instituição em 17/06/2011.

Tabela 2: Taxas de desemprego nacionais – EUA.

Ano	Jan	Fev	Mar	Abr	Mai	Jun	Jul	Ago	Set	Out	Nov	Dec	Anual
1991	7.1	7.3	7.2	6.5	6.7	7.0	6.8	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.7	6.9	6.8
1992	8.1	8.2	7.8	7.2	7.3	8.0	7.7	7.4	7.3	6.9	7.1	7.1	7.5
1993	8.0	7.8	7.4	6.9	6.8	7.2	7.0	6.6	6.4	6.4	6.2	6.1	6.9
1994	7.3	7.1	6.8	6.2	5.9	6.2	6.2	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.1	6.1
1995	6.2	5.9	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.8	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.6
1996	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.1	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.4
1997	5.9	5.7	5.5	4.8	4.7	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.9
1998	5.2	5.0	5.0	4.1	4.2	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.5
1999	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.7	4.2
2000	4.5	4.4	4.3	3.7	3.8	4.1	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.7	4.0
2001	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.1	4.7	4.7	4.9	4.7	5.0	5.3	5.4	4.7
2002	6.3	6.1	6.1	5.7	5.5	6.0	5.9	5.7	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.7	5.8
2003	6.5	6.4	6.2	5.8	5.8	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.4	6.0
2004	6.3	6.0	6.0	5.4	5.3	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.1	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.5
2005	5.7	5.8	5.4	4.9	4.9	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.6	5.1
2006	5.1	5.1	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.0	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.6
2007	5.0	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.6
2008	5.4	5.2	5.2	4.8	5.2	5.7	6.0	6.1	6.0	6.1	6.5	7.1	5.8
2009	8.5	8.9	9.0	8.6	9.1	9.7	9.7	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.4	9.7	9.3
2010	10.6	10.4	10.2	9.5	9.3	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.2	9.0	9.3	9.1	9.6

Fonte: Bureau of Economic Data,
<http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet>, acesso em 15/05/2011.

Series Id: LNU04000000

Not Seasonally Adjusted

Age: 16 years and over

Years: 1991 to 2011

Tabela 3: Índice de Preços ao Consumidor – Buenos Aires.

Ano	Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPC)	Variação referente ao período anterior
1996	100.52	0.2
1997	101.05	0.5
1998	101.98	0.9
1999	100.79	-1.2
2000	99.85	-0.9
2001	98.78	-1.1
2002	124.33	25.9
2003	141.05	13.4
2004	147.28	4.4
2005	161.48	9.6
2006	179.08	10.9
2007	194.89	8.8

Fonte: INDEC, <http://www.indec.mecon.ar/>, acesso em 15/05/2011.

Nota: o IPC mede as variações de preços para o aglomerado urbano de Buenos Aires em um conjunto representativo da cesta de consumo de bens e serviços da população determinado de fevereiro de 1996 a janeiro de 1997.

Tabela 4: Taxas Trimestrais de Desocupação Nacional – Argentina.

Ano	Desocupação
Mai 1994	10.7
Out 1994	12.2
Mai 1995	18.4
Out 1995	16.6
Mai 1996	17.1
Out 1996	17.4
Mai 1997	16.1
Out 1997	13.7
May 1998	13.2
Ago 1998	13.2
Out 1998	12.4
Mai 1999	14.5
Ago 1999	14.5
Out 1999	13.8
Mai 2000	15.4
Out 2000	14.7
Mai 2001	16.4
Out 2001	18.3
Mai 2002	21.5
Out 2002 (1)	17.8
Mai 2003 (2)	15.6

Fonte: INDEC, <http://www.indec.mecon.ar/>, acesso em 15/05/2011.