Carolina Salles Abelha Futuro

The Politics of Displacement:
development-induced displacees in Brazil

Dissertação de Mestrado

Dissertation presented to the Programa de Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais of PUC-Rio in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Mestre em Política Internacional.

Advisor: Prof. James Matthew Davies

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To my parents, family and friends, for their kind support
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Abstract

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This dissertation examines the politics of the displacement of people in the context of the Belo Monte Complex project in the North of Brazil. Specifically, I investigate the politics of the displacement of riparian, small farmers and Indigenous populations in Belo Monte. In light of Jacques Rancière understanding of politics, I do so by looking at the 'wrongs' of displacement rather than to the alleged 'rights' belonging to subjects. Bringing this to the debate will reframe displacement as a matter of political exclusion, not a social or technical problem. Although it goes back to colonial times, forced migration is a rarely discussed topic in Brazil. The country has 1268 hydroelectric plants of some scale, among which 219 are hydroelectric dams. Building those dams requires, in almost every case, sacrificial people and places. As consequences, family ties are undone, ways of living extinguished, homes are killed. Literature on people displaced by development projects grounded on a 'rights based' approach has not been able to address the politics of displacement. The world's third largest dam in installed capacity brought with its 11,233 MW the very same old, foreseen and announced rights violations of previous projects. Over time, it is estimated that one million people have been put out from their homes because of hydroelectric dam projects and their migration to other areas, or their abandonment and impoverishment, have been treated as only one more example of social exclusion amidst the vast Brazilian portfolio of social problems. That might not help to address the causes of forced migration in these cases, though. Situated in the broader scope of modern world politics, in its ways to read and think the State, the implications of politics in the (re)production of the displaced condition are constitutive. This work argues, therefore, that Belo Monte displacees are the 'part with no-part' in Brazilian democracy. They are made 'supplementary people' by the wrongs of a development work but it is also through their resistance to those wrongs that they denounce the inequality in democracy. In resisting this partition and the space of neglect attributed to their existence, they do more than the assigned. By framing

displacement as a conflict over the production of space, then, the dissertation shows how people resist, intervene and contest the representations of their space. Displacees themselves resist to their supplementary status, creating alternative spaces of representation. Therefore, their practices of resistance make evident their political status and challenge democratic life to guarantee their 'part' in future cases alike. I conclude by bringing practical insights inspired by these theoretical critiques to forthcoming hydroelectric projects in Brazil; already announced and, so far, inevitable.

Keywords

Resumo

Esta dissertação examina a política de deslocamento de pessoas no contexto do projeto da Usina Hidrelétrica Belo Monte, região Norte do Brasil. Especificamente, eu investigo a política de deslocamento de ribeirinhos, pequenos agricultores e populações indígenas em Belo Monte. À luz do entendimento de 'política' de Jacques Rancière, faço minha análise olhando para os 'males' do deslocamento ao invés de para os 'direitos' que alegadamente pertencem aos atingidos. Ao trazer isto ao debate, proponho reformular 'deslocamento' como uma questão de exclusão política, não um problema de natureza técnica ou social. Embora remonte aos tempos coloniais, migração forçada raramente é um tópico discutido no Brasil. O país possui 1268 centrais elétricas de alguma escala, das quais 219 são hidrelétricas. Construir essas barragens exige, em quase todos os casos, pessoas e lugares sacrificiais. Em consequência, laços familiares são desfeitos, formas de vida extinguidas, lares são 'mortos'. A literatura sobre pessoas deslocadas por projetos de desenvolvimento a partir de uma abordagem baseada em direitos não conseguiu dar conta da política de deslocamento. A terceira maior barragem do mundo em capacidade instalada trouxe com seus 11.233 MW as mesmas violações de direitos, anunciadas por projetos anteriores. Ao longo do tempo, estima-se que um milhão de pessoas tenham sido expulsas de suas casas devido a projetos de barragens hidrelétricas e sua migração para outras áreas, ou seu abandono e empobrecimento, foram tratados como apenas mais um exemplo de exclusão social em meio ao portfólio brasileiro de problemas sociais. Isso, no entanto, pode não ajudar a abordar as causas da migração forçada nesses casos. Situado no âmbito mais amplo da política mundial moderna, em suas formas de ler e pensar o Estado, as implicações da política na (re)produção da condição de deslocado são constitutivas. Este trabalho argumenta, portanto, que os deslocados de Belo Monte são 'a parte sem-parte' na democracia brasileira. Eles são feitos 'povo suplementar' pelos danos de uma obra de desenvolvimento, mas é também através da sua resistência a esses danos que denunciam a desigualdade na

democracia. Ao resistir a essa partição e ao espaço de negligência atribuídos à sua existência, eles fazem mais do que o designado. Enquadrando deslocamento como um conflito sobre a produção do espaço, então, a dissertação sugere como as pessoas resistem, intervêm e contestam a representação de seu espaço. Deslocados resistem ao seu status suplementar criando espaços alternativos de representação. Suas práticas de resistência, portanto, evidenciam seu status político e desafiam a vida democrática a garantir sua 'parte' em casos futuros. Concluo trazendo insights práticos inspirados por essas críticas teóricas para os próximos projetos hidrelétricos no Brasil; já anunciados e, até agora, inevitáveis.

Palavras-chave

Migração forçada; Remoção forçada; Desenvolvimento; Deslocamento; Domicídio; (Des)Igualdade; Espaços de representação; Resistência.

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List of Abbreviations

AIDA – Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense

ANA – National Water Agency *(Agência Nacional de Águas)*

ANEEL – Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency *(Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica)*

APP – Permanent Preservation Areas

BNDES – National Bank for Economic and Social Development *(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social)*

CBDB – Brazilian Committee on Dams *(Comitê Brasileiro de Barragens)*

CESCR – UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

CIMI – Indigenous Missionary Council of Brazil *(Conselho Indigenista Missionário)*

CNDH – National Council for Human Rights (Conselho Nacional de Direitos Humanos)

COIAB – Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon *(Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira)*

DIDPs – Development-Induced Displaced People

DPU – Public Defender's Office *(Defensoria Pública da União)*

EIA – Environmental Impact Studies *(Estudos de Impacto Ambiental)*

FUNAI – National Indian Foundation *(Fundação Nacional do Índio)*

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

HPP – Hydroelectric Power Plant

IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Ibama – Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources *(Instituto Brasileiro de Meio Ambiente e Recursos Renováveis)*

ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICMBio – Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity *(Instituto Chico Mendes de Conservação da Biodiversidade)*

IDPs – Internally Displaced People

INPA – National Institute of Amazonian Research *(Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia)*

ISA – Socio-Environmental Institute *(Instituto Sócio-Ambiental)*

MAB – Movement of People Affected by Dams *(Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens)*

MESA – Madeira Energy S.A. *(Consórcio Madeira Energia S.A.)*

MPF – Federal Public Prosecutor's Office *(Ministério Público Federal)*

MPF/PA – Federal Public Prosecutor's Office of Pará state *(Ministério Público Federal do Pará)*

OAS – Organisation of American States

PAC – Growth Acceleration Program *(Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento)*

PBA – Basic Environmental Plan *(Plano Básico Ambiental)*

PBA-CI – Indigenous Component on the Basic Environmental Plan *(Plano Básico Ambiental – Componente Indígena)*

PCHs – Small Hydroelectric Plants *(Pequenas Centrais Hidrelétricas)*

PPP – Public-Private Partnerships

PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira

PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores

Resex – Extractive Reserves

RIMA – Environmental Impact Report *(Relatório de Impacto Ambiental)*

Rio-92 – United Nations Conference on the Environment

RUCs – Collective Urban Resettlements *(Reassentamentos Urbanos Coletivos)*

SDDH – Pará's Society for the Defense of Human Rights *(Sociedade Paraense de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos)*

SDG – Sustainable Development Goals

SPU – Union's Assets Department *(Secretaria de Patrimônio da União)*

TAUS – Statement of Authorisation for Sustainable Use *(Termo de Autorisação de Uso Sustentável)*

TIs – Indigenous Lands *(Terras Indígenas)*

UCs – Conservation Units *(Unidades de Conservação)*

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

Xingu PDRS – Plan for Sustainable Regional Development of the Xingu *(Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional Sustentável do Xingu)*

Arapujá. Nunca soube por que, nem donde vinha esse nome. Quando nasci, já era. Quando meu pai chegou por aqui, há mais de um século, também. Acho até que já nasceu Ilha do Arapujá.

[…]

Quando criança pensei que nunca ia morrer. Como toda criança. Os mais velhos riam e ensinavam: ninguém vive para sempre. Eles não me entendiam. Isso não valia para mim. Nunca mais falei no assunto, apenas, inventei, para fugir de tão negro determinismo, um vaticínio pessoal. Só meu que não podia ser compartilhado com ninguém:

– Nunca vou ficar velho e só vou morrer quando a Ilha do Arapujá acabar.

[…]

A nova beira do rio de Altamira, agora tem uma mureta que a modernidade chama, não sei por que, de cais. A rua da frente, das mangueiras, virou uma ampla "avenida". Gramados e jardins, por vezes até bem cuidados. E bares. E telões. E caixas de som do tamanho de prédios. Não há música. Apenas som. Se é bom ou ruim é irrelevante.

[…]

Debruço-me sobre o tal muro baixo que divide a modernosa "avenida" do que restou da beira do rio.

[…]

Não convém que índios, ribeirinhos e pescadores conspurquem, com seus andrajos, o lócus de lazer da nova elite. Seria no mínimo antiestético.

[…]

Creio que os índios, os ribeirinhos, os pescadores, enfim, os despossuídos, só se sentem em casa, quando atravessam a tal mureta e pisam a areia e a grama da beira do rio.

O Xingu é democrata.

Sinto um nó na garganta. Impotência. Vergonha.

[…]

Divago, sem angústia, sobre o destino da Ilha do Arapujá que um dia elegi irmã siamesa.

As águas subirão lentamente. Como se viu, o veredicto foi dado. Vai morrer. O diagnóstico foi de câncer linfático. Agressivo. Galopante. O mínimo que poderei fazer é sentar-lhe à cabeceira, como um acompanhante de moribundo.

Como não sei rezar, abrirei um livro e o lerei. Ora mudo, ora em voz alta. Prosa, ou verso. Prosa e verso. Mais verso do que prosa.

André Costa Nunes, *Xingu, Requiém para uma ilha*

1
Introduction

'Growth' has been world's religion for a long time. The Brazilian program to accelerate economic growth sees Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) as the apple of its eye. Hydroelectric power is taken to be a good option to produce energy to sustain growth since it is considered 'clean energy':

> Brazilian society is certain that it is necessary to ensure electricity to the country's growth and that this should be done by keeping our *clean* and renewable energy sources through hydroelectric plants.

Is Brazilian society certain of that?

> The federal government, in turn, has shown that this can be done by aggregating key benefits, such as actions that improve the quality of life of the local populations as well as urban and rural infrastructure, among others. (BRASIL, Federal Government, Acceleration of Growth Program (PAC) website[1]) [Translation mine.]

It is only seen as clean energy because the social, environmental and personal human costs of building a HPP are not internalised in the projects. If everything that has been mentioned in the following pages was taken into account — both monetarily and in terms of social justice — Belo Monte might had never come out of the paper. That is why it is 'cheap' to provide hydroelectric energy in Brazil, at least. Saying that Belo Monte's construction forwards the interest of the Brazilian society to produce clean energy is a green sell that those suffering its consequences refuse to buy.

The problem I analyse in this research is the problem of inequality of part-taking in the Brazil of Belo Monte. Hydroelectric energy requires sacrifice zones, producing sacrificial people and places. So, the optimisation of Brazilian society's life through growth is achieved at the expense of the non-optimisation of the lives of people forcibly evicted from their homes, their islands, their farms, and essentially their ways of life. The main hypothesis this research advances, then, is that displacees are the 'part with no-part' in the Brazil of Belo Monte. I show that the practices of the 'partition of the sensible', a concept of the French thinker Jacques Rancière, cannot actually count nor account for the entirety of the parts, always producing a supplement. That supplement is the part with no-part; both because it has no place in the part-taking but also because its place is of being the 'part taken'. Ultimately, practices of distribution of the sensible are practices of 'othering'. What the practices of partitioning the sensible do in the context of Belo Monte is to de-problematize and de-politicise the violences committed by Brazilian

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[1] Available at: www.pac.gov.br/noticia/96d1096a. Accessed in: 16 March 2016.

State and its partners against Brazilian citizens.

Displacement is not only a social exclusion, but a political one. That, however, can only be verified by framing displaced people as *subjects of wrongs* rather than *subjects of rights*. That is to say that when displacees present their demands as claims for equality they are immediately perceived as people who have been excluded from taking part among the equals, i.e., who have been 'othered'. These *verifications of equality* make evident the wrong within the social order, what will be treated as *tort*. The social is presented as naturally ordered in the partition of the sensible, which accounts for the ways to produce order and govern life by distributing functions, places, ways of being. The event of identifying victims of the tort and those who perpetrate the tort is the essence of *politics*. Politics has, therefore, a negative ontology once it is a *disruptive* force of the natural, positive, ontology of the social order. Political practices are, hence, practices of supplementarity. I have drawn my conception of *politics* and of *the political* from Rancière's insights. This is the theoretical framework that I use to understand the problem posed by the displacement of people by Belo Monte, in the unequal experiences of Brazilian citizens under a 'democratic' government and through a development project.

In order to present displacees as the part with no-part in the Brazil of Belo Monte, I begin the research by bringing a more detailed description of the wrongs in this development project, from which to ground the political claims of displacees. Why these wrongs happen inside an allegedly democratic regime is what I discuss next. I analyse how the partition of the sensible (or *distribution of the sensible*, as it may also appear), done through systems of representations, produces these torts. The underlying logics of this distribution of places, roles and ways of being is the separation between the *social* and the *political*. This separation substantiates the representations of the displaced and, therefore, serve as a platform from which to identify the torts and supplement the community with parts that have not been counted nor accounted for. The efforts of supplementarity, of *dissensus*, are debated through the experiences of displaced people with regard to *space*, particularly the space of the *home*. By thinking dissensus as a conflict over the production of space, I read displacees as political agents once the political is a form of *aesthetics*, in that it produces a rearrangement of social reality for a renewed perception of bodies and voices that were neither seen nor heard before.

The *politics of displacement*, as I read it, holds a twofold dislocation: the forced and arbitrary displacement of the body, identifying a tort, and the event of resisting to the representation of this body as a body worthy of being dislocated,

the displacement of a representation. This leads me to conclude that this multiplicity of small displacements can and should be anchored in *inscriptions*, which can cut across different arrangements of the sensible. It might be true that we do not live in what the common sense believes to be 'democracies'. We live in oligarchic rules of law, in systems that give the strongest minority the power to govern without disturbances; at least from the perspective of the events in Belo Monte. *Democracy* resides fundamentally in a constant and conflicting expansion. It is not a finished state, nor a finished state of affairs. It is not reduced to the design of institutions, or governability, or party play, but it comes from below, in the insolent effort of the people to invade the space that was destined to the 'superiors'. The *disruption of the sensible* is the political and democratic moment and movement that the displacees in Belo Monte enact when they flee the spaces, places and roles attributed to them. Internally displaced people's (IDPs) struggle is not behind the political, it is the political.

<div align="center">***</div>

What follows now is a general statement of the wrongs of development in Belo Monte as displacement of people and its consequences, which introduces the contents that will be described ahead in more details. Next, I present my considerations in regard to the structure of the research and methods.

1.1
The Wrongs of Development in Belo Monte

On February 17th, 2016, five years after the construction began, Belo Monte tested its first turbine. From 22,000 to 28,000 workers, from an initial cost of R$6 billion to a total cost (so far) of R$33 billion, the third largest dam in installed capacity in the world, only behind Three Gorges Dam (China) and Itaipu Dam (Brazil-Paraguay), *Belo Monte Hydroelectric Complex* is deluged with imprecisions. Expected to flood 516 km^2 of both rural and urban lands[2], it actually ended up flooding an area the size of the city of Chicago, i.e., 606,1 km^2 in the Brazilian state of Pará (Brazilian Amazon)[3]. The dam has diverted more than 100km of the Xingu River from its natural course, of what is known as the 'Xingu Big Bend' (the *Volta Grande do Xingu* in Portuguese). The construction of the hydroelectric power plant

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[2] Source: <http://www.mme.gov.br/web/guest/destaques-do-setor-de-energia/belo-monte>

[3] Source: *Belo Monte: After the Flood*, a documentary film directed by award-winning environmental documentarian Todd Southgate, and produced in collaboration between International Rivers, Amazon Watch and Cultures of Resistance, 2016.

(HPP) has been granted, in all its instances except issuing environmental permits, to a private consortium which operates for profit. This grant includes the responsibility for the impact on nearby cities, demanding the consortium put together under the name of *Norte Energia S.A.* to take on activities previously carried out by the state, such as building schools, settlements for the affected, sanitation infrastructure, hospitals and other works related to the effects of both the displacement of populations and the mass migration of thousands of workers needed to take forward this pharaonic project.

According to the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB), one of the oldest and most active social movements against the construction of dams in Brazil, 40 thousand people have suffered the impacts of Belo Monte HPP works, and at least eight thousand families have been displaced from their homes[4]. A great part of this number, more than half of it, has not received any kind of compensation for their losses. Curiously, about 203 thousand animals have been removed from their natural habitats, of which 190 thousand (93,7%) have been relocated to some area, according to *Norte Energia S.A.*[5] The loss of flora and of the still (and maybe forever) unknown fauna, though, is incalculable. The many controversies which surrounded the dam since its first inventory studies conducted during the 1970s, when Brazil was under a military dictatorship, and the increasing pressure from Indigenous communities led the World Bank Group to suspend funding for the project back in 1989[6]. So, since then, the government had to carry the project on its own. In 2010, The Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) granted Belo Monte's prior license in exchange for a robust package of mitigation and compensation measures, known as *socio-environmental conditionings* for the plant's viability.

Among the compensatory measures envisaged, there were 'anticipatory actions' for health, education and basic sanitation, which, according to official discourses, should prepare the region to receive the works, preventing and minimising the main impacts on these public services, due to the population increase. It was estimated that approximately 74,000 people would be attracted by the project in a time lapse of only five years. That should almost double the population of the region (which, according to the 2010 Census, was of about 99

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[4] Source: http://www.mabnacional.org.br/noticia/obras-belo-monte-s-suspensas. Accessed in: 14 January 2016.

[5] Source: http://norteenergiasa.com.br/site/2015/08/07/belo-monte-devolve-190-mil-animais-silvestres-a-natureza/. Accessed in: 14 January 2016.

[6] Source: *Belo Monte: After the Flood*, Todd Southgate (dir.), 2016.

thousand inhabitants)[7]. The construction of the HPP began in February 2011, with the installation of construction sites, despite a significant delay in the implementation schedule of those anticipatory actions. Ibama acknowledged, in analysis, that the request for issuance of an installation license was made when there were still pending issues, mainly because of the 'non-implementation of anticipatory programs aiming to prepare the region, notably municipal administrations, to receive the enterprise'[8].

These delays in the implementation of health, education, and sanitation infrastructure, as well as in the pace of land regularisation and protection actions for affected Indigenous Lands (TIs) and Conservation Units (UCs), persists to this date, more than five years after the granting of the preliminary license. According to Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA), the work was installed at the same time as the main impacts that should have been avoided by anticipatory actions were gradually realised: the overload of public equipment, the environmental degradation of the region, the deterioration of the quality of life of the local populations and the loss of natural resources essential to the maintenance of Indigenous peoples and traditional communities' ways of life in the Xingu region[9]. As for the resettlement of the rural and urban population quickly and compulsorily evicted from their homes — whether due to the construction of the plant's structures or due to the future filling of the reservoir — it has been a traumatic and disorderly process for the more than eight thousand families considered 'affected' by the enterprise (ISA, 2015, p. 12).

Additionally, the urban reallocation program has been pointed both by ISA and by Federal Public Prosecutor's Office of Pará state (MPF/PA) as disorganised, inadequate and not transparent. For more than two years, almost 3,000 families already live in the new settlements (called Collective Urban Resettlements, or RUCs), without adequate public services, including transportation, health, sanitation and education. Many more, on the other hand, are still waiting for relocation due to what apparently has been a process undersized by the entrepreneur, which initially registered 5,141 occupations considered as affected, but only hired 4,100 houses for construction. Moreover, it is not rare to read or

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[7] Source: ISA, *Belo Monte Dossier: there are no conditions for the Operation License*, 2015, p. 8.

[8] Brasil, Ministry of Environment, Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources. Technical Advice n° 52/2011. Reference: Analysis of the application for the Installation License of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, process n° 02001.001848/2006-75. Brasília, 23 May 2011, p. 25. Available at: https://www.socioambiental.org/sites/blog.socioambiental.org/files/nsa/arquivos/3_parecer_ibama.pdf. Accessed in: 17 January 2017.

[9] Source: ISA, *Belo Monte Dossier: there are no conditions for the Operation License*, 2015, p. 9.

listen testimonies of people denouncing that they have never even been registered.

The affected families who accepted monetary indemnities — to a large extent, due to induction and lack of clarification about the options they would be entitled to during the negotiations — received insufficient amounts for the acquisition of other urban properties, largely because of the vertiginous real estate speculation provoked by the plant but in part because the compensations took a patrimonialist perspective and, therefore, were really low. On top of that are the extremely asymmetric negotiations between the affected and the company, which took place without the minimal legal assistance of public institutions. Inexplicably, the Public Defender's Office closed its doors in the second half of 2014, during the peak of the works. In the wake of a public hearing on urban resettlement convened by the MPF/PA in November 2014, the Public Defender's Office (DPU) mobilised an itinerant group of defenders to work in Altamira, seeking to at least partially repair the injustices and violations committed during the process (ISA, 2015, p. 12).

In a worst situation, in the rural area, the rights of small farmers and riparians directly affected (to be resettled under conditions equal or similar to those in which they used to live) were not observed. Collective Rural Resettlement, although foreseen in the Basic Environmental Plan (PBA) — a document which contains the specifics of the mitigating and compensatory measures to be adopted by the entrepreneur to minimise environmental and social impacts — and formally presented as an option for families who had to choose a form of compensation, was not deployed. This process, which took place more than four years ago with the former inhabitants of the HPP installation sites, has been repeated, as badly as or more seriously than, with the residents of the Xingu islands or banks. They are traditional populations which live mostly from fishing. Submitted to disinformation, embarrassment and pressure, these populations have been led to accept low indemnities. Not accepting the indemnities at all would mean litigating against a large company, without access to free legal assistance once there is no Public Defender fixed in the region and the itinerant group was only assisting urban cases. The other option — or the only real one as MPF/PA suggests[10] — was to accept the transfer to a resettlement that, besides being located miles from the Xingu River, had not even have begun to be actually constructed.

Other riparians, who relied on the use of the river for their physical and cultural subsistence, were ignored in the licensing process. Although, during public

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[10] MPF/PA, Inter-Institutional Inspection Report, 2015, Verifications n° 20 and n° 21, pp. 23-24.

hearings prior to the undertaking's licensing, it was requested the realisation of a detailed analysis of the socioenvironmental impacts related to the riverine populations that lived in the surroundings of Altamira and to the communities that lived in the Extractive Reserves (Resex) of Terra do Meio, nothing was done. ISA sustains that the absence of appropriate diagnosis has left no definition of measures to mitigate and compensate the damages suffered by these people during the building of the HPP (2015, p. 15). Since the State trusted to the consortium the supervision over its own work, official reports issued by Norte Energia S.A. usually do not take into account the demands of many who suffered the actual (and side) effects of a massive deviation of the Xingu River. Beyond the displacement of the 'home', Belo Monte was able to displace, to dislocate, to detach the live actually lived from the life described in the official documents. Life was abstracted as a concept. It was conceived as something that could be rebuild somewhere else by its 'resilient' bearers. But there is more.

Fishing communities, in its turn, complain of numerous negative impacts of the works over the river, which directly interfere with fishing. The hundreds of explosions of dynamite and the lights of the powerful nigh time spotlights in the construction sites led to the de-characterisation or physical destruction of places previously abundant in fish, causing even, according to reports of fisherwomen and men of the region, the disappearance of certain species (ISA, 2015, p. 15). Besides, there has also been an increase in the conflicts caused by the dispute over the remaining fishing areas outside the protected areas and the TIs in the region; sometimes even within these protected areas, restricted to Indigenous access only and/or complete preservation. ISA also points out that the consumption of chelonians, an important food alternative throughout the Volta Grande, was also threatened due to problems in ecological management activities and the almost complete noncompliance with environmental control conditionings against predatory hunting in the main turtle nesting area on the Amazon basin, the Tabuleiro do Embaubal (2015, p. 15).

The ISA Dossier on Belo Monte says that data demonstrates the ongoing conversion of riparian populations into exclusively urban or farming populations, due to the absence of real options to ensure its maintenance on the river banks. According to Norte Energia S.A. data from January 2015, of the 1,798 families that have already opted for one of the compensation proposals, only 28 (1.5%) chose the supposed alternative of collective rural resettlement (perhaps because that was not a feasible option?). Another 1,358 families (75%) opted for cash indemnities, which do not allow the purchase of the expensive lands on the banks of the river.

The option for letter of credit, or assisted reallocation, contemplated 379 families (21%), but this implies the search of a land or lot by the affected her/himself, for later purchase of the area by Norte Energia S.A. This is impracticable — one could say perverse — for populations mainly illiterate in a context of poor access to information and land tenure. Another 33 families (1.8%) opted for individual resettlement, in areas also without access to the river[11]. Along with the river, riparians lost an essential element for defining their selves, a thing that theorists call 'subjectification', and that they know as 'being myself'.

As for the TIs and UCs of the affected area, they are under heavy pressure from illegal logging. This is no new problem. But after Belo Monte it became more pressing, once the installation of the plant occurred in the absence of effective control measures. ISA highlights that the exponential rise of these indexes was due to the insufficiency of environmental enforcement actions in the region, for which the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) and Ibama are the entitled entities. In addition, 'the proportionally null reuse of the wood extracted from inside the construction sites led the entrepreneur to buy thousands of cubic meters of wood from the regional market, reinforcing this pressure' (2015, p. 13). The mitigation and compensation measures for Indigenous peoples, therefore, were far from attended. Drawn by FUNAI, they consisted of 31 conditionings, which were responsibilities of the entrepreneur and the public power. It also included a 35-year Indigenous Component Basic Environmental Plan (PBA-CI). A good part of these actions remains only on the documents.

By April last year, virtually half of Indigenous conditionings had not been attended or are still presented pendency. The full implementation of the PBA-CI, according to ISA (2015, p. 14), began more than two years late in relation to the start-up of the plant. According to Norte Energia S.A., R$ 212 million have already been spent with Indigenous peoples. However, instead of being invested in a structured way, in the agreed mitigations and compensations of impacts, these resources were mainly used to supply material goods. Up to March 2015, 578 boat engines, 322 boats and motorboats, 2.1 million litres of gasoline, and other goods were purchased, consolidating an unacceptable relationship of patronage between businessmen and Indigenous peoples (ISA, 2015, p. 14). The funds were distributed over two years (from October 2011 to September 2013), in the form of a kind of 'allowance' in the amount of R$ 30 thousand per month per village. In this

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[11] Data from: NORTE ENERGIA S.A., 7th Consolidated Final Report of the PBA Course and of the Conditionings' Compliance, January 2015, 4.1.2. Indemnification and Acquisition of Lands and Improvements Project, p. 9 cited in ISA, 2015, p. 13

way, the entrepreneur and the state were able to temporarily control the processes of Indigenous organisation and resistance, leaving a legacy of social disruption and the weakening of food production systems in villages, putting at risk the health, food security and autonomy of these peoples.

This way, in Belo Monte context, monetary compensations, called 'Emergency Plan', were strategic to silence the only ones who could actually have voice and visibility, the Indigenous peoples. Today, and at the time, social movements cannot come close to construction sites due to a judicial order. At the time of building Belo Monte Complex, the Indigenous emerged as perhaps the only voice that was still able to be heard and which had some possibility of interference, since any non-Indigenous could receive an arrest warrant. The Emergency Plan was then a way to silence that voice. According to Thais Santi, the only Federal Public Prosecutor who remained in the region, at every moment Indigenous people came to speak against Belo Monte, with occupation of a site, for example, this organisation was very quickly de-constituted by the practice of offering to the leaderships a series of benefits and consumer goods. The modern 'little mirrors'. Santi gives an example of this: there was an occupation where the fisherwomen and men spent 40 days by the river, in front of a construction site, under the rain, and did not have an answer. That suffering went unnoticed. When suddenly the Indigenous decided to support the claims of the fisherwomen and men, bringing their demands as well, from one day to the next the press appeared[12].

So, in sum, in the five years following the issuance of the preliminary license, few actions have been taken to prevent or reduce the impacts on Indigenous peoples. In the vast majority of cases, such actions were only carried out after protests, interventions of the MPF or judicial decisions. Norte Energia S.A. has not only failed to comply with FUNAI conditions, but also has been questioning its obligation after the installation license to the HPP has been issued. In order for the entrepreneur to recognise the obligation to carry out some mitigation actions, judicial determinations were necessary.

From what has been done by the company, the R$ 485 million invested in the installation of pipelines and in the sewage and water treatment plant still do not guarantee the operation of basic sanitation in the city of Altamira in 2015. Residents continue to use the old system of pits and wells, as none was connected

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[12] Thaís Santi, interviewed by Eliane Brum, Belo Monte: the anatomy of an ethnocide, El País, December 1st, 2014. Available at: https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2014/12/01/opinion/1417437633_930086.html. Accessed in: 14 January 2016.

to the system built by Norte Energia S.A. The R$ 115 million invested in public security were not enough to make Altamira a safer city. Between 2011 and 2014, the number of murders per year jumped from 48 to 86 (an increase of approximately 80%), while the municipality's population was estimated to have grown from approximately 100,000 to around 150,000 (an increase of 50%). Homicides, traffic accidents, cases of violence against women and teenagers, thefts and robberies have almost doubled since the plant began to be constructed in 2011. With regard to Indigenous peoples, in the last five years, the situation of the Indigenous Land (TI) Cachoeira Seca (inhabited by the Arara people and where, before the beginning of the work, there were already non-Indigenous occupations and illegal activities) only worsened. Only in 2014, a volume of wood equivalent to R$ 200 million was looted from this TI, evidencing the extreme level of vulnerability to which the peoples of the region are being exposed (ISA, 2015, p. 5).

For all that has been said, the main work of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), installed in a region with historical absence from the state, with Indigenous peoples made vulnerable due to the opening of roads and colonies along the years, Belo Monte remains, more than five years after the auction for construction and operation of the plant, a symbol of socio-environmental default and disrespect to affected populations. It was known from the beginning that Belo Monte would be settled in a world of agrarian conflicts, in the region where Sister Dorothy Mae Stang was murdered, where the social leader Dema was murdered, where the syndicalist Brasília was murdered, where Indigenous lands were and still are systematically sacked by loggers and *grileiros*[13], among other invaders. Yet, Norte Energia S.A., a consortium capable of rising the third largest hydroelectric power plant in the world, has not been able to build a single public hospital in Altamira in three years, in order to meet the demand generated at the peak of construction. The negligence and irresponsibility of the alliance between the state oligarchies and the entrepreneurial ones has led to many consequences. Some consequences were deadly.

'It is important to remember their names in such a short life' Eliane Brum, a

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[13] 'Land thievery is committed through corruption, strong-arm tactics, and fraudulent titles and is so widespread that Brazilians have a name for it: *grilagem*, from the Portuguese word *grilo*, or cricket. *Grileiros*, the practitioners, have been known to age phony land titles in a drawer full of hungry crickets. When Brazil's agrarian reform agency, Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA), reviewed Amazonian land ownership records over the past three years, it voided more than 62,000 claims that appeared to be fraudulent.' Source: http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2007/01/amazon-rain-forest/wallace-text. Accessed in: 5 September 2017.

journalist dedicated to the cause of displacees in Belo Monte, said. Kinai Parakanã, 1 year; Irey Xikrin, seven months; Kropiti Xikrin, 11 months; and Kokoprekti Xikrin, 1 month and 22 days, are the four Indigenous children who died due to the flu that hit their villages. In a document dated May 1st, 2016, the Indigenous Special Sanitation District of Altamira reported the severity of the outbreak of influenza-like illness in the villages, especially for children up to five years of age and the lack of structure to combat the threat to Indigenous health. It also shows that the picture worsened after the Indigenous Day celebrations in Altamira, when villages that had not yet been hit were contaminated after the return of the Indigenous people of the city. That week, Norte Energia S.A. sponsored the First Asurini and Araweté Indigenous Culture Festival, attended by dozens of people of these ethnic groups. Since the hospital that was part of the conditionings of the HPP is ready but had not been inaugurated or equipped yet, there was no possibility of treatment for illnesses which were now circulating in more areas. More, the restructuring of Indigenous health, contemplated in the conditionings, with stations and trained teams in the villages (so that the Indians do not need to go to the city in search of care) was not completed (Brum, 2016)[14].

There are many other consequences of all the wrongs of Belo Monte that could be discussed at length. They should be mentioned, though not all of them might be written here: a 127% increase in child malnutrition in Indigenous villages; overload in Altamira city public health services; decline in education quality indexes in the region; worsening of water quality by massive sewage disposal in the Xingu; uncontrolled increase in deforestation and illegal logging; ethnocide ('cultural genocide') of Indigenous and traditional peoples; destruction of traditional fishing activity; disruption of family income sources; increase in the price of the basic basket of the region; loss of purchasing power of land; disruption of affective communities and family ties; production of a mass of unemployed people who worked on the construction of the HPP but were not absorbed after its completion; increase in crimes, violence, slave-like labour, child labour and sexual exploration of teenagers in Altamira region; and others (ISA, 2015; MPF/PA, 2015; Brum, 2016[15]).

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[14] BRUM, Eliane. Dilma compôs seu réquiem em Belo Monte. El País, Coluna Opinião, 10 May 2016. Available at: https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/05/09/opinion/1462804348_582272.html. Accessed in: 17 February 2017.

[15] *Idem*.

1.2
Research Design and Methods

The *objective* of my research is to look at development-induced displacement beyond an obvious cruelty. Belo Monte is an interesting case to provide a provocative examination of what we conceive as *politics* in the context of a development project, linking it to considerations on *democracy* and *equality*. Important problems for International Relations arise when a critical analysis of these concepts, practices and beliefs displaces regular understandings of matters like *development* and *sovereignty*. For the purposes of this work, I will be talking mostly about *Indigenous, small farmers and riparian peoples of the Xingu region*. I, however, acknowledge that there are other people affected by the dams and its impacts and I do not deny their existence or the possibly equally pernicious consequences over them; for example, the approximately 36 thousand workers who migrated both to the region where the dam was being built and to the nearby cities (most of them with their families)[16]. To limit the scope of this research, nonetheless, I will address these groups of people because I am interested in a specific experience of part-taking they share, the forced evictions.

These forced evictions have been carried out under a developmental paradigm. Development is a way of sorting groups of people, defined by their containment in the national territorial space, into hierarchical relations among States and also inside them. Rainforest regions, at least in South American experiences, present 'in common' the relative tendency to be 'historically forgotten and isolated' for a long time by their States. In the 1980s, yet, they became a 'new frontier for development' as they were '(re)discovered' and seen as unexplored spaces over which unfold macro-projects — development ones among them — and new forms of capital accumulation[17] (Escobar, 2003). The ones abused and excluded under this current extractive economy are often presented by studies as 'socially excluded' and the efforts to see them as political agents are very much restricted to a *post-crisis* moment. This does not actually leave much room for action to impede projects like Belo Monte, mostly because displacement is seen as a technocratic problem.

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[16] Source: http://norteenergiasa.com.br/site/2016/07/22/nota-de-esclarecimento-sobre-belo-monte-no-profissao- reporter/

[17] For more on how State land grab for development programs such as the building of hydroelectric power complexes can be configured as a new accumulation by dispossession, see: SASSEN, Saskia. A Savage Sorting of Winners and Losers: contemporary versions of primitive accumulation. Globalizations, vol. 7, n° 1-2, pp. 23-50, 2010.

My research is justified, then, by the fact that reading development-induced displacement as a social/technical problem contributes to the reproduction of the displaced condition, because it frames displacees as subjects of rights, which is the representation that has produced them as displaced in first place. That being said, I have chosen to refer to the people forcibly evicted from their homes/lands by the Belo Monte HPP project as *development-induced displaced people (DIDPs)* both because (a) it is the term internationally used to refer to people that has been displaced under the justification of a development action from the State, and because (b) I want precisely to dialogue with this reading of the problem, that is, with the representation of people in this specific way of distributing the sensible. It would not have been as useful to my point as speaking about them as DIDPs if I had chosen to frame Belo Monte as a conflict-induced displacement or a disaster-induced displacement, though these elements (conflict and disaster) are also present in the multiple torts and wrongs done against those people. Lastly, before presenting the structure of my chapters and method, I would like to stress that whenever I refer to Amazonia, I mean the Brazilian Amazon. Conversely, when 'the Amazon' is referred to, it is meant to account for the area of the Amazon biome that covers most of the Amazon basin of South America.

As for the chapters' structure, Chapter Two brings a concrete-empirical description from which I ground the political claims of displacees. It is a more detailed account of the displacement of people by Belo Monte project from which I show the wrongs that have been done and that have provoked them to make political speech. It begins by presenting the history of Belo Monte Complex project, from the context in which it was conceived to the moment of its implementation. Then, it addresses who are the people that have been displaced by the dam and the moment of displacement itself, when the unaccounted-for are forcibly removed. The last part of this second chapter brings concrete-empirical descriptions of practices of resistance that will be framed as practices of supplementarity to the representations of displaced people.

Following it, Chapter Three brings my first analysis and is dedicated to think about the potent tools on offer that allow the powerful to discount [or miscount] the lives of the less powerful (Klein, 2016). That is, it looks for the representations of the displaced to explain why the sensible has been partitioned in the ways it has; or, why they have been displaced in the first place. I bring a literature overview to make the case that displacees are usually represented as subjects of rights, but these representations miss precisely the 'count of the (un)accounted for'. After reviewing our state of understanding the development-induced displacement

problem, I frame it as a problem of inequality in part-taking. To that, I analyse how the representations of the displaced, done in terms of public and private, of (sustainable) development, of human rights and of the categories of the IDP and the refugee, are based on the arbitrary separation of the social and the political. This separation, as mentioned before, is the basis of the logic of the distribution of the sensible. The end of this chapter, then, dislocates the representation of Belo Monte displacees from subjects of rights to subjects of wrongs, from which political action grounds its dissensual activities.

So, after showing how the different violences done to them make evident their political status with the theoretical support from Jacques Rancière in Chapter Three, I go on to the second analysis, where I think about displacement as conflict over the production of space. With theoretical supports from Henri Lefebvre, Chapter Four shows how *space* is a double critical category to displacement: both as a critical concept that can be disputed from corporealised experiences (the lived space), and consequently as a means through which politics creates its new *stages of interlocution*. The question this chapter articulates is not *if* internally displaced people are, ought to be configured, or must be empowered as political agents but *how* are they political. I argue that a good way to see their polemic scenes is to look at the space of the *home* that has been made private or abstracted in the *juridification of the social* and in discourses of *resilience/sustainability*; such an important space to everyone, especially to the ones who lost it. I conclude this chapter by pointing to *domicides* as a consequence of what the abstractions of the space of displacees and the miscalculation of law can lead to.

The fifth and last chapter will bring the final remarks on my political reading of displacement through which I have argued that Belo Monte displacees do not take part on (solely) a social exclusion, but that they are the supplementary part that must be annulled once they are subjects of wrongs who can disrupt the natural ontology of social order in a moment. From what I have debated in the research, I have identified two other subjects, which are intertwined, that might be further investigated. The first one is the problematization of categories. Once categories are ways of partitioning the sensible, they are also strategic essentialisms. The absence of the 'category' of the displaced before Brazilian law has much contributed both to its invisibilisation and to the difficulty of attributing responsibilities towards the violation of their rights. Attached to that, there is the creation of what Rancière has called *inscriptions*, that is, founding texts in law to which vulnerable people can recur to seeking for protection. Following Aradau and Huysmans, I suggest that both actions and inscriptions are fundamental tools for

the mob to be seen as political by means and equal by principle.

Regarding methods, Huysmans & Aradau (2014) suggest that they are practices for the creation of worlds, of identities and of fragile and continually modified things. It is interesting to think about this capability of methods 'to enact' previously neglected realities — or the very material and urgent realities of 'the parts with no-part' in Rancière's phrasing. The 'discipline of method' that has shaped Belo Monte HPP project articulated only causal relationships and technicalities of the feasibility studies. Once methods are thought — and performed — from another 'kind of discipline', a new world of complex relationships arise between human-environment, between communities and physical spaces that are more than abstracted spaces: they are continuities and possibilities of existence. Methods, therefore, are capable of more than providing a means for producing reliable knowledge: methods are capable of producing realities by excluding some and neglecting others (2014, p. 605). Or, conversely, by hearing some realities as meaningfully spoken when they have been understood by State and its agents as no more than 'groans and cries'.

For Rancière, the theoretical is the articulation, in theory, of the thoughts and experiences of social actors (Deranty, 2003). More, once in his theoretical intuition only equality can acknowledge inequality, and not the other way around, the role of the philosopher is not to give voice to the silent aspirations of the dominated. If all people are equally intelligent, Rancière did not believe in the division of labour that separates the intellectual's science from ordinary experience, since this would be nothing more than an ideological fallacy which perpetuates the relations of domination. This means that my analysis of domination and exclusion, in order to be able to see the development refugees as political agents, cannot be carried out from above or behind the back of the exploited. Both as a political commitment and for methodological coherence, my analysis must be but carried out in the exploited's own words and actions (Deranty, 2003). The methodological consequence which stems from this commitment to equality, then, is to add a voice to the vulnerable instead of interpret them, it is to help them to resonate, to make them circulate (Deranty, 2003). This explains why I have adopted the method of 'storytelling': the simple recounting of the dominated experiences stated in interviews, in front of documentary cameras, in their own reports or testimonies.

This research is made to talk about people. Not by people, but about them. I have always missed 'people' in international relations theories. We study systems, hierarchies, hegemonies, power scales, structures, post structures, and

even practices of resistance, but what about us, humans, where are we? For that reason, the following pages will be cut at all times by speeches, interviews, cries, thoughts and words articulated by those to whom Belo Monte made mute. It is not me who made them to speak. They have already manifested, they have created spaces of representations for themselves. They have even done so in languages other than the Portuguese; something that certainly has no-part in Brazilian society of meaningful speakers, let alone in development thinking and practice. Rist (2008), discussing the 'invention' of the notions of development, asked who would oppose to such a perfect plan; 'you do not argue about the obvious' (2008, p. 77). If development is synonymous with growth, and is said to produce the nation's well-being and better living conditions for children, how to question it?

Raimunda Gomes da Silva, a former resident of the Barriguda Island, has questioned it. 'Nothing against the dam. [After all] it is development. But, if it is development, why swallow the others?' (Raimunda, MPF/PA, 2015, p. 41) [Translation mine]. With Raimunda's word, we move to the second chapter, which brings (almost all) the reasons to argue about the obvious.

2
'Belo Monster' Hydroelectric Power Plant Project

If you ever tasted it, pacu is a delicious freshwater fish. With its thick and tender flesh, it swims up the river to spawn — a marvellous nature's event named *piracema*. I tasted it for the first time in January 2016, when in Maranhão, a state in the North portion of Brazil. It was a wonderful one-time experience. About 1,300 km from there, however, people like Mrs. Fátima used to have pacu as a daily meal. "Fishing… for these days, I said 'Raimundo, do you know what I feel like eating?' 'Açaí?', he asked me. 'No, pacu' I said. Because every afternoon [it was like this]… 'what are we going to eat for dinner?' 'Catch a pacu [we used to reply]'."[18] Mrs. Fátima, like many fisherwomen and men in the Xingu region after Belo Monte Dam was built, can no longer catch the pacu once so easily available by walking a few meters towards the river, or can only do it way less frequently. Some yet are not even in a walkable distance from the Xingu, or actually from any river, anymore.

The lack of one fish in a few hundreds of families' daily baskets is a case for a political research because it exposes the wrongs within a social order, where the different violences done to people like Mr. Fátima make evident their political status. In the major picture, then, pacu's heartfelt absence can show a larger controversy. I could have started this work, certainly, with many other everyday events and examples of disruptions caused by the Belo Monte Dam, but *fishes* are iconic to the purposes of this chapter. The following pages are dedicated to place Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant within the broader national political context of the project and the narrower context of its building process. For such, I would like to start with former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's statement about a particular family of fish like pacu, the bagre (or catfish, in English). On 19 April 2007, during an Economic Council meeting, the then president Lula said that the country's energetic demands could not be compromised because of a catfish: 'Now it cannot be done because of the catfish. They dumped the catfish in the president's lap. Why should I care?'[19], he said with contempt.

Lula complained about the delay in issuing the environmental licenses for the Madeira River hydroelectric plants (an undertaking previous to Belo Monte, but

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[18] These lines were addressed to the Inspection Group #2 and are reported in the Inter-Institutional Inspection Report, 2015, pp. 54-55.

[19] The statement is in the piece written by the journalist Luciana Nunes Leal, for the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo*, published on April 20, 2007.

equally part of the Growth Acceleration Program). To be more precise, the former president objected to Ibama's (the licensing authority) opinion of the 21st of March, same year, which recommended the denial of that particular license. The Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) argued that the Madeira River HPPs would endanger this family of fishes, which has the most consumed species in the basic basket of the population that inhabits the entire region. After, however, significant pressure from both Federal Government and private corporations and, most importantly, after two changes in the entity's presidency, the licenses were issued by Ibama in July 2007. Conveniently before that, the institute was dismembered into two: ICMBio (Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity) which would take care of protected areas, and Ibama which would deal with the remaining duties of the former Ibama, including the licensing of infrastructure projects.

The EIA (Environmental Impact Studies) urged the infrastructure works to allow the passage of sediments, eggs, larvae and young fishes through turbines and water spillways, along with 32 other conditions. Also, from the date of signature of the concession agreement, it required the sponsors of the works to carry out, within a maximum of two months, the monitoring of the drift of eggs, larvae and young fishes of large Catfishes, such as dourada, piramutaba and babão (slobbering catfish, in English), as well as tambaqui in order to evaluate mortality rates. Suffice to say, by December 2008 Ibama applied Madeira Energy S.A. (MESA, the consortium operating the works) a R$7,7 millions fine for the death of 11 tons of fish during the construction of the HPP Santo Antônio, in Rondônia, Brazil. At that time, Ibama's superintendent in the state, Cesar Guimarães, accused the company, which had Odebrecht and Furnas Centrais Elétricas as its partners (both under investigation in Operation Carwash for corruption), of 'malpractice' and 'negligence'.[20] The impact over daily lives of hundreds of people who lived in the region is said to be 'not estimated'. There is simply no data.

Certainly, the clash between politicians and environmentalists is far from being a Brazilian uniqueness — the same way that political appropriation (or neglect) of technical studies on the environment is widespread even among the major powers; and Donald Trump might have become an iconic example while in campaign, during his mandate withdrawing from Paris Agreement and the rest is yet to be seen. What is distinctive in Brazilian model of governmentality, but not yet exclusive, and ought to be explored in this dissertation is a systematic adoption

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[20] Reported by Mônica Tavares (journalist) for *Jornal O Globo*, on December 23, 2008.

of illiberal and anti-democratic measures by a self-defined liberal administration, against the same 'category' of citizens — among them, many of its voters. This is to say that Madeira River HPPs were not the first or the last of 'development works' to enact malpractice and negligence. Or to impede the reproduction of the pacu and of hundreds of ways of life. As a matter of fact, a few years after the controversial Madeira River HPPs have been built, a larger monster took over another Amazonian river: Belo Monte HPP. 'Belo Monster', as it is known among the local population and the critics (myself included), has a particularly interesting (and terrible) history, as it is told below.

Figure 1. Location of the Madeira River HPPs, Santo Antônio and Jirau, and of the Belo Monte HPP Complex, in Pará state, North Region of Brazil.

Source: The Economist

2.1
The Project: the history of Belo Monte Complex

Forty-one years after the beginning of the Hydrographic Inventory Studies of the Xingu River Basin (1975) the first turbine of Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant was turned on. During these four decades, a lot has changed in Brazil: from dictatorship to (re)democratisation, from rightists to leftist's governments.

Developmentalism, however, remained to be the order of the day especially after 2000 when the country (along with Russia, India and China, later also South Africa) was pointed as an 'emerging power' by Jim O'Neal[21], head of the Economic Research team of the financial group Goldman Sachs — what came to be known as the promise BRICS. In the beginning of the new millennium, BRICS became a sort of 'brand' for governments trying to attract foreign investment and, as any commodified concept, it had to be sold. The vigour of major infrastructure works served the purpose of advertising for this brand. Works on energy infrastructure were, therefore, not only a boast of the 'majestic rise' of the BRICS but a fundamental strategy for energy security for the increasing demands of the growth years envisaged.

Combine great infrastructural works with discourses on providing energy for an emerging economy, growth and poverty relief and one shall have a strong rhetoric even among critics and affected peoples. Picture that. A white little boy, curiously with a dark Curumim's[22] hair, holding the red star of Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) with tenderness, almost with gratitude I could say. What a powerful image for a document aiming to determine where Amazonia would sit in country's development — (the document was actually entitled *Amazonia's Place in Brazilian Development*). Presented in September 2002 by the, at the time, Government Program Coordinator Antônio Palocci, this piece was PT's program — of the about-to-be-elected President Lula — for the whole region. If, back then, there was one party 'minimally able' to speak openly and with little fear of back-firing about exploiting Amazonian lands and rivers, that party was PT. After all, Lula was elected for his first mandate with a massive expression of constituents' support. In 2002 National Elections, he won in every state of the Federation but in Alagoas, collecting 61.3% of the valid votes against 38.7% of José Serra, the second-placed.

The first left wing party to win the presidency carried on its shoulders a whole lot of expectations, especially in the areas of social justice, redistribution and the rights of minorities, their historical flags. The statements in the one of the very first documents to be released by the new administration seemed to point in this direction, as it follows:

> Large economic and ecological interventions in Amazonia require sound scientific basis, *broad public enlightenment* and political agreements between the different

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[21] The fine details can be found in the Goldman Sachs's report — *Building Better Global Economic BRICS — Global Economics Paper No: 66*, available at: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf

[22] Curumim is the Tupi-Guarani word for *child.*

> sectors of society so that the means for economic exploitation with minimum negative impact and maximum benefit for all are assured. Brazilian energy matrix demands urgent *modernization*, to begin with the assimilation of sustainability concepts and, as public policy, *holding a greater commitment to society, conditioning economic viability also to socio-environmental viability*. (Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), *Amazonia's Place in Brazilian Development*, 2002, p. 15) [Emphasis added] [Translation mine]

The same document also criticizes specifically Belo Monte project (ongoing since 1975) for being in the centre of controversial debates and proposes to rethink Brazil's energy matrix with strong investments in technological innovation, in order to avoid interventions of great ecological impact on water resources.

With the election of President Lula, the physicist Luiz Pinguelli Rosa takes on the presidency of Eletrobrás (a Brazilian holding created in 1962 to coordinate all companies in the electric sector) and tells the press that Belo Monte construction project will be discussed and options for economic and social development around the dam will be on the agenda, as well as the possibility of it having a reduced installed capacity. In May 2003, in the very beginning of the first left wing administration after redemocratisation, Federal Government announces that it will resume environmental impact studies for the construction of the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River, following the recommendations of Ibama and the Ministry of the Environment. So far, this may seem very mundane in the political world — government actions that seem to distance themselves from campaign promises — and it is. And that is a first wrong. The severity of impacts should have demanded immense efforts to listen and to understand the people to be affected and its complexity. The studies kept being conducted in default of those who were being studied, unconstitutionally.

By 2005, Legislative Decree n° 1.785/05, authorising the implementation of Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th of July. In the Article 231, third paragraph, the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil clearly rules that the use of water resources in Indigenous Lands can only be carried out with 'authorisation from the National Congress, *after hearing the affected communities*' (emphasis added). Local communities which would be affected were not heard, though. A week later, the Senate also approves the bill (turning it into PDS n° 343/05) authorising Belo Monte's deployment. It became a Legislative Decree, n°788/05, so it was now 'part of the law'. Again, it followed for promulgation without hearing the nine Indigenous peoples which could be seriously hit by the HPP's flooding waters. After reaching this point and driving that much attention to the issue, Belo Monte found its first obstacle. In August, the Attorney General's Office (PGR, in Brazil) filed a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality

in the Supreme Court (the STF) against the decree approved in both Houses and the continuation of Environmental Impact Studies (EIA), while the hearings were not conducted.

A series of judicial battles between Federal Government and MPF were dragged on until 2008, moving the validity of the plant's installation license back and forth. The impasse of Brazilian justice and the pressure of corporations over the state became reasons to put forward an encounter which brought together representatives of Indigenous and riverside communities, social movements, civil society organizations, researchers and experts, to discuss impacts of hydroelectric projects on Xingu River basin. Xingu Forever Alive Encounter (19 to 23 May 2008) took place in the city of Altamira (Pará state, Brazilian Amazon) to discuss, above all, the planned construction of the Belo Monte plant; a part of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and of Small Hydroelectric Plants (PCHs). The 2008 encounter happened 19 years after the First Meeting of Indigenous Peoples, held in Altamira in 1989, which brought together about three thousand people, among them: 650 Indigenous from different parts of the country and abroad; leaders such as Paulo Paiakan and Raoni; the then director of Eletronorte (Eletrobrás' subsidiary), Fernando Antônio Muniz Lopes; congressmen; 300 environmentalists; around 150 journalists and the English singer Sting.

The 1989 meeting became globally known for events which have shown that Indigenous people were not going to passively watch the takeover of their homes. For example — and the most expressive one in my opinion — during Muniz Lopes' exposition on the construction of the Kararaô plant (the first given name for Belo Monte HPP), Paiakan's cousin Tuíra rises from the audience and touches her blade a couple of times on the director's cheeks, in a warning gesture, expressing her indignation. The scene was reproduced in newspapers of diverse countries and became a historical image. Apart from the obvious aggression of the forced migration, *Kararaô* meant a cultural aggression against Indigenous peoples. The word means 'war cry' in the dialect of Kayapó peoples, who lives in the vicinity of the Xingu River and against whom Federal Government and its institutions were battling. Due to domestic and international attention driven to the cause, Muniz Lopes announced that Indigenous names would no longer be adopted to hydroelectric plants and that Kararaô would then be named *Belo Monte*. Riparians and Indigenous still do not see any beauty ('Belo' in Portuguese) in that.

The event of the late 1980s was concluded with the launch of the National Campaign to Defend the Peoples and the Amazon Forest, demanding a review of development projects in the region, the Indigenous Declaration of Altamira and a

greeting message from the singer Milton Nascimento, known to be fond of Indigenous causes. 1989's Altamira meeting was, and still is, considered a landmark for socio-environmentalism in Brazil. The event of the late 2000s, however, did not have the same success. During the 2008's meeting, a group of Indigenous attacked the responsible for the environmental studies of Belo Monte after his speech. In the midst of the confusion, Paulo Fernando Rezende, coordinator of the inventory studies, was injured with a deep cut in the arm. That scene has also been reproduced to exhaustion. A couple of days after the 2008 encounter, the social movement Xingu Forever Alive released a letter opened to the public entitled homonymously. The final document assessed the threats to the Xingu River, presenting the movement's own version of what a development project for the region should be like and demanding from public authorities its implementation.

The chronology of the project, though extensive, and the succession of the events is determinant to elucidate the systematic deafness — and why not obliteration — of the official 'authorities' to what people were clearly, loudly and relentlessly saying. So, in the following year, four public hearings were held on in the cities of Brasil Novo, Vitória do Xingu, Altamira and Belém, in a time window of six days, revealing the weaknesses of the studies and the several gaps in the licensing process. The EIA (Environmental Impact Studies) was only made available *two* days before the first hearing, hence leaving no time at all for a qualified and joint review by affected communities. Besides that, Federal Public Prosecutor's Office of Pará state (MPF/PA) had recommended Ibama to conduct at least another thirteen hearings so to include more regions that would be affected; after all, according to initial studies, Belo Monte would directly and indirectly affect 66 municipalities and 11 Indigenous lands. No minor impact whatsoever. Due to this, Federal Justice suspends the environmental licensing and determines those new hearings, following a request from MPF, so that the communities were heard. A day later, the injunction is overturned.

In the first quarter of 2010, the Ministry of Environment granted the preliminary license to build the hydro plant, although acknowledging that central issues to evaluate the impact of the works were not yet explained. Ibama's Technical Advice at the end of November 2009, which had not been made available on the internet, denounced political pressure coming from the Presidency of the Republic to release the works. It also indicated that superficial studies could not predict what would happen to fishes in a stretch of more than 100 kilometres of river, and consequently with the people who relied on them, especially the

riverside Indigenous communities. This same plot had already been seen in 2007, as told in the opening of this chapter, when Ibama pointed that the licensing of Santo Antônio and Jirau Hydroelectric Plants would highly impact on the reproductive cycle of Amazonian Catfishes. At that time, the pressure over the entity was so intense that it made Ibama be split into two organizations.

Belo Monte auction was finally held by Brazilian Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL) on the 20th of April 2010. Norte Energia Consortium won the venture and, back then, its composition was: São Francisco Hydroelectric Company (CHESF) with 49.98%; Construtora Queiroz Galvão S.A.,10.02%; Galvão Engenharia S.A., 3.75%; Mendes Junior Trading Engenharia S.A., 3.75%; Serveng-Civilsan S.A., 3.75%; JMalucelli Construtora de Obras S.A., 9.98%; Contern Construções e Comércio Ltda., 3.75%; Cetenco Engenharia S.A., 5%; and Gaia Energia e Participações with 10.02%. Norte Energia S.A. today is composed by: Eletrobrás Group (Eletrobrás with 15.00%, CHESF with 15.00%, Eletronorte with 19.98%); complementary pension entities (Petros with 10.00% and Funcef with 5.00%); private equity investment funds (FIP) (Caixa FIP Cevix with 5.00%); special-purpose entities (Belo Monte Participações S.A. (Neoenergia S.A.) with 10.00%, CEMIG and LIGHT (through Amazônia Energia Participações S.A.) with 9.77%); autoproducers (Vale S.A. with 9.00% and Sinobras with 1.00%); and other companies (JMalucelli Energia with 0.25%).

Once constituted, Norte Energia Consortium faced a number of difficulties in complying with the conditions — or 'impact mitigating measures' — imposed by the *preliminary license* which, theoretically, would address the gaps detected in the EIA. Faced with the impossibility of granting the *installation license* — authorisation for the beginning of the works — and under a lot of pressure, the substitute president of Ibama Américo Ribeiro Tunes issues a 'partial' installation license, which allowed the construction of lodgings, industrial site and stock area for soil and wood. Soon after, Ibama issued a permit to suppress vegetation leading to the elimination of 238.1 hectares of vegetation, of which 64.5 were found within Permanent Preservation Areas (APP). Shortly thereafter, the 'partial' license was suspended by injunction and, on 5 April 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organisation of American States (OAS) requested Brazilian government to stop the works until the constitutional matters pending with Indigenous peoples were solved — i.e., consultations with each of the affected

communities had to be carried out in a 'previous, free, informed, of good-faith and culturally appropriate'[23] manner.

IACHR's decision responded to a complaint filed in November 2010, on behalf of several traditional communities in the Xingu basin, by the Movement Xingu Forever Alive, the Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB), Territorial Prelature of Xingu, Indigenous Missionary Council of Brazil (CIMI), Pará's Society for the Defense of Human Rights (SDDH), Global Justice and the Inter-American Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA). According to the complaint, and as has been pointed through all the previous phases of the undertaking, the region's Indigenous and riverside communities were not adequately consulted on the project, which, if carried out, would cause irreversible socio-environmental impacts, force the displacement of thousands of people and threaten one of the most valuable regions for the conservation of biodiversity in the Amazon. Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) received a period of fifteen days to inform OAS that the determination was fulfilled, to what Brazilian government strongly reacted and, soon after, in May 2011, the president of Ibama, Curt Trennepohl, announced the issuing of a *definitive license* for the construction of Belo Monte.

A few months after the friction between OAS and Brazilian government, the country 'retaliated' the organisation: until the last quarter of the year Brazil had not yet disbursed its annual quota of (at the time) US\$6 million, corresponding to 6% of OAS budget and to one month of its employees' salaries. The 'arm wrestling' around the dam escalated until the point that, in October 2011, social and Indigenous movements held a new meeting in Altamira (the largest city in the region) from which came up a decision to put through a one-day occupation of the largest construction site of the plant, Sítio Belo Monte. As expected, a prohibition ban was issued by the state (Pará) court, enforcing the withdrawal of demonstrators from the site. As the year came to its end, MPF's Public Civil Action on the absence of wider hearings was assessed by the Regional Federal Court of the 1st Region and was rejected, by two votes to one. The following year, 2012, was not less stormy. Problems on the construction sites such as low wages and misuse of duties led workers to a general strike from the end of March to the

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[23] OAS Precautionary Measure 382/10 — Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil. Available at: http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp; the PDF file of IACHR's notification to Brazilian government can be found at: http://www.xinguvivo.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Carta_otorgamiento_corregida_peticionario1.pdf

beginning of April, demanding compliance with agreements established at the end of 2011.

2.2
The People: who are the Belo Monte displacees?

The works have begun in the middle of 2011 and, with that, a very different landscape started to show up in the local villages. What used to be a quiet place — named, coincidentally, by more than one of its dwellers as 'Meu Cantinho' (something like 'my little corner')[24] — is now a lousy, grey, dusty landscape. When MPF/PA Inspection Group #3 interviewed the people of the Santo Antônio Village about the life they used to have before the dam, Mr. Hélio replied:

> What was it like living in Santo Antônio? Do you know paradise, madam? It was [like] to live in paradise, where nobody had much money, but everyone was happy. We had beaches, the best beaches in our region, we had a strong friendship, so strong that in Santo Antônio 'politicking' did not exist… sincerity existed, the people who lived in the community, it was [by] sincerity and with love that [we] did the things, so there was paradise. (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 73) [Translation mine]

Life in Amazonia, however, cannot always be described as paradisiacal. In fact, the community 'found' happiness despite deprivation: *nobody had much money*. One can analyse this statement through ethical, philosophical, economic lenses, but that is not my point here. What I bring now is a brief account of who historically are the displaced, i.e., where Xingu River population fits in Brazilian history.

Riparians originate, so to speak, from the migration flows of economic cycles associated with the exploitation of rubber in Amazonia, when large numbers of North-eastern peasants were taken to the region by rubber barons, rubber exporting companies and by the Brazilian State. Between 1840 and 1920s Amazonia experienced a new economic cycle, 'The Rubber Cycle' as it is called in the country. As rubber was one of the main raw materials of the Second Industrial Revolution, Brazil saw an opportunity to be inserted into world economy once the rubber supply in Amazonia was vast. Manpower, however, was an issue, since the formal (though not concrete) end of slavery had just happened in the last years of XIX century. Celso Furtado, a Brazilian economist who used to put things into a historical perspective, pointed in *The Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey from Colonial to Modern Times* (1959)[25] that two main population movements met labour demands: a large migratory current from Europe, destined to sustain the

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[24] Reported in the Inter-Institutional Inspection Report, 2015, pp. 10, 29, 34-36, 40-41, 46.

[25] In the original title: *Formação Econômica do Brasil*, 1959.

coffee economy in Southeast Brazil, and a North-eastern migratory current to support that of rubber in Amazonia.

According to Furtado, European immigrants, with government support of their own country, arrived at the plantation with all expenses paid, guaranteed residence, ensured maintenance until the harvest and the possibility to plant food. North-eastern Brazilians, however, converted into rubber tappers in Amazonia, began to work in debt since they had to reimburse expenses with travel, labour tools, installation expenses, and had to rely on the businessmen who controlled the supply in their shed to feed themselves — something very peculiar to Amazonian's relations of production since colonial times: 'sistema de aviamento'. This placed rubber tappers in a regime of easement. When rubber prices fell, especially after the Second World War with the coming of synthetic materials, misery rapidly spread. Those women and men turned to supplement their income with hunting and fishing, regressing to a more primitive form of subsistence economy, of the ones who dwell tropical forests. Pushed by force of survival to river banks, the rubber tappers who remained in the region formed families, often with Indigenous people, and learned to live in and out of the forest, developing a distinctive way of life and unique knowledge.

In the 2000s, some of these communities managed to secure the possession of their traditional territories, in the form of Extractive Reserves (Resex) — most of them dedicated to farming activities. Others, who exercised mainly fishing activities, received a Statement of Authorisation for Sustainable Use (TAUS), a document issued by Union's Assets Department (SPU) in 2010. Supposedly, these two instruments can help guarantee the rights of use of the space by the people who live there and, in some way, transmitted a feeling of less vulnerability. Or could, before the dam. It is not difficult to comprehend the expectations of riparians, Indigenous and small farmers who for a long time have lived under a cloak of invisibility in the eyes of the state — since colonial time in terms of rights and investments, at least — and that now have leastwise one State regulation in their favour; something to call 'yours'. These little but important conquers, however, did not reach all. In a place known as Vila Maribel, located inside Indigenous Land Cachoeira Seca, other communities of riparians still lived (and live) with land insecurity, without effective recognition of their territory by the State, being even more vulnerable to the impacts of Belo Monte HPP.

I say 'even more' because for many, having a TAUS or living in a Resex were meaningless before Norte Energia S.A. 'technical decisions' on resettlement; not to mention the incoherence between the policies, once many fisherwomen and

men had recently acquired SPU's document acknowledging the occupation of those lands for decades and authorising its sustainable use. Despite de fact that the TAUS bestows the right of traditional fisherwomen and men to remain in their 'islands' (as they, and therefore I, refer to their fishing spots), in other words, despite the fact that the Federal Government says, by force of law, that those people are there as fisherwomen and men, Norte Energia S.A. has its own eligibility criteria and says they cannot and have not the right to be. But how does that much power to rule over lives of State citizens ended up in the hands of a private company? Law and public-private partnerships (PPPs as they are known) can help to understand how.

Although there is nothing new in the model of collaboration between public and private entities, PPPs' system was inaugurated in 2004 by the Law 11,079 which established general rules for bidding and contracting within public administration. PPPs were presented, and launched, by the then president Lula as a prosperous solution to make viable great infrastructure works lacking in the country. The idea is that the private partner can provide public administration and, ultimately, the community of certain goods in exchange of a periodic remuneration paid by the State and linked to its performance during the period of reference. PPPs are said to be desired and guided by limitations of public resources to cover necessary investments as well as to increase the quality and efficiency of public services delivered. When referring to PPPs, Ministry of Planning, Development and Management sees it as a 'modern instrument' to develop the country: 'international studies proves that the lack of infrastructure limits the economic growth and the global competitiveness of countries'[26].

When asked 'how do you feel about all this?' a fisherman like Mr. José Rodrigues do Nascimento — known among his fellows by Mr. Dedé, as he prefers — replies 'I feel like I'm back in 1888'. What does Mr. Dedé mean? 1888 is the last year in which the slavery regime was in force in Brazil, formally. So, he means that he feels violated at the core of his human dignity; he feels 'thingyfied', taken from here to there and back, like a commodity, to which no one asks permission to move. "This time [in 1888, slavery] 'has acted' to this day", he said not to me but to the anthropologist Mauro de Almeida (UNICAMP), from the Inspection Group #1. According to the inspection's team reading of the situation, "the simplicity of these people's gaze, the way they perceived that they put their last hopes in the

work of these 'government' inspection teams, the despair of those who cried when giving their testimonies", all these elements and certainly others show that 'it is blatant the subjects' hypo-sufficiency towards this public-private partnership, which at the same time that it is a company, has the heavy hand of the state' (MPF/PA, 2015, p.122).

The weight of this hand, however, was conceded to the private partner by State itself. I will explain. On the 26th of October 2010, the then President Lula signed Executive Decree n° 7,342, instituting the creation of a national registry to identify people affected by dams, in order to guarantee their rights. This initiative was a response to a demand posed by the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB) in July 2009. With this decree, ANEEL was instructed to include the costs of servicing the people to be affected by the dams within the bidding notice of the HPPs. No new venture should be done without a diagnosis of the number to be affected and that diagnosis should be concluded *before* the issuing of preliminary license — meaning, when the removals *actually start* — precisely during the scope of environmental licensing. The decree also indicated the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Commission to lead the elaboration of registries with the companies responsible for the works in each case. In practice, Decree 7,342/10 has done nothing more than merely stating the rights of people affected by dams to be registered; and that was considered an achievement from their part which, until then, had no legal dispositive to resort to.

That is certainly not asking too much: demanding the state to create mechanisms to protect the rights of people forced to move away because of a public-private work is no whimsical demand. And yet, Federal Government — through Ministry of Mines and Energy — yielded to the pressures of transnational corporations active on the electric sector and regulated an ordinance that, in effect, made null the dispositions of Decree 7,342/10. Inter-ministerial Ordinance n° 340 of June 1st 2012, in its 5th Article[27], determined that the registry of those affected by dams would be outsourced to private companies. In other words, the companies that have the responsibility to produce the registries will be the same ones that are the owners of the dams' projects. This puts the whole process under the very real risk of the registries to be produced without any suitability. MAB strongly defended at the time that the registries should be carried out by the State (as the decree itself established) as a way to avoid distortions since, in the logic of profit, companies

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[27] 'The company in charge of the enterprise will bear the costs inherent to the realization of the Socioeconomic Register.' (Inter-ministerial Ordinance n° 340, art. V, June 1st, 2012)

may not be completely committed to the rights of those affected — especially if a comprehensive effort to register everyone affected delays the beginning of energy (and profit) generation.

In addition, the regulation changed the deadline for preparing the registry. According to Article IV of the ordinance, sole paragraph, 'the activities of elaboration of the Socioeconomic Register will be carried out, *preferably, in concomitance* with the stage of the preliminary license' [my emphasis], but could be done during the construction or even moments before closing the lake of the plant. This means reproducing what has already been done by companies in the electricity sector, that is: the dams' works are finished and it is not known in fact how many people and families were affected, as shown by the recent cases of the Santo Antônio and Jirau power plants, in Rondônia, the ones mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. According to estimative of the MAB coordinator, Marco Antonio Trierveiler, since the 1970s[28]— the decade of the 'Brazilian (Economic) Miracle', during the military dictatorship which fostered developmentalism as a national orientation — when large hydroelectric plants began to be built in the country, such as Itaipu and Sobradinho, about 400,000 families to 1 million people which have lost their homes or their businesses did not receive any type of compensation.

Therefore, the Decree was a legal achievement after 30 years of struggles which guaranteed not an automatic right to repairs, but the simple right to be noticed by public (and private) authorities — the right to not be invisible. With the new regulation of 2012, though, Federal Government suggested that the 'mere registration does not generate rights or obligations to registered persons, nor to those responsible for energy generation' (Article II, sole paragraph) [Translation mine]. It was important to go through the details of this legal instrument, for it dismantled the basis for guaranteeing appropriate resettlement and/or indemnity. Besides the untying of any obligation, the affected would have to prove their condition; this is, to be registered, they would have to prove, through documents, that they would be affected by a HPP yet to be built. To require a group of people which did not took part on the elaboration of the project to know and to speak out if or not they would be affected is, from a logical perspective, ludicrous at least. If the terms of the decree were respected, the registry would be a public record, with the purpose of surveying the population.

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[28] The full statement on the estimated number of people affected by dams since the 1970s can be found at: <https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/lula-assina-decreto-que-cria-cadastro-para-identificar-pessoas-atingidas-por-barragens-2934551>

2.3
The Displacement: removing the unaccounted-for

As a consequence of all that plus the lack of transparency and publicity in the generation of the registry, the overall result of compensation process was the exclusion of part of the affected population. According to the rich and sound 2015 dossier put together by Socio-Environmental Institute (ISA) — a non-profit research organization with the mission to propose integrated solutions to social and environmental issues — the first registration process, carried out between 2011 and 2012, was permeated by gaps and serious failures, which prevented the proper characterization of the people and families affected. This was mainly due to the non-inclusion of the absent people on the household at the time of the registration interview and the non-inclusion of the aggregate nuclei of the family in the same house. In 2013, a new company was hired to review and correct mistakes in the first register, visiting house to house to make changes and updates to the registry. With this, the situation of some families that had been excluded was reconsidered, but the accumulated errors in the process and the lack of clarity in the process had already impacted the negotiations (ISA, Belo Monte Dossier, 2015, p. 32).

Once I have detailed how things got to the point they have, I can address now the actual process of removals. During the negotiations between ECSA and Diagonal — the companies outsourced by Norte Energia S.A., the latter (according to Ordinance n° 340/12) responsible to survey the population to be contemplated with compensations and to address those needs — a lot was left aside. In fact, of more than 8,000 families to be affected by the dam, only a number around 4,000 — half of it, therefore — is present in the calculus of assisted families. Considering that the average of people per family in Brazil is 3,3, according to the 2010 Demographic Census (the last one to be carried out in the country), possibly as many as 13,200 people remained unassisted in some aspect after the dam. So, at first and perhaps most flagrantly, the visits in the villages and, therefore, the 'notice of existence' did not reach everyone in time. One, but not the only reason for that, is that these people have a bilocal pattern of residence; some were in the city house (or 'street house' as they refer to it) when the negotiators came by the islands, and vice-versa[29].

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[29] Reported by Inspection Group #2 in the Inter-Institutional Inspection Report, 2015, p. 50.

With regard to the bilocal pattern of residence — something very understandable on the lives of fisherwomen and men, very obvious for types of communities who live in river banks, since the city life with schools, hospitals, market places and so forth, is not found on river sides — it could no longer exist. Norte Energia S.A. did not give, because it did not recognise, the option to keep and be compensated for *both* houses. Many of those people, like Mr. José Arnaldo, took years of their lives and hard work to be able to provide a city house for their children whilst keeping a house in the islands from where to get their subsistence:

> When someone asks me 'do you have a house on the street?' Yes, of course I have a house on the street because of when it comes time we have to take our children to study, right? So, our wives couldn't go fishing... so we had to keep maintaining the family in the city and studies for the children, thank God. (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 56) [Translation mine]

Choosing between the street house or the island house did *not* allow to restore the entirety of their ways of living, let alone to improve it, as premised on the Basic Environmental Plan (PBA).

PBA is a document which contains the specifics of the mitigating and compensatory measures to be adopted by the entrepreneur to minimise environmental and social impacts identified in both the Environmental Impact Study (EIA) and its respective Environmental Impact Report (RIMA). So, PBA is a very import document once it states what *must be done* as conditionings to license a certain project. As a public bidding work in Brazil, Belo Monte should meet a given number of conditionings before it began to operate — precisely, 7 general and 34 specific ones defined by the licensing authority Ibama, as seen before. Among these total of 41, a fundamental one said that 'the compulsory reallocation of the affected populations must guarantee means to recompose the ways of life *with superior quality or at least equal to the one existing before* the work' (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 4) [Emphasis added] [Translation mine]. However, people could not keep both houses simply because that option was not given to them.

The licensing authority, Ibama, set parameters for (a) the elaboration of the socioeconomic registry (which included commercial activity); (b) of the physical-patrimonial census (evaluation of properties to be expropriated after the elaboration of the price books) and (c) determining the options to assist the affected (indemnities, residential unit in Collective Urban Resettlement (RUC), social rent, letter of credit, assisted reallocation) — which is worth remembering, as seen, was put under the responsibility of the private company. In theory, the population should have had free access to the socioeconomic registry and to the price books, as well as having guaranteed the right to take part in the elaboration

of both so that the people could negotiate, even during the elaboration process. Besides, Ibama's Installation Licence (the one which is granted before the definitive, the Operational Licence) demanded that 'population's full freedom of choice should be guaranteed regarding the various types of indemnification treatment provided in the PBA observing the modalities available for each public' [Translation mine][30].

Despite all the recommendations, the Option Terms (documents which people had to sign choosing their 'option' among the compensations offered) not only differed from each other but were also introduced to the people without the aid of juridical support. This is something big if it is to be considered that a good number of the people who had to read, make an option and sign a document were illiterate (completely or functionally) — there were cases, like the one of Mrs. Rosa, in which people 'signed blank', i.e., in which people put their thumbs in a blank paper, making a blind and good faith choice. Mrs. Rosa is 55 years old now. She suffers from depression and since the removal she is under strong medication. Curiously, Mrs. Rosa possesses a TAUS, issued by SPU under n° 38597/2012, which would prove — as the documentation required by Ordinance n° 340/12 — that she was entitled to be resettled on river banks, as fisherwoman or related activity (MPF/PA, 2015, pp. 38; 57). As many others in the same situation, waving their TAUS or Resex documents in the air, resettlement on river banks was never an option to be signed for.

According to data from January 2015 reported in the ISA Dossier (2015, p. 13), of the 1,798 families that had already opted for one of the compensation proposals, only 28 (1.5%) chose the supposed alternative of collective rural resettlement. Another 1,358 families (75%) opted for cash restitution, which did not allow the purchase of expensive land on the banks of the river. The option for letter of credit, or assisted reallocation, contemplated 379 families (21%), but it implied the search of a land or lot by the person to be affected itself, for later purchase of the area by Norte Energia S.A., which is impracticable for populations mostly completely or functionally illiterate and in a context of poor access to information and land tenure. Another 33 families (1.8%) opted for individual resettlement, in areas also without access to the river. This, concluded the MPF/PA Inspection Team, led to a worsening of their livelihoods as well as to the impoverishment of these people.

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[30] See items 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16 of Installation License n° 795/2011 issued by Ibama. PDF available at: <https://site-antigo.socioambiental.org/banco_imagens/pdfs/LICENCA_DE_INSTALACAO_N_795-2011.pdf>

Moreover, although the Option Terms signed by the island's residents stated that they were being offered a Collective Rural Resettlement, Finding n° 15 of the Interinstitutional Inspection Team reveals that, in fact, it was being offered to riparians the same 32 lots in an area on the Km 27 of Transamazônica Road, destined to all the inhabitants of the rural area to be affected; what puts up about 1,800 real estates. Besides the fact that this area is absolutely inappropriate for agro-extractives fisherwomen and men, it is really difficult to understand how it was possible for the company to offer such a restricted number of lots to this whole affected universe. Travessão 27 (as the access to the Km 27 is known) was offered to all affected families in the rural area, not just riparians, and although it had no longer available lots and was distant from the river, it continued to be 'offered' in the negotiations with river bank dwellers. Findings n° 20 and 21 pointed that there has never been a project of collective resettlement for the riverside, which contemplated the need to stay close to the river and that was apt to maintain the way of life of these populations.


Figure 2. Belo Monte HPP Complex general arrangement. The location of Travessão 27 is shown on the map as 'Road 27'.
Source: Gilberto Veronese (superintendent at Norte Energia S.A.) LinkedIn webpage[31]

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[31] Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/belo-monte-hydropower-plant-current-construction-status-veronese/. Accessed in: 20 August 2016.

This is to say that equal or better reallocation was never an option and the company has forced indemnities or letters of credit. Worst, indemnities were calculated on the basis of Norte Energia S.A. criteria. These, in short, were limited to pay back people for any construction that *the company* considered to be proper houses (not stilts, not huts) disregarding the value of the terrain and the value of improvements and possessions (such as trees planted to sell their fruits, animals who could not be taken with the families to the new houses in the city and such); which means they were purely patrimonial evaluation's. Apart from the humiliation suffered by people who heard that their homes were nothing more than 'huts', there was a significant difference between how much those people could profit from their land; for example the income that would come with the agricultural products and animals, not only the value of the bricks and, not always considered as it worth, the land. Monetary valuations of houses and plantations on the islands depreciated both symbolically and materially the way of life of fisherwomen and men. Thus, at the time that some leisure occupations considered 'urban infrastructure' would have received high indemnities, to the riverside residents were offered ridiculous and humiliating amounts, with absolute disregard for their way of life and their territoriality, even when recognised by the SPU (MPF/PA, 2015, p.11).

Between this and that, to the ones who had the chance to be contemplated by an Option Term, the choices were made under nefarious conditions: insufficient information on the process of building the dam, on the reach of the flood, and on the future conditions of the river and its islands; denial of access to the socioeconomic registry (despite legal determinations); inconsistency of the offers, which changed according to the negotiator and even to the day of the visit; ludicrous offers; worsening in the quality of the offer, sometimes proposing indemnity for both houses, other times only a letter of credit; pressure and more or less explicit threats to lose any rights of compensation if not given a quick decision or if demanding the presence of a lawyer; signing documents in hostile environments, as company's offices, where no one would speak for you; among other equally pernicious things. Mr. Manuel reports a fraction of all this and is worth quoting at length:

> They come here and say: 'Mr. Manuel, your land there is 16 hectares, worth 34,533 reais, your son's is 7,000. Now, your son has the right to choose a [piece of] land'. 'And where is the land?' 'No one knows, we still have to look for the place. When we find it, we will look for you.'
>
> I said I want something on the river bank. I am a fisherman. To me, going to a faraway road… I would have to abandon fishing. Fishing is good to me because when the time of retirement comes, it will be easier for me to retire. But not in the land, I am not used to deal with the land. I fish since I was a kid, since I was a 'pipsqueak'.

> Then, they told me 'how are we going to do this, Mr. Manuel?' Then he came back and said 'your situation has changed. We were giving you a house, with a [piece of] land, water, light and toilets. Now we are giving you a letter [of credit] worth 131,000 reais, but you will have to find a land, that has a definitive title, in the value of that money'.
>
> 'But land in the river bank is difficult [to find]. For this amount [we] don't find'. Because there is not land with definitive title for this price. Whoever has it won't sell. (MPF/PA, 2015, pp. 9-10) [Translation mine]

The specialists on socioenvironmental causes from Ibama, ISA and Inspection Groups, and I too, find it difficult to measure in a purely patrimonial way the extension of what is lost in a forced removal. With Mr. Manuel's report, finally, I arrive at the moment everyone was waiting for — with grief.

2.4
The Resistance: challenging distributions of the sensible

Of all the stages involved in building a HPP of the magnitude of Belo Monte — just to remember, the world's third largest in installed capacity — certainly the most painful and, why not, traumatic is the forceful removal which comes just before demolition of houses. The scene is, actually, grotesque.

> You know that, to tell the truth, my friend, I got off the boat and did not feel the ground. I did not feel the ground beneath my feet, because it gave me a blank. There, at the time, I do not know what I felt. Because when I saw it from afar, I did not think I had... When we got there, I saw my house burning, I went down, I climbed the barrier, I sat, and I went blank, all gone, I do not know. I do not even know how to tell you what I know, what I felt, I do not know, because I did not feel anything... I was numbed from what I saw. Because… how come they call me to take what's mine and burn the house down a day before? I stood still, thinking about life, just… you see. What world do we live in? (Mrs. Raimunda Gomes da Silva, former resident of Barriguda Island, interviewed by Eliane Brum, El País, 22 September 2015) [Translation mine]

Whether in the city, in the farms, in the islands, in the Resex or along the banks of rivers, many lives and ways of life were permanently impacted.

The speed of the removals was incompatible to the evacuation of the islands and proper resettlement of the ones entitled to. Not receiving a decent compensation for their losses, many riparians came back to occupy their old fishing spots. Others refused to leave in spite of the constant warnings — or threats — that within 30 days the dam would be filled and the whole area, flooded. This 'silent resistance' to come back to the river acquires a very interest meaning in the words of Mrs. Rita: 'Yes. It is here that we come to earn a living to take there [to the city] to pay for the energy bill' (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 8) [Translation mine]. That is to say that her displacement is part of a placement of some sort. Once she cannot get to the river banks from where she makes her living, she cannot afford an energy of the same nature of energy which forced her to leave in the first place. She is part

of Belo Monte project once she has to be removed to give way for the dam. Which means, her role is to leave so that energy that she cannot afford can be produced. She is a part that, in fact, has no part in the community of the people counted to be benefited by the HPP once she belongs to the undifferentiated collection of the 'unaccounted for'. Actually, in this reality, her part is to not belong, to not have and to not be there; her part is to have no part:

> Because if people leave this island here, go to another one there, after a while they go there and take us off again. So, there is no option for us to be able to keep up with our work. [...] We leave here without knowing where we are going next. (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 12) [Translation mine]

Rita has paid the price for energy twice.

Many other *torts* not yet mentioned have been done to people in the Xingu River region. The word *tort* will be used in the following pages in a specific sense drawn from Rancière, which I will be expanding on in Chapters Three and Four. This is a key theoretical concept for my political analysis because the notion of a *torsion* holds the idea of a twisting, a wrong that is made within but not set apart from the whole. As Brazilian citizens, the harms Xingu people have suffered point to wrongs within the category of the citizen. For that reason, I use *tort* and *torsion* rather than more generic or legal terms as 'damage', 'harm' or 'violation'. Many more torts, then, than the abovementioned will not fit in the scope of this dissertation, and it is not to say that they worth less. Family ties undone; psychological 'conditions' that have appeared; the rise in illegal logging; irregularities in cutting and destination of deforested timber for the installation of works; dismantling of the fishing activity of the region; loss of the riverside and Indigenous way of life; families forced to leave their homes and productive areas without new housing guaranteeing living conditions equal to or better than the previous ones; districts created for resettlement incredibly far from the river; transportation services not properly installed, preventing these families from continuing to carry on their main activity, fishing; the exponential increase in violence and prostitution in the nearby cities; a two-years delay on the beginning of water supply and sanitary sewage works; and the list goes on.

What is troubling is that these flaws, which amplify socioenvironmental impacts, have happened in the undertaking considered to be the greatest accomplishment in infrastructure and the biggest work of the first left wing government since redemocratisation. What worries is that these problems have happened under a project largely managed by the Union, financed by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), patrolled by the National Force and supervised by Ibama, but which was not been able to guarantee that a

single hospital was delivered for the population — as part of the agreement — during three years of works, or that the basic sanitation system was functional at the moment of Operational License (when people are truly pushed to the areas out of the reach of the dam). The ineffectiveness and recklessness of actions taken to mitigate impacts on local society in a work with a volume of investments such as that of Belo Monte simply shows that what is at stake in the environmental licensing system is not its slowness or incompetency, but its difficulty to make entrepreneurs and public authorities to truly commit.

In face of all this, the major failure of licensing might be in monitoring the fulfilment of conditionings. Belo Monte evinced how hard it is to establish spaces for effective social control as well as an independent mechanism to oversee the whole process. In spite of legal prescriptions, the public hearings were carried on by mere formality. Conducting the hearings in urban centres rather than in the areas to be affected, make available the documents to be debated one to two days before the hearings, none of this shows genuine effort nor real concern on the part of those involved to truly debate the venture with the society. On top of that, Federal Government actively worked to overturn several judicial orders that determined the works to stop due to legal noncompliance. For that, it used an exceptional judicial measure usually triggered at the time of the dictatorship, the Suspension of Security, by which it can unilaterally suspend lower court decisions before a supposed risk of serious damage to public order, health, safety and economy.

It is interesting to think how this frame the schedule of progress of the enterprise, the fear of a 'blackout' yet to come, the need to install each year about 5,000 MW of additional capacity to guarantee a 5% GDP growth in the next 10 years, as things much more relevant than the rights of the people to be affected. It is equally interesting to read from that a logic of what can be sacrificed, of what kinds of things one is willing to dispose, of what kinds of people one is willing to dispose. Hélio Alves da Silva, the fisherman who lived in Santo Antônio for more than 30 years, resides today in a farmhouse in an agricultural village 73 km away from the river. His fisherman license was suspended for no longer presenting the results of his activity.

> [T]he village has a world of more people than Santo Antônio, but nothing works. I cannot stay in my house because I was used [to stay] in the middle of people. I had a person to talk to me at any time. Every minute that I left my house, or that I was in my house, someone would pass by and say 'hi'. [Now] I spend fifteen days at my house there… if I do not leave the house, there is no one to say 'hello'. So, with this, I was isolated and I cannot stay there. I do not stay there. (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 79) [Translation mine]

The story of a hydroelectric power plant converts itself into a story of a multi-scale displacement. That is the story I have been telling so far, though mostly not through my speech.

This is, still, also a story about resisting neglect, denial, resisting the government, the silence and the sacrifice. National Council for Human Rights' (CNDH) adviser Darci Frigo, who integrated MPF/PA Inspection Team, recalled reports of the destruction of mental health of fisherwomen and men — just like the one of Mr. Hélio quoted above. Many cried when giving their testimonies. Mrs. Raimunda, however, sang. And she said that she left Tucuruí (another HPP) alive, but Belo Monte was destroying her, because violence manifests itself in many ways. A fisherman's house was demolished with all his fishing gear inside, 'flour ovens' were buried when people specifically asked to take them back. But people have demonstrated against these perversities and now there is a process of persecution and criminalization of the ones who protest. Pará's Military Police and National Force deliberately act in favour of the entrepreneur and the use of the police or private security apparatus in favour of the company explains that for the affected there is the total absence of the state while for the entrepreneur the State is ever present.

After one demonstration, a fine was imposed on the president of the fishing colony. MAB denounced the prohibition for new demonstrations which curtails the constitutional right to free speech. People are speaking out, contacting media, producing documentaries, getting in touch with celebrities, calling attention to their plight. Something was born from all these torts. Even the littlest of things, like a refusal to concede the space you think about when you think about home:

> Even if it's destroyed here, the way it's going to be destroyed, no one can deny my home. They took part of my dreams. There is a gap inside me, I will never be the same again. But the house, even destroyed, it remains here. Even though no one else can see it, it's still my home. (Antônia Melo, former resident of Volta Grande do Xingu, interviewed by Eliane Brum, El País, 14 September 2015) [Translation mine]

Those everyday events, the tension of their dynamics, the way they disturb ordinary logics like Antônia did with her thoughts, these things can say a lot about how and why such unequal forces interact. They suggest that, behind the obvious cruelty of every situation brought here, beyond every testimony and speech, there is a certain politics in place. The politics of displacement.

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As I was writing the end of this chapter, Superior Electoral Court Minister, Mr. Herman Benjamin, mentions Belo Monte HPP live on television during the trial that could have repealed Dilma-Temer Presidential Ticket (though at the end it did not),

as 'another vast ocean of corruption evidence' which goes back more than ten years, up to the catfishes[32]. Belo Monte consortium is investigated to be part of a bribing scheme in exchange of infrastructural works contracts, like the dam. The public-private partnership, or promiscuity in some cases, and the 'political world of democracy' does not work within a register of rights — either of doing what is right and just or of the rights of people. What we call 'democracies' is in fact a state and a government functioning that is the exact opposite of what we conceive as democratic life. This operation is based, in short, on the appropriation of the public 'thing' and of the public space by a solid alliance between the state oligarchy and the economic one. The evils our 'democracies' suffer, such as the questionable building of a historically controversial HPP to feedback corruption schemes between private companies and politicians, are therefore linked to the 'insatiable appetite of the oligarchs' (Rancière, 2005, p. 94).

Those oligarchic appetites, however, are said to be correspondent to the society's interests once the republic is the regime of homogeneity between State and society; that is, the correspondence between institutions (such as law) and costums, where no void exists. So, as noticed in this chapter, Amazonian rivers are seen as a huge megawatts market. From governmental programs and reports (like the ones above mentioned) to research funded by electric companies, Amazonia is a new frontier for development. Until 2020, 130 hydroelectric plants of some scale ought to be built throughout the region[33]. A space that, for centuries,

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[32] Santo Antônio and Jirau HPPs were mentioned by informers on Operation Car Wash, the largest investigation on corruption ever carried out in the country by Federal Police. Odebrecht and Furnas Centrais Elétricas are equally involved in both Madeira's HPPs — which have opened this chapter — and Belo Monte. In the El País article entitled 'The work that united in corruption PT, PSDB, Indians, ruralists, CUT and Força Sindical: construction of Madeira River hydroelectric dams involved payments to political actors of opposing specters', on the 2nd of June 2017, journalist Gil Alessi explains it in details. Available at: http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/04/24/politica/1493053356_900561.html. Accessed in: 30 August 2017.

[33] 'The energy produced by the Belo Monte plant will be used to meet economic growth, with competitiveness, and the expected demographic expansion of the country. The largest share (70%) of the energy of Belo Monte plant is destined for the captive market, which encompasses all residences, most of commerce and services, and a large portion of industry, including small and medium-sized ones. The remaining 30% is for the free market and for self-producers — where the electro-intensive industry is also located.' It is important to note here that the benefits associated with Belo Monte HPP have mostly been perceived and proclaimed by the Federal Government in the form of 'development and growth' to the region, much more than as specific projects to bring energy to rural and inner places in the state of Pará or surrounding areas. It is true that the social program 'Luz para Todos' (*Light for All*, in English) will benefit from Belo Monte energy, but the first transmission lines are still about to be implemented. Moreover, the bulk of transmission lines are supposed to be directed to Southeast and Midwest regions. In 2013 (base year 2012), despite being the largest geographic region and having the third largest population, North region's residential consumption was the fifth (i.e., the lowest one) among the five regions, with 3,937 clients — compared to, for example 30,245 in the Southeast region. The most recent statistics, from 2016 (base year 2015) reveals that little has changed, despite social programs and localised improvements. Residential consumption remained under 4,000, and actually declining (3,843 clients); still the last one in consumption. Certainly, data *per se* does not have much of a sense of analysis, but the crude figures

has been treated with neglect by state policies in detriment of Southerner areas is, since the 2000's, an apple of development's eye. The great potential of Northern rivers to generate energy for 'Brazil's growth', however, might not be actually converted into what government perceives as a benefit to society itself. In fact, energy generated in the Amazon region is — and will increasingly be, as the projects move forward — mostly directed to mining and electric-intensive industries. The bulk of energy generated will not be used, then, to provide for houses but for industries from 6 branches which, together, are responsible for consuming 30% of country's power supply, namely: non-ferrous metal industry, cement industry, steel industry, ferroalloys metal industry, chemical industry, and pulp and paper industry[34].

Energy, then, generated with the high human cost paid by the Amazon people used to explore Amazonia's natural resources; and the at the time President of Republic agreed to that[35]:

> I think it's important to point out that, with Belo Monte, we do not only bring energy to the rest of Brazil, [but also] we create a unique wealth here made available; it is made available to companies that want to come here and start their business, to participate in this State that has large mineral reserves, great agricultural potential, [companies that] can come here because there will be no lack of electricity.

As well as the Mayor of Altamira city[36]:

> Belo Monte is important for our country, it is important to develop not only the region, but Belo Monte is important for the development of our country because it will prevent the blackout. We who live here are in favour because we are Brazilian too.

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do show that though Belo Monte HPP has been completed, the regional and local realities did not seem much changed — meeting most of activists and affected peoples' critiques. These data were taken from the Statistical Yearbooks of the Energy Research Company. The extract opening this footnote was taken from *Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant Project, FAQ*, Energy Research Company, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Brazil. Available at: http://www.epe.gov.br/leiloes/Documents/Leilão%20Belo%20Monte/Belo%20Monte%20-%20Perguntas%20Frequentes%20-%20POR.pdf

[34] Célio Bermann, architect and urbanist by the University of São Paulo. Specialized in Histoire et Géographie des Populations at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (France), he is the author of Energy in Brazil: for what? for whom? — crisis and alternatives for a sustainable country (São Paulo: Ed. Livraria da Física/FASE, 2002) and Exporting Our Nature — energy intensive products: social and environmental implications (Rio de Janeiro: FASE, 2004), among other works.

[35] Excerpt of speech given by the President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff, during a ceremony to commence the commercial operation of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, Vitória do Xingu, Pará, Brazil, 5 May 2016 [Emphasis added] [Translation mine]. Available in full at: http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-o-planalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-durante-cerimonia-de-inicio-da-operacao-comercial-da-usina-hidreletrica-de-belo-monte-vitoria-do-xingu-pa

[36] Mayor of Altamira interview, Altamira, July 2011, in Fleury and Almeida, 2013, p. 152 [Translation mine]

And, also, the Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic[37]: 'This energy generated by Belo Monte is fundamental to sustain the economic development in march that Brazil is adopting, so *everything is great around Belo Monte*'.

*Every*thing is not great around Belo Monte, because not everyone or everything has been (ac)counted for. In this chapter, I have presented the empirical aspects of the politics of displacement in Belo Monte. People have been registered, their needs have been defined, policies put in place to meet those needs and a legal regime has been assigned to (ac)count for the ones to be affected. These things, however, are representations of the space internally displaced people ought to occupy in a given society during a given moment. There are other ways of life, other people, and other aspects of the Xingu space that have been left outside the considerations of Belo Monte project; and that emerge onto the political scene to reinscribe the 'count of the unaccounted-for'. But before discussing the political agency of internal displacees which is born in their disruption of this partition of the sensible, the next chapter analyses *why* and in which ways the sensible has been partitioned in Belo Monte. The empirical descriptions presented in this chapter have grounded the analysis on the wrongs done by the project so that the next chapter can think about what those representations of space miss.

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[37] Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic interview, Brasilia, August 2011, in Fleury and Almeida, 2013, p. 152 [Emphasis added] [Translation mine]

3
The Representations of the Displaced

Bertha Becker (2009b), a long-time geographer of the Amazon region, hypothesised that Amazonia constitutes a 'world-frontier', a term which designates a space of great strategic value for world economy. Becker operates her analysis under Immanuel Wallerstein's (1979) register of the 'world-economy', where a single capitalist world market is structurally defined by a single division of labour in which multiple states take part. But she goes beyond dependency thinkers to place Amazonia as a world-frontier, so to explain the policies directed to the region and the place it was made to occupy in Brazilian economy, society and politics. Since its formation in colonial times until now, the Amazon's strategic value to world-economy is what, to Becker, explains the constant interference of exogenous forces in the region and the continued difficulty of integrating it to its national states up to today. Brazilian Amazonia, in particular, had a history different from the rest of the country. After taken over, it remained for centuries under processes directly linked to the international context and to the metropolis, practically apart from Brazil.

Through scientific expeditions, for example, Amazonia has a history of continuous contact with the great advances of science and technology that have driven the world economy since the 15th century, incorporating the region as an exporting periphery of resources. Along with scientific expeditions, colonial expeditions, piracy and natural resources reservoir have been forces, events and images which shaped the representations of space of Amazonia in the country and in world-economy. Notably, scientific and technological advances have always been generated abroad and serving foreign interests in the region, whether international or from other regions of the country (Becker, 2009). Becker's presupposition for the place Amazonia — and, therefore, some (or most) of its inhabitants, including the Belo Monte displacees — occupies in Brazilian cosmology and in world-economy can be read in terms of *supplementarity*. Being supplementary is a condition of being an 'accessory', but one that (once it is revealed) shows that it has always been there, delimiting what was counted in and out of the totality — hence Amazonia as a frontier, a two-sided space. Supplementarity shows a miscalculation of 'the parts'.

In this way, Becker points out the specificity of Amazonia as a space exceptionally dynamic and contradictory in its relations with the totality in which it takes part. For not benefiting from development equally to the rest of the Brazilian

territory but being directly linked to alien centres of power — both the international context and the metropolis — Amazonia as a supplemental space which separates Brazil from the sum of the parts of the Brazilian body. That is to say that development's representation as a national construct which (as for the nation) counts all the parts of the country, including all the regions, is disrupted once Amazonia is accounted as an ambivalent space. From the actual history of Amazonia, it can be seen that the correspondence of the political to the totality as the representation of the social and of social interests have a void which has not been (ac)counted for. These contradictions have been verbalised by a riparian lady interviewed in *At the Margin of Xingu: disregarded voices* (Damià Puig, 2011): 'The rulers only see our region as a commodities producer. We are not seen as people… people alike the rest of Brazil. As people who works, who has its proper way of life, people who matter. We have influence in nothing' [Translation mine].

What I bring in this chapter, then, is how the representation of the displaced — done in terms of public and private, of (sustainable) development, of human rights and of the categories of the IDP and the refugee — is based on the arbitrary separation of the social and the political. This is the basis of what Rancière calls 'the distribution of the sensible', because these representations are ways to produce order and govern life according to functions, places, ways of being. But these representations have a double function: they separate and exclude, but they also allow participation. That is why Becker's idea of Amazonia as a *frontier* makes a point for Amazonian displacees. It gives a good notion for thinking of 'the part with no part' as something outside that is already inside. Displacees are, fictionally, sovereign subjects needed to legitimise the nation, but political practices in governmental logics have been practices of dividing the people between 'displaceable' and the rest (at least). All these partitionings, however, have the potential to generate new realities in the appearance of bodies and voices where it seems to be none. So, being themselves 'frontiers', segmentations like Amazonia are not fully structured: they are porous and the tensions they reveal are politically flourishing.

From that, what I term 'politics of displacement' is profoundly linked to the perception of Amazonia as a 'frontier', or as a space of evident continuous disputes, which incessantly resist the ordering (or the orderings) enforced upon it. So much so that the Amazon figures on the preferred spaces of global debates around the impasses of achieving a 'sustainable development'. Social sciences frequently discuss it as a dynamic territory in terms of the rhythms and the characteristics of demographic, economic and cultural transformations. The United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) acknowledges these tensions when it concludes that 'overall, in many countries, Amazonian populations have some of the lowest human development indicators, thus posing a greater challenge to achieving the SDGs'. According to UNDP, this is so, because

> The main challenge in the Amazon for the coming years is finding development pathways that combine environmental protection and poverty reduction, *leaving no one behind*. The Amazon is a unique space of diverse but interlinked actors, cultures and landscapes, conflicting interests and layered rights, under rapid change, and with many entrenched incentives and conditions for unsustainable development. (UNDP Policy Paper, *The Amazon and Agenda 2030*, 2016, p. 29) [Emphasis added]

The Amazon has, then, partitioning practices in the geographic sense — delimiting biomes, demarcating environmental preservation areas and separating agricultural frontiers from native forests — but also in a broader sense, in what concerns the contradictions that surround its incorporation to national and global economies. To that extent, President Dilma Rousseff's speech in the inauguration of Belo Monte HPP and the most recent executive decrees issued by President Michel Temer — in the same line of previous federal administrations — have placed Amazonia as a valuable asset to develop the country. Either as a source to power generation or, since the rubber cycle, as a natural resources reserve, Amazonia is the new frontier for capital. To the nation, it is a space of projection to a more affluent future. To companies and economic groups, it has worth as a physical space in the form of commodity and resources reserve. The economic and political potential of the 'world-frontier' makes it a strategic region for the state, which strives for its structuring and control; be it to induct Brazilian growth through insertion in world-market or through its conversion into profit, by issuing exploration licenses. These themes will be further explored in Chapter Four.

In this partitioning of the world, Brazil joins globalised world economy mostly as a primary products producer. In what concerns the Amazonia region, for example, Brazil's aluminium production is concentrated in Pará state (in which Belo Monte was also located), where about 75% of total Brazilian reserves are; this corresponds to a number around 2,7 billion tons of bauxite[38]. The country's crude aluminium accounts for US$ 367 million in revenues and is the fifth main product exported to Japan (which was in the past self-sufficient in that mineral), behind the champion in exports, iron ores and its concentrates, responsible for a US$ 1,21

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[38] Data from a consulting company (J. Mendo Consultoria) hired in 2009 by Ministry of Mines and Energy under contract n° 48000.003155/2007-17, to develop Studies for the Elaboration of the Twenty-Year Plan (2010-2030) for Geology, Mining and Mineral Transformation. Available at: http://www.mme.gov.br/documents/1138775/1256650/P11_RT22_Perfil_da_Mineraxo_de_Bauxita.pdf/1713eb90-cbf9-42e5-a502-18abf47d9a1f

billion[39] income. That is to say: more than primary products exporter, Brazil joins the world economy as a producer of goods of low added value and high energy cost. To that is what the country has been calling *development*: 'Belo Monte is not an isolated project, it is a development project for Brazil and here for the North region of the country, which was not traditionally a region that people who previously ruled Brazil paid attention to' (President Dilma Rousseff, 2016)[40]. As far as this research concerns and at least for the case it makes, however, development is but one on a set of problematic practices of an oligarchic regime.

The development-induced displacement problem does take part in the development debate once dams, power plants, mining, roads and the whole set of infrastructural works are built under the 'umbrella' of development needs. Displacement, yet, has also to do with another set of problems, a wider one perhaps, into which some development practices themselves might be comprehended. Development is both a form of justification for the anti-democratic practices detailed in the previous chapter and part of those practices themselves. What this work actually problematizes is *displacement*. Wide, rich and well-known debates have been delivered by critical development thinkers, Marxists, dependentists, post- and structuralists about developmentalist rhetoric and practices, its impacts, the way they are conceived, who has the authority to impose them, how to foster 'better practices', the links between colonisation, development and underdevelopment, and much more (see Ferguson, 1990; DuBois, 1991; Crush, 2005 [1995]; Escobar, 1995; Mignolo 1995, 2007; Quijano, 2000).

Our state of understanding the development-induced displacement problem is based on a 'rights approach' which, in general, demands better practices, governmental accountability and stands for the need to include the (to be) displacees in the processes of decision-making. That has not been enough to prevent human rights violations — and, ultimately, ethnocide — to have happened in past experiences (as seen in the previous chapter) and to continue, as Belo Monte case shows. Mainstream ways of reading these practices miss the political status of displacement, which points to what has been left outside the 'counting of

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[39] Data from 6 March 2016, provided from Brazil's Trade and Investment Guide, put together by Federal Government through a partnership between Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services. Available at: http://www.investexportbrasil.gov.br/o-comercio-brasil-japao-em-2015. Accessed in: 14 March 2016.

[40] Excerpt of speech given by the President of the Republic, Dilma Rousseff, during a ceremony to commence the commercial operation of the Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, Vitória do Xingu, Pará, Brazil, 5 May 2016. Available in full at: http://www2.planalto.gov.br/acompanhe-o-planalto/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/discurso-da-presidenta-da-republica-dilma-rousseff-durante-cerimonia-de-inicio-da-operacao-comercial-da-usina-hidreletrica-de-belo-monte-vitoria-do-xingu-pa. Accessed in: 16 June 2016.

parts'. The importance of such revision lies in the critical and continued reproduction of the condition of the forced migrant. The rights approach remains inscribed in the ordering of status quo, i.e., a status where the rights of the vulnerable are given through 'natural law'[41]. This premise is in crisis once an event like Belo Monte takes place, an event where the legal 'giver and guarantor' of rights is just the one responsible for the violations in the first place. A political approach would suggest that the rights of the ones forced to bear the unfair share of the costs of development stems from the very negative experience of denial of their equality.

But before exploring this alternative reading, I bring a brief account on the state of the art about development-induced displacees, pointing here and there how the literature trivialises what I will present in Section 3.2 as 'dissensus', the core feature of politics, including of a politics of displacement.

3.1
Literature on IDPs: review and comments

The literature on displaced people by development works stems from, mostly, sociological accounts of the cultural, social, humanitarian, moral, ethical and, more recently, economic aspects of displacing communities. This says quite a bit about how much attention internally displaced people (IDPs) received in the political scene, particularly internationally. For a while, especially when compared to refugees, IDPs were a minor — if not an infamous — concern to international organisations like the United Nations (UN). Gradually, Bjorn Pettersson (2002) argues, internally displacees received more attention from UN, which belatedly recognised them to be as vulnerable as refugees and to outnumber, by far, those who have fled crossing borders. Nevertheless, this more comprehensive approach was still considerably focused on conflict-induced displacees and, consequently, the literature on IDPs reflects these trends. What follows is an overall and non-extensive mapping of the literature about IDPs which, for the purposes of this research, helps to identify the possible gap in this literature that I intend to address.

Back in history, one of the most important treaties on the issue of displacement, the 1951 Refugee Convention (or, officially, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees), did not include internally displaced persons. The

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[41] For this kind of approach, see, for example, *Improving Outcomes in Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement Projects*, compiled by Chris de Wet, in: Refugee Studies Centre (2002), *Forced Migration Review, Vol. 12, Dilemmas of Development-Induced Displacement.*

international conceptualisation of internal displacement was only elaborated in 1998 by a report of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. This report, posteriorly known as the Guiding Principles, defines that:

> Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

As it can be seen, the main definition does not contemplate development-induced displacement. Nonetheless, Principle 6.2 (c) reads that 'The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: [...] In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests [...]'.

On this matter, a lot of what was produced and discussed over IDPs remained in the realm of international law. Most authors have concentrated their efforts in debating the role of international organisations, matters of state sovereignty — such as if IDPs should be treated exclusively as internal affairs or not — and the force of the Guiding Principles as an international binding law (Barutciski, 2002; Pettersson, 2002; Cernea, 2006). Along with it, questions revolving around ethics (Penz, 2002) and human rights (Leckie, 2002; Downing, 2002) also appear extensively in the writings about internal displacees by development works. More, a new concept, 'development cleansing', was coined by the MIT professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal (2001) to refer to the processes that involve direct or indirect violence, 'the loss of homes, lands and property due to circumstances beyond the owner's control, severe declines in their living standards and appalling housing and living conditions during their displacement' in the context of development projects (cited in Leckie, 2002, p. 20).

The ethics and human rights approaches, in the case of development-induced displacement, are notably turned to the controversies that arise from the statement on 'compelling and overriding public interests'. These writings debate over the extent to which it is possible to define what is the 'public interest', or even of which 'public' it refers to. They address controversial themes such as self-determination and equality in the context of development projects and policy. They also point towards a conceptualisation of sovereignty as responsibility, hoping to make the state accountable for those violations of human rights (Cernea, 2006, p. 26). By bringing these subjects to the table, this kind of literature contributes to move the treatment of IDPs away from simple moralism (Penz, 2002, p. 5). It

provides a framework of ethical complexity typical of a contentious, complex, multiple environment such as the real world.

So, since the UN turned its attention to IDPs, by the end of the 1990s, what Michael Cernea (2006) calls 'the research divide' gained prominence in this kind of literature. The research divide debate addresses the pros and cons of splitting — both theoretically and in policy — internally displaced people into categories such as 'conflict-displacees', 'development-displacees' and 'disaster-displacees'. On this matter in specific, Robert Muggah (2014) was one of the first to come up with a unified conceptualisation of population displacement in Brazil. By offering a typology of displacement, Muggah believes that it might help to systematise and clarify the multiple displacement phenomena under way in Brazil, since there is limited treatment of voluntary migratory patterns and 'a veritable silence in the literature on the dynamics and characteristics of forced displacement and involuntary resettlement'. Notwithstanding, Muggah suggests an interaction between the three vectors, for this approach can shine a light on underlying political economies that shape the direction of displacement in the country (2014, pp. 6-7).

The work of Cernea also pointed out that, in spite of the greater regard to the plight of development-displacees, economic knowledge was so far behind sociological and anthropological accounts on displacement and resettlement that it has created a dysfunctional gap in understanding which affects policy and practical action. Edited by Cernea, the World Bank published two seminal pieces on the economics of internal displacement. Building on welfare economics and risk analysis, the books *The Economics of Involuntary Resettlement: Questions and Challenges* (1999) and *Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees* (2000) offer a risks and reconstruction model to identify the risks inherent in resettlement and suggest ways to deal with these risks so as to reconstitute economic livelihoods and socio-cultural systems (Koenig, 2002, p. 7). It is interesting to note that the language of the books is deeply embedded of technical terms such as 'guidelines for risk identification and prediction', 'risk intensity diagnosis', and 'counter-risk mitigatory action'.

Despite its contributions to open a new and important field of research and policy concerning IDPs, Cernea's model has gone under criticism. Authors like Dolores Koenig highlighted the need of bringing a so far forgotten but sensitive topic to the debate: the *political* aspect of displacing people in the context of development works. The political 'problem' referred in this kind of literature stresses the differences in power among people in affected communities. Matters of human rights of displacees, their local autonomy and control, and their ability to

affect their interactions with national institutions are in the core of these debates. A central argument for this perspective is that resettlement impoverishes people by taking away their political power; their power to decide how and where to live (Koenig, 2002, p. 7). Admittedly, the effort of bringing the political content to the debate was a, up to then, unseen contribution to the cause of IDPs, especially because the topic is quite sensitive and, for that, avoided. I suppose, however, that it still might not be the case of how a political reading of displacement can contribute to real changes, as will be discussed ahead.

Even if there is no such chronological sequence in literature, to summarise what had been said so far in a schematic fashion, IDPs at first were not a widely-debated theme, especially in comparison to refugees. During the 1990s, internal displacement gained prominence in UN agenda, which culminated in the elaboration of the Guiding Principles in 1998. This agenda, nonetheless, was not yet comprehensive when it came to 'types' of displacements other than conflict-induced. Advocates for the inclusion of development-displacees in the Guiding Principles — with deserved prominence to the efforts of Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen — paved the way to draw attention to the phenomenon of development-induced displacement in particular. Once development-induced displacees turned out to be of greater concern for the UN, its economic component was perceived to be missing of the discussions that usually revolved around human rights, ethics and international law. Later, due to the lack of improvement even with the advent of the models, the political character of displacement was brought to the debate in the form of 'solutions' such as participatory approach to project planning and implementation.

When it comes to the 'national academy', Brazilian social scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and economists also provided alternative readings to the wrongs of Belo Monte. Fleury and Almeida's (2013) main argument, for example, is that the building of the dam is an environmental conflict. It is so in the sense that it is a conflict in which what is at stake, rather than material and symbolic disputes over the use of resources, are the experiences of society-nature relationship traversed by the notion of development. Conflict, thus, demonstrates 'a cosmopolitical dispute' once it expresses competing ontological perspectives, which clashed with modernity development project (2013, p. 142). The very parameters to define what is most important in the configuration of the world are under dispute. Thereon, nothing is as prominent as the dispute over the definition of development. If in a context of economic growth and political stability, such as that found in Brazil in past years, nothing could sound more offensive in the public

confrontation than the accusation of being against development, the debate has shifted to which type of development is desirable (2013, p. 152).

Central pieces in that are (a) which relationship with the nature is implied in development, and (b) the definition of who are the subjects qualified to intervene in the direction of these processes. As a premise of improvement in the quality of life, development is seen as unanimity. However, as a general model of modernisation, not everyone fits as beneficiaries of the process. Fleury and Almeida point out that at least since the United Nations Conference on the Environment (in 1992, known as Rio-92), the concept of development has been revised to increase the role of local communities in its definitions, but, in the current Brazilian context, more than twenty years after Rio-92, this inclusion is still far from practice. So, in the struggle to redefine the criteria for interpreting development, culture and nature — not as abstract entities to be preserved, but as a possibility of community existence, land to be planted and fruits of labour — are mobilised by local communities to confront the use of criteria such as energy generation and growth (2013, p. 153). These suggestions of 'findings ways to make people participate in the definitions of development', however, remain inscribed in what I analyse in the next half of the chapter as the 'police order'; fundamentally opposed to politics, but linked to it.

At this point, it is worth to mention that Belo Monte is not only an important event choice because of a displacement scale never seen before in similar cases in the country, or for its monstrous size, nor due to its questionable legal status, but mostly because Belo Monte is a landmark for socio-environmentalism. The 1989 Altamira Meeting took place under the legacy of a process ignited in the 1980s, when rubber tappers mobilisation lead to birth of the Alliance of Peoples of the Forest. This movement was pioneer in connecting political struggles to environmental concerns; a fundamental and distinctive aspect of socio-environmentalism in Brazil, to which the 'classic' environmentalist agenda of technical and administrative issues to solve environmental impacts or preserve nature was no longer enough (Fleury and Almeida, 2013)[42]. Since the Altamira Meeting and its aftereffects, 'traditional peoples of Amazonia', historically

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[42] It is also worth — and dignified — to mention that the politicization of environmental causes threatened to shake so deeply the interests of political and entrepreneurial oligarchies in Brazil that it led to the assassination of Chico Mendes in 1988, one of its main leaders; only two months before the Altamira Meeting. Zhouri and Laschefski (2010, p. 12 cited in Fleury and Almeida (2013, p. 143)) consider that Chico Mendes' murder represents a symbolic landmark in a double sense. On the one hand, it marked the peak of the conflicts between environmentalist and developmental views while, on the other, Chico Mendes and his companions have become emblematic in the sense of a new conception of socio-environmentalist acting.

considered to be obstacles to development or, at best, candidates to be subjected to development, 'were promoted to the frontline of modernity, basically due to its association with environmental conservation' (Carneiro da Cunha and Almeida, 2009, p. 277 cited in Fleury and Almeida, 2013, p. 144).

The very notion of 'traditional peoples' emerged from this context of ideological replacement of Amazonia. One word that showed up to describe this shift in literature over this subject is 'surprisingly'. What I suppose, however, is that this ideological replacement of Amazonia and its peoples in the projects, concepts and ordering of Brazil (call it 'development', 'progress', 'modernisation') stems mostly from their own struggles and their own representation of which was their place in this ordering; at least much more than from a gesture of kindness in the governance of these populations. 'Traditional peoples' concept was then read, and still is, as 'political subjects capable of stablishing an articulation between conservation practices and territorial rights' (Fleury and Almeida, 2013, p. 143) [Translation mine]. The argumentative connections between people and environment, pointing to the neglect of traditional peoples' interests and, consequently wellbeing, lead to rethink the conduct of development in Brazil. It is certainly important to question — as Fearnside and Laurance (2002), Maia (2011), Hall and Branford (2012), Jaichand and Sampaio (2013), Pedlowski (2013), Maia and Guerra (2015), and Radomsky (2015) did — to whom does Belo Monte and projects alike mean development.

Nonetheless, these approaches might not have been sufficient to account for the continued violence in development works and to fill the dysfunctional gap in understanding development-induced displacement which affects policy and practical action. I say so because a strong line of defence of Belo Monte project is that it has 'learned' from the mistakes of previous HPP works and incorporated the critiques against those projects. According to the company and its defenders, since the elaboration of the Environmental Impact Study (EIA) and, consequently, of the Basic Environmental Project (PBA), traditional, Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations have been treated with due recognition and respect, implying the development of more than one hundred programs and environmental projects to mitigate and offset the impacts expected from the implementation and operation of the hydroelectric plant[43]. These projects would, according to the consortium, do

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[43] All the initiatives, projects and a full statement from the company about the most common critiques are available at Norte Energia S.A. website. A statement in particular, replying to an anthropologists' interview, summarises all the rebuttals: http://norteenergiasa.com.br/site/2017/01/13/norte-energia-contesta-entrevista-de-antropologa-da-sbpc/

more than compensate patrimonial and territorial losses, but *identify and recognise rights and their owners*, evolving in the extent to which it seeks to ensure equal or better living conditions for the affected populations.

The above mentioned is a premise of Belo Monte PBA, produced by Norte Energia S.A. itself and approved by Ibama, which should be rigorously fulfilled by the project. To defend its fulfilment, the consortium reiterates that 'widely disseminated and discussed public hearings' were held in the region of Altamira during prior environmental licensing of Belo Monte HPP, 'with massive population participation, Indigenous and non-Indigenous'. Additionally, Norte Energia S.A. claims to have carried out what it calls 'Socioeconomic Development Survey' of the resident population and occupants of the Xingu River islands and banks, in the areas that were directly affected by the plant. That would have been consolidated through a project with a catchy name: 'Riparian Dialogues'. It might have sounded like music for many ears: a hydroelectric power company prone to have regular dialogues with the people. This is not surprising. The world had its eyes on Belo Monte. Raoni is worldly famous, Amazonia is of great concern to many international organisations and, 'traditional peoples' were now in the frontline of modernity.

In fact, Norte Energia S.A. did know how to articulate this socio-environmental politics in its favour, presenting itself as a 'city saviour'. When confronted about the invisibility of some groups which were not contemplated by mitigation efforts because they were assumed not to be directly affected, the company suggested that, actually, the invisibility condition occurred before Norte Energia S.A. arrived in the region, since no government agency or entity was present and providing assistance to the people. 'Help' would only have reached them after these families were recognised as rights' holders of assistance by the socio-environmental programs of the enterprise. Whether those statements in defence of Norte Energia S.A. acts are untruths or not it is beyond the point for the research. Federal Prosecution's Office has already produced a rich report on the company's non-compliance to the agreements established (the report from which most extracts of interviews in the first chapter were taken from). This can only mean that, in spite of Belo Monte 'attempt' to absorb critiques and produce 'better practices' — at least complying to minimum legal requirements — it has committed similar or worst violence of other HPPs before it.

Literature on development-induced displaced people (DIDPs) meets, then, an argumentation line which tried to address these yet failures by analysing the 'implementation process' and its impacts. It has turned towards an allegedly

'political' approach of displacement, because the core of its arguments is filled with 'empowerment', 'resilience' and 'resistance' claims. The work of Simão and Athayde (2016), for example, applies the concept of 'cultural and sociological resilience' to Cernea's risks and reconstruction model to Nova Mutum, a community affected by Jirau HPP. They concluded that resilience is fundamental to prevent impoverishment to occur after projects involving displacement, especially in 'stages 3 or 4', which are critical for the people since it is at stage 3 that the resettlement and the socioeconomic rearrangement of communities are due to happen. The relationship that communities have with rivers, forests and all the benefits they provided requires accommodation efforts to the new inhabited space, which, in cases of resettling riverine people in urban or rural inner areas, would be completely different from the previous one: there is no river, no fish, no forests and no fruits available for extraction and survival.

Some families, though, did not 'adapt' to the new space dedicated to resettlement and, with their own wherewithal, they move to other localities of the region, nearer the river, even if with less resources and without infrastructure or financial support. In cases like this, Simão and Athayde (2016) reason, one can interpret these life strategies to relocate nearer the river as a factor of socioecological and cultural resilience. Putting together the two concepts (resilience and resettlement), the authors suggest that this potentiality — of 'social agency' in reorganising communities while resettling — can be used to minimise risks of falling into poverty. Alongside with political goodwill from public administrators, professional qualification of displacees (the 'human capital' investment) and availability of financing to local development, local communities must be brought into planning and decision-making. Stage 3, therefore, is the time social agency must act to push for investment policies in welfare and, ultimately, local development. According to these arguments, it is up to communities to negotiate and achieve (or not) its claims.

Resilience is about the ability to deal with external shocks, to 'build' resilient people, and these theories do not fall far from that. Legacy to future generations falls not only on public administrators' and contractors' shoulders but also on the present community, in its capacity to mobilise, to organise 'the social capital' in search of its rights, needs and expectations. What is missing, still according to this vision of the problem, is support to empower displaced communities. Empowerment can contribute to mitigation strategies and monitoring of socio-environmental impacts if it takes into account local knowledges and strategies of social reorganisation and reconstruction of living spaces. Simão and Athayde

conclude that the joint construction of knowledge between researchers and communities (organising and sharing historical and technical information, impressions, perspectives and future visions), has the potential to contribute to the articulation and social mobilisation of these communities to *cope* with the impacts caused by negotiation, decision making and geographic displacement resulting from the construction of hydroelectric plants in the Amazon (2016, p.115).

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With this brief overview, it can be seen that the literature current debates trivialise the *politics of displacing* people in the context of development works. Even when the political aspect of displacements is on focus, it is limited to what I call the 'post-crisis', in respect to critiques of resettlement failures, or to shed light over displacees as political (not only social) agents regarding mitigation efforts. According to Muggah (2014, p. 8), 'there is in fact a rich anthropological, ethnographic and sociological literature on the ramifications of large-scale development schemes in rural areas, but it is seldom focused specifically on the characteristics of displacement', i.e., on the procedures, on the 'how to displace', on techniques of resettlement, how to deal with population. As will be discussed further ahead, elevating traditional peoples to a notion of political subjects capable of performing a role in the Amazon is not a political reading of people subjected to development practices, but just another form of organising the part-taking in the country. I will read this in light of Jacques Rancière notion of the *partition of the sensible*, which defined the modes in which subjects are perceived and represented.

Hence, as stated in the beginning, this chapter is dedicated to present the representations of displaced people in this specific relationship of part-taking. And the literature that debates DIDPs does not challenge these representations as much as it could, I believe. Once our state of understanding the development-induced displacement problem is based on a 'rights approach' — which, in general, demands better practices, governmental accountability and stands for the need to include the (to be) displacees in the processes of decision-making — what it ultimately does, even with the 'political' reading of DIDPs, is to create other partitionings of the sensible. As will be seen in Section 3.2.2, framing displacees as subjects of wrongs instead of subjects of rights can aid to read how they are political agents. What I would like to suggest with my work, then, is that the 'political approach' might be much further explored. So, if this is our state of understanding the 'development problem' in respect of displacing and resettling people, what I

perceive to be missing is the *politics of displacement*; something that should be looked at before the policies of resettlement.

3.2
The Problem of Inequality in Part-taking

The politics of displacement is not just about social exclusion. It is not only a miscarriage of policies that produce vulnerable people or affect vulnerable people the most. Displacement, in the context of forced migration at least, is an act of political exclusion rooted in modernity; in the modern forms of understanding, governing, perceiving life, particularly in the processes of capitalist accumulation and citizenship formation, and in a modern form of power, known as 'development science'. Contrary to what the literature overviewed above states through various gazes, Arturo Escobar (2003) suggests that displacement is an integral attribute of modernity, not a failure of systems that need to be perfected. The case of Belo Monte displacees is an empirical case of a theoretical problem: the problem of inequality in part-taking in what is believed to be a democratic State. So, the alternative reading for development-induced displacement I bring suggests that it will continue to happen despite revisions in the concept of 'development', despite increase in participatory science, in participatory decision-making projects and solutions alike, since them all happen under the very same order that produces these inequalities in the forms of part-taking, what will be referred to as *torsions*.

What can be done alternatively is to start an analysis by the wrongs done to the affected people rather than by their 'rights'; which would look like the normal place to start. But that is the point of departure: 'normality' is an attribute of the regular order, what I will analyse as *police order*, the existing distribution of the sensible. By departing from the torsions on the social instead of from the natural order, which would investigate development-induced displacement as a consequence of malpractices, as technical mismanagement, as failure to observe the law and so forth (as the literature reviewed presents), one can claim that it is political exclusion that explains displacement. It is political exclusion in a twofold sense. First because it is by excluding 'the political', the polemic, from the social that we create an order — a seemingly natural order in which this type of consequence in a development project is minimally acceptable or 'predictable'; and what can be done about it reach as far as 'mitigation efforts' go. Second, because it is through this 'non-political' order that power remains restricted to certain people

(be it Congress, Ibama, Federal Administration), once it attributes no part in politics, in speaking, in considering the will and the choices of the displaced.

To read forced migration in the context of Belo Monte as a political problem, I theorise development-induced displacement in Rancièrian terms. Jacques Rancière is a contemporary political thinker who reads *politics* as 'verifications of equality'. In the case I make, this means that in order to commit illiberal, violent, dignity defiant practices such as the burn of a home (narrated in the words of Raimunda in the previous chapter), the demolishing of a house in no time to withdraw personal belongings, the flood of an entire region, State (and the institutions entitled by the State to build the dam) could not make room for verifications of equality: it had to ignore it or, at least, render it invisible. There are a few ways that can be identified in Belo Monte context to ignore radical equality. I have chosen four of them to examine. But first, it is important to understand the crucial role 'equality' plays in Rancière's theory. Unlike other theorists who have structured political thought to reach the essence of equality, or to conclude ways of achieving equal terms, putting it as a value or a goal, for Rancière equality is in the beginning of the theory: it is a presupposition.

Drawing from the work of Joseph Jacotot, Rancière suggests that equality should be a presupposition, 'a practice rather than a reward situated in some distant future' (1991, p. xix). 'All people are equally intelligent', a statement from Jacotot, is the epitome of his thought. In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* (1991), to be specific, he was concerned with the philosophical and historical relations between knowledge and 'the masses'. The act of teaching, he believed, rested on the condition of inequality between a knowledge and a non-knowledge — or between an 'already' knowledge and a knowledge 'to become'. The pedagogical fiction, therefore, works by representing inequality in terms of velocity: slowness, delay and, especially, backwardness. Most importantly, this fundamental pedagogical fiction bears resemblance to the XIX century myth of progress, from which modernisation and development theories grew their roots. In our times, this fiction has been cast on global scale: just like the student will never catch up with the professor, developing nations will never catch up with enlightened ones (1991, p. xx).

The point, nonetheless, is that even to realise the inequality between the one who knows and the ignorant, the developed and the underdeveloped, equality is needed: the two parts must be equally capable of acknowledging their roles and the part they take in the relationship, at least. That is, only equality can acknowledge inequality, and not the other way around. So, if all people are equally

intelligent, Rancière did not believe in the division of labour that separates the intellectual's science from ordinary experience, since this would be nothing more than an ideological fallacy which perpetuates the relations of domination. This means that the analysis of domination and exclusion cannot be carried out from above or behind the back of the exploited, but has to be carried out immanently, in the exploited's own words and actions (Deranty, 2003). The methodological consequence which stems from this commitment to equality, then, is to add a voice to the vulnerable instead of interpret them. This explains why I have adopted the method of 'storytelling': the simple recounting of the dominated experiences stated in interviews, in front of documentary cameras, in their own reports or testimonies.

The *theoretical* in Rancière thought is, according to Deranty (2003), the articulation in theory of the thoughts and the experiences of social actors: 'I always say that we are simply considered disposable objects with this project. We are simply disposable.' (Raimunda, in *Belo Monte: After the Flood*, Southgate, 2016). I read the politics of displacing people by development works, then, through the thoughts and the experiences of small farmers, riparian and Indigenous people — through their storytelling — who have themselves made sense of their exclusion; i.e. who have pragmatically verified their equality in struggles and demands: this is *the political* for Rancière. In acknowledging the inequality in society and State practices, by putting forward their claims of equality, displacees make evident their political status: a supplementary part, necessary to constitute social order but at the same time, as Raimunda says, disposable. It is this entanglement between equality and inequality that Rancière uses to point out the fallacy of the radical separation between social and political, private and public, between the master and the student, the developed and the underdeveloped.

As said in the beginning of this section, the modern forms of understanding, governing, perceiving life, particularly in the processes of capitalist accumulation and citizenship formation, works under the assumption that the social has a nature of its own: an unequal structure, which some believe needs to be constantly perfected to achieve equality. And, for that purpose, world has seen the birth of many 'techniques' and devices, ranging from international cooperation for development to local charities. The organising principles of the past, Rancière suggests, did not account for every form of relation — of every unequal structure — since humans are governed by those who hold the titles to rule; the superiority of 'birth', in God or human affiliation, the power of wealth, or a combination of both. The only title capable of cutting through structuring differences in the fabric of social life is the absence of any title to govern, what Rancière names 'anarchic title'

(2014 [2005], p. 63). In our times, the principle of governing societies is 'politics', in which the very premise of superiority over ancient forms of rule is the absolute absence of any principle of superiority. So, if politics requires the absence of entitlements to govern, *democracy* gives that to it.

But the power of the *demos*, of the mob, of the people, is a power with no 'natural' reason to govern the ones with no 'natural' reason to be governed, since it is the power of anyone. Which means, only equals choose who will be distinguished, or entitled, to rule. For Rancière, equality is no fiction or goal, but it is in the beginning of the forms of government: an irreducible equality. Hobbes, Rousseau and the modern thinkers of 'social contracts' realised that political power lies in the irreducible equality of perception (at least), since the sovereign, in order to rule sovereignly, had to be acknowledged as such by the ruled people. This is to say that only equality can found inequality or again, in other words, equality is needed so that inequality can work. Consequently, the radical opposition of the social to the political must be rejected since the underlying principle of social order is hierarchy, which is only logically possible on the basis of a radical equality to make sense of it. This tension between the logics of the social and the logics of the political is what Rancière conceived as the logic of the *wrung*: a wrong within, a tort (Deranty, 2003).

I believe Rancière's theoretical insights much contribute to think about the politics of displacement. It is a true 'wrong within' to admit that the State, which is *supposedly* operating to organise social life in an equal way, since it was put together to work in favour of all in the sovereign body of its people, is responsible for producing inequalities and violations of rights. So, where does this distortion happens? Put in another way, if (for Rancière, whose theoretical intuition I betake) *the political* works under the assumption of a radical equality, of a break between affiliation or wealth and the principles of government, and if democracy is a form of rule that does not rest on entitlements to rule, then *politics* is in essence democratic. However, this does not seem to correspond to the actual practices of 'democratic regimes', vide for example how Brazilian Federal Government carried on the Belo Monte project. That is why Rancière distinguishes between *politics* and *police*. If politics is the dissent, if it creates polemic scenes by denouncing ways in which fundamental equality is wrung into social inequality, police is the organising force, one which unifies and identifies a structure of multiplicity, like the social field (Deranty, 2003).

Police is not a social function but a symbolic constitution of the social presented as naturally ordered. The essence of police, Rancière states, is neither

repression nor even control over the living. 'Its essence is a certain manner of *partitioning the sensible*': a general law that defines the forms of part-taking (2001, Theses n°7, Emphasis added). Part-taking is the second crucial concept in his theoretical intuition, because it means both that which separates and excludes and, at the same time, that which allows participation. Importantly, *police* and *politics* should not be valued in normative terms; there is no better or worse in this. Police order exists because the social body is constituted by differences in birth, by different functions, locations and interests (2001, Theses n°8). Under the police order, there is no excess; i.e., 'all parts' have been counted, and functions, places, ways of being were all accounted for. Accordingly, in *police* logics the models of govern and the practices of authority are based on a given 'natural' distribution of places and competencies; one which forces order, hence 'police'.

So, as a structure that regulates the social field — which is historically organised by the 'play of oligarchies' (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 70) — police is oligarchic. Saying that we live in 'democratic regimes' is but a fiction destined to legitimate this or that arbitrary (to the entirety of people) principle of government. Democracy will never be fully identified to one juridical-political form, because its essence is to always *differ*, to never establish orders and orderings, or to determine what is visible and what is sayable, not to divide the sensible, therefore, but to always make the move to include the excess, the 'part with no-part', the *demos*. Thus, what we call 'democracies' are only governments of representation, through which elites in fact exercise, in the name of the people, the power that they are compelled to grant to the people without acknowledging it as born in a foundational equality (in the form of, for example, an electoral system) — otherwise there would be no other reason for them to rule more than to be ruled (2014 [2005], p. 69). Logically, this is the precise opposite of Rancière's democracy. And there is the distortion.

Once I have established that the Belo Monte event has not actually happened under a 'truly' democratic rule, given that it is neither a State or a state (of affairs), nor an achieved way of governing life, and that the social and the political are not radically opposed, I can now move to the specifics of sustaining this fiction.

3.2.1
Development and the Separation between Public and Private

Looking at State elites and its partners actual practices of dividing the sensible, instead of to the supposedly normal rationale driving their decisions, one can realise that in many occasions, like Belo Monte, what these oligarchies really end up doing is working to each other. Having in mind what was previously discussed, what we consider to be 'representative democracies' is no more than a form of State functioning, based initially on the privilege of 'natural' elites and gradually diverted from its function by democratic struggles (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 71). The play of oligarchies need, in this way, to happen on a façade of purity of the public, which means it need to expurgate continuously the individual interest from the public space. Only that way the police order can claim to be enforceable to the entirety of the governed. The effort of the ruling elites, therefore, is to constantly reduce the public sphere, the sphere in which 'everyone' has a voice, a space where decisions are applicable to the, unitary, collective of the population. This effort to keep the public as restricted as possible has two main and intertwined purposes: to reduce the possibilities of intervention of democratic moves and, so, to keep power where it is. Separating public and private is the first way (of four I analyse) to divide the sensible, rendering radical equality invisible and trying to reduce the space for dissensus.

Given the extent and diversity of impacts of building a hydroelectric dam, it certainly is not an easy project to carry on, or justify. But the distribution of spheres between *public* and *private* interests is competent enough to frame infrastructural works as an entirely public domain, which must be carried on for the good of Brazilian society, and which impacts are justifiable on the basis of economic needs; keeping dissent and interventions away. It is always posited on the argument of benefits to the totality of 'Brazilian body', as can be read not only in the statement of the Mayor of Altamira city, '*We who live here are in favour because we are Brazilian too'*, but also on the sayings of Dilma and Lula, abovementioned. The debate on the power of the concept of 'national interest' that is usually approached by literature discussing sovereignty, ethics and human rights (as pointed out in the previous section) left aside the questioning of how 'public' itself is configured. United Nations' Guiding Principles on displacement and resettlement, as also mentioned before, admits that arbitrary displacement *can* happen in projects justified by 'compelling and overriding public interests' (Principle 6.2). Therefore,

according to Rancièrian thought, there is a consensual vision in the logics of oligarchic system: *economy* is an unescapable, and single, reality.

The unlimited power of wealth, as Rancière frames *economy* read in terms of a science (economics), leaves no way out to governments and its representatives other than to give adapted answers — regardless of different opinions, aspirations, leaving no room for interpretation of the 'scientific laws' of growth (2014 [2005], p. 98). In the documentary film *Belo Monte: Announcement of a War* (André D'Elia, 2012) a regional politician, Nicias Ribeiro (PSDB-Pará), speaks this gospel truth: 'in the modern world, no one survives without electric energy […] so how can I stand against Belo Monte? Belo Monte is very good to Brazil. It will solve the problem of electric energy once and for all'. As part of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), the hydroelectric complex is seen by the Federal Government as a pivot-work of development in the country. The Ministry of Mines and Energy, in the FAQ section about the plant, on its website, when inquired over the real need to build Belo Monte complex, replies that the annual growth targets of 5% of GDP over the next 10 years could be compromised if the power supply was not increased. Right after mentioning 'growth', the Ministry suggests that to keep up with the efforts to 'eradicate poverty and to better income distribution', the country must install each year, about 5,000 MW of additional capacity[44].

Energy security seems to be completely undebatable, especially if put in the context of reducing inequalities through GDP growth. It is interesting to think how the schedule of progress of the enterprise (which could not wait until all the conditionalities were met to begin the installation process), the fear of a 'blackout' yet to come, the need to install each year 5,000 MW of additional capacity to guarantee growth, are things much more relevant than the rights of the people to be affected. It is equally interesting to read from that a logic of what can be sacrificed, of what kinds of things one is willing to dispose, of what kinds of people one is willing to dispose, to remember Raimunda's words in the beginning of Section 3.2. So,

> if in fact the non-limitation of the wealth is the inescapable reality of our world and its future, it is up to governments concerned with a realistic management of the present and a bold prediction of the future to eliminate the inertia that exists in the interior of national states is opposed to its free development. *Conversely, however, as this development has no limits, it is not concerned with the particular destiny of this or that population or fraction of population in the territory of this or that State.*

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[44] *Belo Monte Hydroelectric Plant Project, FAQ*, Energy Research Company, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Brazil. Available in full at: http://www.epe.gov.br/leiloes/Documents/Leilão%20Belo%20Monte/Belo%20Monte%20-%20Perguntas%20Frequentes%20-%20POR.pdf

Thus, it is for the governments of these states to restrict it, to subject the uncontrollable and ubiquitous force of wealth to the interests of these populations. (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 98) [Translation mine] [Emphasis added]

The second way in which the sensible is partitioned is through the conception of 'real science'. Real science, says Rancière, consists on finding the right measure between equality and inequality, which means, a knowledge on how to manage the local effects of the 'global need for wealth' over the population. To that is what we call *modernisation*: a 'marriage' between the principle of wealth and the principle of science, which founds the new oligarchic legitimacy (2014 [2005], p. 99). The role *development* occupies in this case (as I read in this work) is of a science which justifies the anti-democratic practices detailed in the previous chapter as a matter of technical decision, a decision that does not need to be chosen or debated, once it stems from the knowledge of the objective state of things, which is a matter for the specialist, and not for the popular choice (2014 [2005], p. 100). This takes me back to *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*'s premise, on the equality of intellect — and of disposition to make sense of the world. Displacees point out that this division between the unquestionable intellectual's science and ordinary experience is flawed and, actually, arbitrary.

Raimunda Gomes da Silva, a fisherwoman who knows the fish of the Xingu in the intimacy of everyday life and who, until Belo Monte was built, depended on them to generate income, intercepted Jansen Zuanon, a researcher at the National Institute of Amazonian Research (INPA), and one of the leading fish scholars in the Amazon region, in some of the few meetings between researchers, riverines and technicians from Ibama and the National Water Agency (ANA), among others. Eliane Brum, a journalist covering the meeting, reports that Raimunda's black hand caught Jansen by his very white arm, while he walked down the ladder to leave: 'There is no teacher with 15 universities who knows more about the river than one *colono*[45]. We have no reading, but we do have wisdom. Listen to what I'm telling you: it's us who support this elite. It is the thick hand that sustains the fine hand.'[46]

Not to mention the loss of rich, ancient, tacit and immersed knowledge on the regional biodiversity — since local knowledge lost its space for exercise and renovation in the disarticulation of these ways of life, possibly leading to prejudice

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[45] A word which in English would mean 'settler' but that in the current context is used to refer to riparians, small farmers and Indigenous peoples who dwell the countryside, mostly descendants of the first inhabitants of Amazonia, encouraged by the State to populate the inner lands, such as the rubber tappers.

[46] News report *'The rhythm of hunger is not that of bureaucracy'* (*O ritmo da fome não é o da burocracia*, original title), Eliane Brum, El País, November 21, 2016. Available in full at: https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/11/21/opinion/1479734590_770064.html

to mainstream science itself in Brazil — Raimunda acknowledged that the inequality of her private life now sustains the seemly 'purity' of the public, in which one finds the technical. The public is not pure but it is made pure by the exclusion of Raimundas in their democratic excess. She would not understand the language of the technicalities, taken into account by the private consortium Norte Energia S.A. to not consider her house a proper residence worthy of restitution, because the language of technicalities is a private one. The ones in charge of restitutions told her that her house

> was a 'tapiri'[47]. [To what] Raimunda replied, 'In your language it can be all that. But in mine, it's my home. And I felt good in it, you see?'. When she found her house turning into ashes, Raimunda sat down by the river:

> — I would never imagine they would set fire to it. If I go to set fire to their office, I'm in jail for the rest of my life. They set fire to my house and nothing happens. *It is the prophecy of the end of the world that my father spoke about, the big wheel cutting across the little one.* (Raimunda Gomes da Silva, former resident of the Barriguda Island (PA), interviewed by Eliane Brum, El País, September 22, 2015) [Translation mine] [Emphasis added]

But development is also part of those practices themselves of dividing the sensible, where lies the sayable and the debatable. In this sense, Escobar's (2003) premise that displacement is an integral attribute of modernity, not a failure of systems that need to be perfected can be understood as a logical consequence of systems of rule which founds their legitimacy in principles of wealth and in a unitary comprehension of science. Raimunda and the displacees have manifested their disagreement not only to the technical dimension (the way the project was carried ahead, without proper consultation, without previous and in-depth study of the area and its peoples, without the elaboration of a register and so forth) but also to the modern faith on the need to build such a monstrous enclave in the heart of Xingu region. The oligarchs, the government, its specialists, the engineers, and its ideologues, the economists, read their dissent as an act not of politics but of ignorance: if science cannot impose its legitimacy, it must be because of ignorance (2014 [2005], p. 101). That is, if after one or two meetings with technicians who would 'enlighten' the to-be displacees about the unescapable need to build the dam, to displace them, to relocate them, even if after all the *explanations* were given they still did not conform to the role of the one who would be displaced, it could only be because they were backward and therefore could never grasp the unavoidable rolling of the wheel of wealth.

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[47] *Tapiri* is an Indigenous word for a temporary stall, but it is mostly used in the pejorative sense to refer to poor houses or local stilts, in attempts to disqualify certain residences.

But they were misled. Raimunda's father could grasp it. And way before Belo Monte. Perhaps because he knew, by his own life experiences, that the prophecies of the gospel of development recurrently come true.

3.2.2
From Subjects of Rights to Subjects of Wrongs

Once the social is seen not as unitary, not consensual but made of a myriad of histories, origins, filiations, religions, cosmological views and much more, in order to rule the social, our modern governments must incarnate unitary principles of ordering. As both a science and a practice, then, development is believed to work for that purpose since it can supposedly resolve these torsions by pointing ways to elevate the ones who are at the downside on the social fabric. *Sustainable development* is one example of that. It means, generally, that development should not deplete world's resources, so that they can endure for future generations. So, the idea behind sustainable development is resilience. As Reid states, 'the resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, not a political subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structures and conditions of possibility' (2013, p. 109). When literature on DIDPs, as seen, discussed the 'agency' of displacees as political subjects who could — and should be empowered to — dispute their rights during phase X or Y of resettlement in a project, those theories were actually disputing new divisions of the sensible, not *politics*.

Therefore, the logics that development is needed and unescapable, and the matter is mostly what 'brand' of development is to be adopted remains untouched. In isolating the natural ways of governing from the possible critiques and in taking development as the natural functioning way not much more is done other than ascribing new places in the same logics of separation between social and political, private and public, to whomever is to be affected. A cosmopolitics such as sustainable development aims at the composition of a common world, of a cosmos, which must be realized *with* others, those excluded from republican political modernity: the non-modern ('forest peoples', rural communities), the nonhumans (environmental reports, rivers, forests, animals) and/or the supernatural (religions, beliefs, fetishes) (Fleury and Almeida, 2013, p. 152). Accordingly, UNDP states that:

> The main challenge in the Amazon for the coming years is finding development pathways that combine environmental protection and poverty reduction, *leaving no one behind*. The Amazon is a unique space of diverse but interlinked actors,

cultures and landscapes, conflicting interests and layered rights, under rapid change, and with many entrenched incentives and conditions for unsustainable development. (UNDP Policy Paper, *The Amazon and Agenda 2030*, 2016, p. 29) [Emphasis added]

Leaving no one behind is a pretty powerful idea if we think (a) that state development practices are due to embrace the entirety of the population and bring *everyone* forward (because behind is backward), (b) that there is no alternative to it, since the wheel of wealth is unescapable and it is up to governments only to manage the impacts of the global pressure for resources over local people, and (c) that political struggle counts parts that were left behind; the democratic excess. So, there is not much room for dissent and, therefore, for democracy when it comes to development, be it locally or globally policed. UNDP and other international institutions that are bound to help vulnerable people end up feeding back the political dynamic oligarchies play in states. So, through a Rancièrian gaze, whatever development theory policy makers take, however Brazil (as an unitary project) decides to read the place of Amazonia, in any way United Nations and international organisations make sense about who is supposed to do what and in which (natural or not) ways, if it pretends to explain, enlighten, develop, there is no possibility to do it — divide society to rule it — if not leaving something (rivers, forests, animals, religions, beliefs) or someone (riparians, Indigenous, 'forests people', traditional peoples, and so forth) aside.

As a matter of fact, there is no way of *not* leaving someone behind since what is needed to organise the whole (everyone) is to determine who takes part in it and who does not; as seen in the discussion on how private interests are shaped not to take part on public sphere. In its turn, this is done on the basis of social logics, of 'natural ways' of perceiving places and functions, which is a logic of inequality, hierarchy and, ultimately, domination. For example, the moto of UNDP is 'Empowered lives. Resilient Nations.' UNDP believes that

> international organizations […] can address the challenges the Amazon faces by mobilizing scientific and technical expertise from academia, civil society, and the private sector in support of sustainable development problem solving at local, national, and global scales with integrated solutions. (UNDP Policy Paper, *The Amazon and Agenda 2030*, 2016, p. 29)

That is, certain knowledges and experiences are rendered legible to empower unequally capable subjects, justifying the projection of social hierarchies into the political, i.e., justifying domination. In this way, the partition of the sensible, a general law that defines the forms of part-taking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed (Rancière, 2001, p. 9), is reproduced on a different arrangement, but yet reproduced.

Representative systems, as I began Section 3.2.1 analysing, are taken as a good criterion for the expression of the plurality of interests in society and, with that, for the guarantee of equal distribution of rights. Allegedly, it was designed to widen this part-taking in politics; thereby a tool for empowerment. In order to be called 'democratic', a representative system should gather some rules such as the control of the interference of economic powers in electoral processes, to guarantee the separation of public and private interests, hence purifying the public (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 93). The concept might be good, but the actual practices of the elites, notably in Belo Monte, are far from what is understood as a democratic representative system. Public-private partnerships are supposed to work for the common good by delivering what cannot be provided by public administration. They would also be a public concern once governments pay a periodic remuneration linked to the performance of the PPP during the period of reference, and that budget comes from public money: taxpayers' money.

Belo Monte consortium, however, is under investigation for taking part into a bribing scheme in exchange for public-private arrangements, like the dam. Along with it, Santo Antônio and Jirau HPPs, which preceded Belo Monte (and were mentioned in the opening of the second chapter), were brought up by whistle-blowers on the Operation Car Wash, the largest investigation on corruption carried out in the country by Federal Police. According to the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, Otávio Marques de Azevedo, former president of Andrade Gutierrez S.A., one of the largest contractors in the country, revealed to Operation Car Wash a kickback scheme in the amount of 150 million reais involving the hydroelectric plant. Other companies, such as Odebrecht and Furnas Centrais Elétricas are equally involved in both Madeira's HPPs and Belo Monte bribing schemes. The money would be divided equally between PT and PMDB and would have been handed over by the builders involved in the hydroelectric project in the form of legal grants to the 2010, 2012 and 2014 election campaigns. Basically, money laundering by way of campaign financing. If the scheme exposed by the plea-bargain is proven, Belo Monte can reach the then president Dilma Rousseff[48].

The appropriation of the public 'thing' (*res publica*) by a solid alliance between the state oligarchy and the economic one is the disappointing face of our so called representative democratic regimes. The public-private promiscuity,

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[48] Eliane Brum, the *El País* journalist covering the minutiae of Belo Monte, analyses the architecture of the corruption in the construction of the dam in two articles of her weekly column in the newspaper. Available in: https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2016/04/11/opinion/1460390361_909016.html and in https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2015/07/06/opinion/1436195768_857181.html

whose partnership is far from being with 'the sovereign people', and the political world of democracy do not work in a register of rights: neither of doing what is right and just, nor of the rights of people. In his way, Rancière suggests that "the evils that plague our 'democracies' are linked in the first place to the insatiable appetite of the oligarchs" (2014 [2005], p. 94). Once democracy is not a state of things nor a regime corresponding to what everyday life and daily news report, Brazilian State is not a State of democratic rights, but one of oligarchic rights. States of oligarchic rights are the ones in which 'the power of oligarchies is limited by the double acknowledgement of popular sovereignty and individual freedoms' (2014 [2005], p. 94). These freedoms, nonetheless, are not a blessing from the oligarchs but have been achieved by force of democratic moves. In this way, 'the rights of man and the citizen are the rights of those who make them real' (2014 [2005], p. 95).

Here, the argument of Rancière is at its clearest for the empirical problem of Belo Monte. 'Human rights speeches' are the third way of partitioning the sensible in Belo Monte. If DIDPs need to present their claims in the form of claims for human rights, it is because 'human rights' do not actually work as we believe them to, i.e., on the premise of the *innate rights of the human*. As pointed out by seminal authors on citizenship like Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, the 'bare' human, the human without belonging to a constituted national community, has no rights. Human rights are then the empty rights of those who have no rights; or the rights of the ones belonging to a national community. That means saying that human rights are the rights of the citizens of the nation, the rights of those who have rights, which is pure tautology (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 76). It is therefore unfruitful to begin the analysis of development-induced displacement by critiques of how displacees rights have been violated because those approaches work under the assumption that *the political* has a single principle; the principle of duality: citizen *versus* human, reality *versus* illusion, equality *versus* inequality. They are caught in tautology when they resort to the very source of rights, the State, to solve a problem of this way of creating the distribution of the sensible in our political communities, the States.

It is precisely by making explicit their equality through the denial of their rights, of presenting the *wrung*, the torsion on the seemly natural order, or even the equality that sustains inequality, that displacees make their rights real. The 'positivity' of attributing equal rights to citizens (which is one way of partitioning the sensible) is disrupted at the moment when this partition is contested from a part who took no-part in it; who took no-part in having rights during a given event of building a hydroelectric dam. Considering the equality of intellect, every human

being is capable of acknowledging its own absence in the part-taking, therefore conflicting the seemingly integral, universal and international system of human rights with the actual fact of her/his exclusion. Riparian and Indigenous in Belo Monte, through social movements or even in front of documentary cameras enacted the polemic scenes of 'an eruption of negativity, of thinking, into a social category', the dispossessed of rights (or the violated in its rights), anteriorly defined by the positivity of *having* rights (1991, p. *xviii*). Political subjects, then, are not born in law or in constitutional texts but in the gap between identities: in this case, between the ones who have rights and the ones to whom rights are denied.

This takes me to the fourth and last analysis on the partition of the sensible chosen to be read as part of the *wrungs* in development-induced displacement. So, if we live in states in which 'rights' are given not by simple and single principles of belonging, but achieved by verifications of equality, i.e. by democratic action and maintained by this action, we live in states of oligarchic rights. Going back to it, in states of oligarchic rights 'the power of oligarchies is limited by the double acknowledgement of popular sovereignty and individual freedoms' (Rancière, 2014 [2005], p. 94). The fiction of the sovereign people is a way to include the democratic excess, to transform in a principle of order the anarchic principle of not having title to govern. It is, therefore, an attempt to accommodate and police dissent. Representatives regimes of popular sovereignty give to a minority the power to govern without disturbances and to create both a majority and an opposition who are in agreement to this ordering; even if in disagreement to what happens inside this ordering. But popular sovereignty also allows the oligarchy to defend itself against democratic excesses pointed out from outside the State.

In the literature review section, I have looked at some of the debates about IDPs as they emerge from *within* the contributions that focuses on IDPs. However, the initial separation between *internal* and *external* displacement is also a way of organising the particular claims the subject can make, to whom it should report them and who has the authority to respond to them. The places to speak and also to hear are fixed in the differences between displacees and refugees. These differences matter because of the way that sovereignty is located in the State. State sovereignty works both as the rule of oligarchy over the population — consented by the principle of popular sovereignty discussed in the last paragraph — and as the principle of equality between States in the international system. That is, once sovereignty is a principle of *arkhé* based on authority, it draws boundaries and borders between who has the authority to displace and who has the authority to challenge it. This inside/outside kind of problem is made evident in the way the

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organisation of American States (OAS) responded to a complaint filed in November 2010 on behalf of several traditional communities in the Xingu basin, by the Movement Xingu Forever Alive, the Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon (COIAB), Territorial Prelature of Xingu, Indigenous Missionary Council of Brazil (CIMI), Pará's Society for the Defense of Human Rights (SDDH), Global Justice and the Inter-American Association for Environmental Defence (AIDA).

On 5 April 2011, IACHR requested Brazilian government to stop the works until the constitutional matters pending with Indigenous peoples were resolved, which included the need to carry on a proper consultation of the to-be affected communities. For the distribution of the world's sensible, the logics of international politics, internal displacement is a national problem, because only the absence of an *arkhé* (anarchy) can guarantee sovereign equality on the international system. So, there is no one entitled in the international to challenge the authority of the State. Some authors mentioned in the literature review (like Barutciski, 2002; Pettersson, 2002; Cernea, 2006) have addressed the inside/outside problem by framing sovereignty as responsibility, therefore questioning States' capacity to deliver the protection of human rights. Ultimately, this means questioning national sovereignty, if we consider that in the sovereign fiction there is only sovereignty in exchange of the protection of people. In the documentary film *Belo Monte: Announcement of a War* (André D'Elia, 2012) the regional politician, Nicias Ribeiro (PSDB-Pará), wrathfully interprets the inside/outside problem: 'Who is the OAS to debate an internal matter of Brazil? If, by any chance there were any accidents, if Belo Monte caused some disaster, this catastrophe would be confined to the Xingu River. If it caused any harm, it would be restricted to a portion of the Brazilian people and to Brazil'.

Mr. Ribeiro meant to say that the division between national matters and international matters is very obvious and accounts for the territorial space in which this given matter happens. In (ac)counting the parts and places, Mr. Ribeiro ignored — both in the sense of 'missing' their counting, but also because hearing them would put in check sovereignty fiction inside and outside the State — people like Raoni. Raoni, the worldly famous Indigenous leader mentioned in Chapter Two, who became friends with Sting, understood that he could not change the political practices Brazilian State has been having in respect to Indigenous peoples since colonial times. The political subjectivity the State has given to him ranges from neglect and invisibility to confrontation or conversion. As a leader, not only of people to be affected by the dam but also as representative of 'traditional peoples

of Amazonia' (who were now, as seen before, in the frontline of modernity due to its association with environmental conservation), Brazilian State expected that Raoni would talk his fellows through the building of the dam. The democratic move of Raoni is not one of aiming to change the political subjectivity State gives to him, but it is a move of changing his political status.

Raoni challenges the inside/outside authority by giving up the State as a part qualified to deliver and guarantee the rights of its people. In 2011, during a visit to France, he spoke openly against the Belo Monte project, denouncing the violations of human rights and the complicity of Brazilian State, and asking for the support of the French president. The following year, during a United Nations Special Group visit to the region, an Indigenous woman stated that 'we want our rights […] the government always rolls over our rights and we are here to ask for help'[49]. When government took the arbitrary decision to build Belo Monte and left to Indigenous, riparians and smalls farmers the space of a couple of meetings with engineers, Ibama technicians and consortium representatives to debate resettlement options and to *explain* them what Belo Monte meant to Brazil, it has made them supplementary people, for they were not counted for taking part on the decision in the first place. Being shut or made inexistent, displacees return subversively when they denounce internationally the torsions in human rights of a national sovereign State; i.e., the wrongs within the very notion of citizenship (a quality of the ones who have rights). That is to say, democratic excess leaks through borders and boundaries.

<center>***</center>

The main point of this dissertation is to present displacees as political agents. Or, better said, how they enact the political agency denied to them in development projects like Belo Monte. I began by pointing out that politics remains a relatively marginal issue in the literature on displacement which addresses a wide range of themes: it goes from technical and social approaches, international law, international relations, state relations, international organisations, donors-receivers' interactions, better practices, UN, its agencies' mandate and sovereignty, to the economics of displacement, resilience and social agency of displacees through human rights claims and empowerment. Literature thereby separates a political democratic reading of displacement from its socio-economic scope. But before thinking about them as political agents one has to think about how they are represented, so that political agency can claim its dissent. While

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[49] *Belo Monte: Announcement of a War*, documentary film by André D'Elia, Cinedelia, 2012.

State, its institutions, economic oligarchies and even international organisations depict displacees as subjects of rights, this chapter has discussed how a political reading of displacement requires to see displacees as subjects of wrongs.

Aradau and Huysmans (2009) debated the quasi absence of a political reading of mobility as democratic expression and democratic practice on the international by pointing that the lack of political analysis is not simply the result of disciplinary divides between sociology and political science, between a political and a more socio-economic theorising of the international and so forth (2009, p. 585). Rather, most importantly, politics is primarily interpreted as 'a question of the formation and exercise of democratic authority formulated in terms of representative institutions, political accountability and a public sphere where opinions can circulate and be negotiated' (2009, p. 585). Thereby, challenging the narrative of displacement as a social exclusion puts in for challenging the artificial and arbitrary divide between the social and the political. Being the social the realm of inequalities and hierarchic rule and what we understand as the political the space for equal representation, I have shown how in fact what we assume to be representative democracies are more mirrors of social difference and domination than spaces of radical equality. The implications of such a shift was to begin an analysis of displacees as subjects of wrongs rather than as people who were subjects under the inscription of the citizen because they had rights, since their lives told and evidenced a different story.

Displacees enactment of democratic moments — i.e., the *politics* of displacement, in a Rancièrian reading of what constitutes the political — reveals that approaching the problem of development-induced displacement by claiming displacees to be subjects of rights falls on the trap of recurring to the same practices of distribution of the sensible that have prevented them from having their rights guaranteed in the first place. The representation of their space as subjects of rights, whose role is to either accept and act resiliently to cope with the mitigation efforts predicted by law or to be empowered to fight for better compensation rights, make evident their political status: they belong to *the mob*, to the part with no-part in political play and in the society mirrored by what counts as public and political and what counts as private and social. They are included in the sovereign people of 'representative democracy' by force of exclusion, a democratic excess therefore. By speaking out the wrongs done to them (which is framing themselves as subjects of wrongs) displacees want to see recognised their denied equality as meaningful speakers, supplementing the community.

These verifications of equality make evident the structuring inequality in

social order once they create situations of dialogue and spaces of contest which were previously shut or inexistent. In order to build this way of understanding what I have called the politics of displacement of people in terms of wrongs, I will avail my analysis of the contributions of Henri Lefebvre, Stuart Elden, Neil Brenner, Bertha Becker and others to read displacement as a conflict over the production of space. Space is a critical concept which has been wrongly and wrungly appreciated in Belo Monte. Part of displacees effort to create new scenes for themselves, other spaces of representation, was to show their unconformity to modern and private understandings of space and space relations, like home. After I have begun my analysis by an empirical description of the wrongs in Belo Monte, followed by a theoretical appreciation of why and under which practices and processes these people have been forced out of their ways of life by a seemly democratic regime, I turn now to the contribution of framing displacement as a political exclusion to which political answers are given through their practices of resistance. The next chapter is dedicated to that.

Figure 3. Public telephone deactivated in one street of the Volta Grande do Xingu, already partially invaded by the dam's waters. "The one who is 'unaccounted-for', the one who has no speech to be heard, is the one of the *demos"*. (Rancière, 2001)

Photo: Lilo Clareto.

4
The Politics of Displacement

Displacees are the part with no-part in Brazilian liberal democracy. Our societies' conception of what is the government celebrates 'pure politics' as a domain of what righteously concerns and accounts for every citizen. The ideas of Jacques Rancière however have shown that, in practice, this celebration of pure politics entrusts the virtue of the 'political good' to governmental oligarchies enlightened by 'experts'. That is to say that the supposed purification of the political, freed from particular interests, 'comes down to nothing more (or less) than the reduction of the political to the State' (Rancière, 2001, p. 2). The public has a good or specific universality which represents the space of belonging in terms of what is political and what is social, what or who are proper to politics and what or who are not. That is what I have called, following Rancière, the police. So, police is a specific relationship of part-taking where partitioning is both participation in a common set, the sovereign people represented by political oligarchies, and the division into parts, those whose way of life is proper to rule and those whose way of life is proper to be ruled.

In fact, development displacees are *'a'* part with no-part in Brazilian liberal democracy, because there are as many alterities as common shares in society. The partition of the sensible makes visible who can take part in the common according to what it does, to the time and to the space in which this activity is carried out. And time and space are two important concepts in Belo Monte. In other words, having this or that occupation defines competencies or incompetence for the common. It defines the fact of being or not visible in a common space, endowed with a common word (Rancière, 2000). Ultimately, the partition of the sensible happens through systems of representations. The part required to conform the 'common', the community, the whole of the society, but which is excluded from political practice for its unconformity or lack of properties to rule is the surplus, the democratic excess. This excess is, then, a supplementary part needed in principle to legitimise a 'democratic' form of rule — of which organising principle is the absence of entitlements to rule — but that is immediately excluded from specific spaces. By declaring their expertise to stem from scientific prerogatives, as in the science of economics where development thinking and policy come from, oligarchies reject this democratic supplement. But this excess reinscribes itself subversively through verifications of equality. What I debate in this chapter, then, is the critique of development-induced displacement by equals.

4.1
Representations of Space and Police

As a national construct, development necessarily makes the State the responsible part for fostering it and for guaranteeing the welfare of the people, but at the same time it is required to the State to preserve the freedom of its subjects. Following Mitchell Dean (2001), this exercise of government which entails the articulation of a form of 'pastoral power', responsible for building energy infrastructure to sustain economic growth and welfare of the population, with one of sovereign power which assigns rights and guarantees freedom, has what he calls a 'demonic' character. If our modern societies understand 'liberalism' as the government through the freedom of its subjects, there ought to be liberal ways of governing life. As seen in the previous chapter, economy as a form of science meets the requirement of governing through freedom because it is an objective form of knowledge that does not require individual/private interpretation and can, therefore, be applied to the entirety of the population. What economy requires is that the governments of the States take on their role of guaranteeing the rights of its people by finding the proper measure between equality and inequality, which means, a knowledge on how to manage the local effects of the 'global need for wealth' over the population.

But the combination of these two types of rule cannot account for the entirety of the population. It can neither pastoralize and develop the whole nor provide and guarantee the rights of the same whole, because the demands of a subject of needs not always meet the ones of the free political citizen. To make it clear for my case, the representation of Brazilian society as composed by subjects who need electric energy to sustain economic growth — which according to economics is an unescapable need of modern societies — requires the government to deny the freedom of the Xingu people; the freedom to *stay*. Conversely, development thinking and policy represent the Xingu people as subjects in need of care, of a certain understanding of development, people who lack the 'attributes of responsible freedom' (Dean, 2001, p. 46). For that reason, sovereign power works for them not under the premise of political freedom and equality, but of being subjects of the rights which the 'pastoral' State believes to be their rights. Those rights, however, are the rights of resettlement and compensation, not the right to remain once State sees there is no option other than to build the dam, secure energetic offer for Brazilian society and deal with its impacts over the lives of the local people.

This state of affairs is not indefinitely sustainable. It might be that ruling

oligarchies allow democracy to intervene more or less in their conduct of government to keep their legitimacy. Or it might be that it 'buys' the immediate dissatisfactions of people, like Norte Energia S.A. did by buying trucks, high-tech TVs and directly giving money to Indigenous people in order to contain their dissent in what Chapter One presented as 'Emergency Plan'. Or it might also be that the National Public Security Force (in Portuguese, *Força Nacional de Segurança Pública*), a joint cooperation of various Brazilian public safety forces, is called to intervene in favour of the consortium and guarantee the demolition of peoples' homes. Dean (2001) contributes to my analysis by pointing out that the demonic character of modern states is given once liberalism is incapable of preventing the fact that the optimisation of one's life is done at the cost of not optimising the lives of others. States, or (better) States of oligarchic rights, cannot work to guarantee everybody's freedom because it is impossible to conciliate the unlimited expansion of capital, read as the unescapable need to growth, to the limits of the will of populations or parts of the population. But sooner or later things get unsustainable in the police order.

There will always be, following Rancière (2014 [2005]), practices of division of the people, that is, of democratic supplementarity. *Police* is the activity (or activities) of ordering the experiences of the sensible, i.e., the possibilities of experimenting *the living*, into which there are the audible, the sayable, the visible and, I add, the (dis)placeable. So, policing is a *consensual* and *perpetual* activity of adequacy. Put simply, police is a philosophical stipulation for the actual forms we conduct life in society, which avails itself of transcendental principles to make reasons for these distributions. I have discussed four main ones and a few unfoldings of them in particular before: the division between public and private, the unescapable expansion of capital, the scientific prerogatives of development practices, the optimisation of life through the need to generate energy to growth, modernisation as a balance between equality and inequality, human rights and sovereignty. Those things are seen as naturally applicable to and desired by the community as a whole. But in order to be effective, they have to organise hierarchically spaces of what should be seen, heard, and where. In the case of development practices, specific knowledges are formed in universities and this knowledge can account for any portion of the territory, including the Xingu river.

Police, thereby, sets criteria for an activity to be recognised within a specific sphere of competence. It establishes identities by fixing bodies to specific activities and functions and by assigning a *representation* to a body. To the eyes of the consortium who built the dam or to the State in its double façade (both on the role

of the mandatary and of the defender), who are the parts with the competence to 'speak' development, Xingu river people are subjects of rights, that is, people who are either subordinated to the decisions of engineers and politicians or victims of human rights violations. Their knowledge is not a knowledge proper to the development world, so they do not have a word on this. But they only do not have a word on this because they have not been to universities, which are the proper places to form the competences required to 'speak' development. As it has already been established in the previous chapter too, it is a *tautology*, ultimately, that sustains police order. At the same time a very weak, once it is disrupted by mere verifications of wrongs, and a very powerful tautology, anchored in the marriage between the power of wealth and the power of science. As an activity of consensus, police tends to convert into class-specific claims whichever wrongs are exposed, so that order is brought back by a conciliation resolution. This movement is the effort to 'purify' the public by keeping the wrongs contained (and dissolved) into the private (the class, the home, the tribe, the small farmers' community, the site construction workers).

Consensus, therefore, reduces all political demonstration to a situation of interlocution between partners, whose resolution imposes itself rationally. There are plenty examples of the disarticulation of the political in Belo Monte into private matters, treated in private, between two parts, between the consortium and those to be affected. The most striking one is perhaps over the negotiations of compensations measures; something that will be looked into in detail ahead when I discuss the politics of home. However, in spite of this calculus of the 'common good' which speaks for the benefits of building a dam to supply energy demands for growth, and of this consensus which suppresses the wrongs to a particular place, there are demonstrations to the contrary. That is, there is *politics*: the assertion over the existence of parts who were not counted for and not even accounted as such. For police order, there is no place of void in this fittings of functions, places and ways of being because there is no part that has not been accounted for, since all the places have been attributed (Rancière, 2000): EIA was supposed to foresee the impacts and the needed mitigations measures; the company assigned its representatives to catalogue all the people who would be affected; Ibama was disposed to oversee the guaranteeing of human rights and so on.

Mr. Francisco, Mrs. Iolanda's husband, is a retired man on a wheelchair who used to live in the Barriguda Island for about ten years. When he informs the Inspection Group — and the world outside his world — that he was not only not

registered but that he has never received any kind of proposal from Norte Energia S.A and, more, that a few months before the Inspection Group's visit some representatives from Norte Energia S.A. passed by his house informing that he had to leave the area until a certain date, Mr. Francisco makes very clear that he was neither counted nor accounted for (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 33). By putting his body and his words to speak when he was not supposed (or expected) to speak, Mr. Francisco highlights that there is in fact — at least — one additional share to the part that was (ac)counted. In its multiplicities of experiences, these additional shares are 'the parts with no-part'; parts of the community that are not counted in the distribution of the sensible or are counted in a position of subordination — as if Mr. Francisco should actually leave in 30 days after the warning without complaint. So, in police logics, these kinds of fundamental mistakes in calculations and distributions are ignored since inequality is a 'natural' feature of society. *Politics* is this irruption of 'natural' order of inequality spoken by Mr. Francisco; (opposed to but fundamentally linked to the police). Politics is *dissensus*.

If only equality can acknowledge inequality, what acknowledges the torsion of the social order, the wrong within it, is political equality. From what was discussed about Rancière's theoretical intuition, equality is the premise of all human relations including the foundational relations on the basis of social contracts and of the renewed contracts on representative democracies, since (in principle) democracy is the type of rule that does not rest on entitlements to rule. But taking a look at the practices of our so called democratic regimes one can see that what we actually have established for common life are regimes of oligarchic (rather than equal) rights. That had already been established in the last chapter through four different ways is which Brazilian State, in Belo Monte, ignores or renders invisible the radical equality of all men. Oligarchic rights are then unequal rights which, in different shapes and through different attempts to produce consensus, are made evident once a wrung (a torsion inside the democratic logics) is pointed out. This wrong within opens up the space for dispute of two different pre-given identities: the identity assigned (or made inexistent) by the police (or what our societies conceive as 'politics') and what the subject of the wrung her/himself claims to be.

So far, in this chapter, I have summarised the argument of how displaced people are represented (or obliterated) in political life, which I have described in details in Chapter Three. The representation of their space reads them as political subjects in this particular way of part-taking; which, in the theoretical reading of Rancière, is a place of no-politics. But police order can only be seen as a space of no-politics if we begin the analysis by the wrongs, the torts, that make evident the

non-correspondence between what has been (ac)counted for — and represented — and what the actual experiences of the lived show. What I move on to argue now is that their dissent makes evident the 'demonic' character of this distribution of the sensible. This dissent is operated in terms of differential perceptions that show how the attempts to combine 'pastoral' identity with the identity of 'free (political) subjects' produce various forms of violence. The imperfect correspondence between these two identities points out that political subjectivity, then, is not given by the specific place assigned in the part-taking but from the distance between identities that are differently *conceived/perceived/represented* and *lived*, drawn from the wrong. The wrong within juxtaposes the political community of the wrong to the community (ac)counted by the police. These pragmatic verifications of (in)equality — and pragmatic because born from practical wrongs done or experienced by people — always create polemic scenes.

Polemic because they always create *scenes* and *dialogues* where before it existed none. The aesthetic in Rancière's theoretical stipulation is his intuition to think politics as an intervention upon the visible and the sayable (2001, Theses n°7). So, the principle function of politics is to configure its proper space, i.e., to manifest dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one (2001, Theses n°8), to juxtapose or to challenge the universality of the 'existing' world. The last chapter was dedicated to discuss at length the processes and the practices through which displacees were represented, or how their space was represented as such. Now that I have made the point that subjectification happens through antagonism and how dissensus disrupts the partition of the sensible, I can turn the analysis to *how* displacees are political agents. Their dissent regarding the representation of their space shows that they already have their own spaces of representation. But before diving in how a political reading of space — where and through which people enact the polemic scenes on the politics of their displacement — contributes to make evident the activity of dissent carried on by displacees in the illustrative case of the *home*, I need to build the understanding of what it is a political reading of space.

4.2
The Production of Space and Politics

Political struggle brings politics into being by separating it from the police, thereby creating its own space. As seen, to refuse the title of political subjects to a certain category, it has traditionally been sufficient to assert that these subjects belong to a private space, separated from public life; 'one from which only groans or cries

expressing suffering, hunger, or anger could emerge, but not actual speeches' demonstrating a shared comprehension (Rancière, 2001, Theses n°8). Politics is a constant attempt to re-qualify these places, to make them be seen as the spaces of a community. Space is a very important matter in Belo Monte, if not the most important one. The exclusion of displacees as supplementary part is enacted through their exclusion from certain places by a certain comprehension of space. The contributions of Henri Lefebvre are helpful to analyse space because (a) it is an intervention on space that has produced torts against displacees and (b) because dis*place*ment is an attempt to make move in space what is intended to make move in 'time' (in the notion of development as 'progression'). Yet, it is through their reinsertion into space (among other things) that displacees disrupt the sensible and manifest their political subjectivity. Ultimately, space is political because it is a stage for polemic verifications of equality, i.e., for politics.

In other words, space has complex configurations and it is much more than pieces of land over the planet. Critical geography (and geopolitics) unpacks space and finds fragmentations and hierarchisations to say that different spaces have different values, but also that even the same physical space can be valued differently. For some people like Raimunda and Francisco it may be *home*, while for someone else like Norte Energia S.A., *profit*, and for some other like Federal Government, *development*. Following Lefebvre, after a territory is constituted and secured by the State as its concrete fundament, State begins a process of producing a political space, its own space, to exercise social control, made up of norms, laws, hierarchies. We have seen that this is the logics of police order, which equates the public space to the State space, and sees space as fully conceptualised: 'the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic and social engineers, all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived' (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974], p. 38). These representations of space, therefore, leave no space for a void, once every social experience with space is (ac)counted for in particular conceptions of space.

In planning and practice, development then works with a notion of territory in a way of what Elden (2010) has taken to be land (property, a form of possession) — think about *dispossession* word formation – and terrain (sites of contestation and object of contest). But although it is both, territory is more than that. The political-economic understanding of territory as a sovereign space to be laid out by the state (the concept of land) and the political-strategic understanding of territory as source of needed resources, for example to water supply to generate energy (the concept of terrain), are important but insufficient to see how territory can serve

as a political technology as Elden suggests. And a political technology, I add, to distribute the sensible. The implications of the abstraction of space as land and terrain are that this bracketing enables the erasure of whatever remains 'outside' it. Lefebvre's reading of territory as a State space explores how this erasure is operated. Brenner and Elden (2009, p. 353), from Lefebvre's work, named *territorial effect* the 'state's tendency, through its territorial form, to naturalise its own transformative effects on socio-spatial relations'; a way, therefore, to produce consensus, as what has been debated in Section 4.1.

The space produced for the national is taken to be abstract and homogeneous, dispossessed of difference, but it is in fact a performative (for it produces) and interpretative (for it perceives) *coup de force*, forged by a self-referential authority. As something created by a *coup de force*, the state has to constantly produce and reproduce itself and, as Lefebvre notes, territorial strategies come in handy. One of those, perhaps the leading one, is what Lefebvre called 'state mode of production' (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p. 359): a strategy of intervention oriented toward the reorganisation of places, scales, spaces, in a capitalist way of rationally calculating the spheres of production and exchange. Ways of partitioning the sensible, therefore. Deeply spatially selective, this rationality — like a liberal and modern fruit — produces different spaces under the same homogenous label of national territory. Territory is a highly controversial issue in Brazil since at least the Treaty of Tordesillas and especially now when looking at contemporary Indigenous claims over demarcation of reservations, in view of the 38 hydroelectric plants about to be constructed, according to the Decennial Energy Plan of the Federal Government[50]. Lefebvre insisted that thinking of a national territory is only possible if we are capable of historicising the forms and the political development of space.

Consequently, as Brenner and Elden (2009) indicate, for Lefebvre, the consolidation of a modern notion of (national) territory is intertwined with the State mode of production, which 'mobilises political techniques to control economic resources embedded in its land and landscape', in order to get a better place at the expanding capitalist world economy (2009, p. 363); just like Belo Monte Complex is taken to be essential to ensure Brazilian growth, especially in times of crisis. In the beginning of Chapter Three, I have pointed to the conception of

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[50] The Plan estimates 38 000 people to be affected by the construction of 38 hydroelectric power plants, of which 22 should be ready by 2024. However, Belo Monte Complex alone has surpassed this number, demonstrating that the data provided by the Federal Government is clearly under-dimensioned.

Amazonia as a world-frontier; capable to generate new realities but historically planned in a certain way. Space is, then, fragmented for determining who is targetable, homogenised for saying that these practices are held in the name of Brazilian 'growth', hierarchised for making it all possible and legitimate. Space is not discussed in political sciences in the way it should be, as produced from the bodies, being left aside for the abstractions and conceptualisations of geographers, technicians, the ones with an already-knowledge 'et al'. But space reintroduces itself 'subversively through the effects of peripheries, the margins, the regions, the villages and local communities long abandoned, neglected, even abased through centralising state power' (Lefebvre cited in Brenner and Elden 2009, p. 360). Space reintroduces itself through political mobilisation.

So, for the case of Belo Monte, the geopolitical project for Amazonia's space relied mainly on territorial strategies to implement regional occupation. In an exemplary case of Henri Lefebvre's conception of the 'production of space' by the state, Bertha Becker points to how Amazonia's space was produced in terms of social formation, i.e., of modes of production. Brazilian State development organised the territory through a 'double network of control' — technical and political — made up of all types of connections and networks, capable of controlling flows and resources, and having cities as their logistic base for action. This mesh, which in Brazil is called *programmed mesh*, 'was implanted between 1966 and 1985 by the Brazilian State in Amazonia, aiming to complete the physical appropriation and control of the territory' (Becker, 2009b, p. 221) [Translation mine]. As discussed before, this double network of control is the basis of modernisation: the combination of the principle of wealth (political oligarchies) and the principle of science (the 'technical'). A very important part of this mesh, the hydroelectric network, was established to provide energy, the basic input of the new industrial phase.

The structuring modes of production predominant in Amazonia were, according to Becker, based on the privilege attributed to large groups and the violence of the accelerated deployment of this technical-political fabric, which *conceived* space as isotropic and homogeneous, with profound disrespect for social and ecological differences. This way of producing space had extremely perverse effects in the areas where this mesh was implemented, destroying historically constructed ways of life and local knowledges (2009b, p. 223). So, following Becker's hypothesis of how Amazonia constitutes a world-frontier, from its formation until now, because of its conception as a space of great strategic value for the world-economy and the modes of production which have conformed

that space, Amazonia can be read in terms of supplementarity. Being supplementary is a condition of being an accessory, but one that *must* be there even only to be 'outsourced' in its relations with the metropolis and world market. That is, the production of State space also creates supplementary spaces ('parts with no-part'). But as space is political, those supplementary spaces are reinscribed. This reinscription happens through bodies which have been expelled from those spaces:

> Material things are the ones that have the least value. A chair, a bed, a bookcase. Their value is insignificant to me. Because the significant value, which will never end, is this feeling... The significant value is this certainty that I was happy here. Because I helped to build this, here. It's different from leaving here and buying a ready-made house, a house you were not part of the building. Here I built, this is a very big belonging. The hands, the head... the thought, all is here. It's belonging. That is why it is difficult and painful for people to be ripped out from their homes on the banks of the Xingu. There, it was belonging. So, it's sorrowful, it's something no one ever forgets. Never forget, for the rest of your life. They're forcing me out of here, trying to erase my memory, my life. Belo Monte is this, it is to wrest all forms of life, until the memory is erased forever, until there is no root. Government is a memory killer. (Antônia Melo, former resident of one of the Xingu islands flooded by the dam, interviewed by Eliane Brum, El País, 14 September 2015) [Translation mine]

Stuart Elden (2007) indicates that much spatial language deals with contestation, struggle and productivity. This can be grasped from the words of Antônia 'precisely because spatial language mirrors the actual uses and experiences of space' (2007, p. 107). Where the space of the town is seen by the entrepreneur and its planners as a kind of 'scientific object', as pure and apolitical, the work of Lefebvre suggests that it has been shaped and moulded by historical and natural elements, through a political process. The space of Antônia Melo's home in the representations of State space and in the 'development space' is the 'instrumental space of urban planners and social engineers, that is, space as a mental construct, *imagined* space'. In its turn, spaces of representation, as in the words of Antônia, bring in space 'as produced and modified over time and through its use, spaces invested with symbolism and meaning, the space of *connaissance* (less formal or more local forms of knowledge), space as *real-and-imagined'* (2007, pp. 110-111. Emphasis in the original).

In other words, there is a significant opposition between our conception of space as it is abstracted, mental, Cartesian space, and our perception of space as concrete, material and physical, invested with feelings and built upon historical meanings. The latter, Elden points out, takes as its initial point of departure the body, which Lefebvre saw as the site of resistance within the discourse of power in space. Abstracted and decorporealised conceptions of space contains dissensus because it works on an organisational logic which distributes (or

redistributes) the sensible in homogeneous ways. When the consortium and the government conceive the space of the Xingu basin as 'needed resources' and as a space of development, it subsumes the bodies who live there among its obligations: dislocation, resettlement, compensations. When people like Antônia, whose bodies are contained into those spaces, present their claims over space in terms of the political, pointing out wrongs within, they not only create polemic scenes about their status but also about perceptions of space. The politics of displacement is, then, also a conflict over the production of space. Ultimately, put into theoretical terms, polemic scenes call for polemic stages. Scenes of verifications of equality, which are always polemic because make burst voices unheard, bodies unseen and claims unobvious, make spaces political.

So, the *lived* gives rise to spaces of representations, imagined, beginning with the body and symbolised by it. The conceived, the distant, gives rise to representations of space, established from objective, practical, and scientific elements (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p. 229). One way through which displacees intervene is over space configurations produced by the State and the consortium, resisting them through the physical but also the imagined space of the home. A 'silent resistance', as it has been described by the Inspection Group put together by MPF/PA, is manifested when many families which have been expelled from their fishing spots reoccupy those places through temporary camping, trying to preserve as much as possible their disrupted ways of life. The life in the Xingu river and its banks has a proper rhythm and anyone discussing that space or studying it is aware of that, not only because the relations of production rely on the river temporality — after all there are periods of overflow and periods of drought — but also because a riparian life time (birth, growth and death) is planned according to the river.

The patrimonialist perspective of the consortium could not count, nor account, for the different perceptions of the lived space:

> When someone asks me 'do you have a house on the street?' Yes, of course I have a house on the street because of when it comes time we have to take our children to study, right? So, our wives couldn't go fishing... so we had to keep maintaining the family in the city and studies for the children, thank God. (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 56) [Translation mine]

> Antonio tries to explain the fact that they [all] have two houses:
> — It is because you spend eight days here, fishing, sometimes seven, six, there, to sell. Then you are occupying both places at the same time, your whole life... (Mr. Antônio)
> — So, do you live in both places? (Inspection Group)
> — Exactly. (Mr. Antônio)
> — Exactly. If you take one off it will be missed. (Mrs. Rita)
> — And, if short, we live by the river. (Mrs. Raimunda Gomes)

— If short, [we] live by the river. Lived, hum... (Mrs. Rita)
(MPF/PA, 2015, p. 7) [Translation mine]

When the entrepreneur — the new name of the coloniser in the Amazon — is the one who determines *what is a house* based on his world, his references, his conceptualisation of space, usually forged in very different spaces and realities, violence is installed. The body who thinks, who conceptualises the space of the Xingu is not the same body who lives it. And this is fine. The tort is in believing that technical-political knowledge is the only one and the only form to imagine space, ignoring the political character of it. Police order works on the assumption of the homogeneity of space once within it all has to be equivalent, exchangeable, interchangeable; because space is bought and sold, and exchange can only occur between units that are equivalent, interchangeable. On the other hand, space is fragmented in the form of lots and parcels, and sold on this basis. 'These aspects of capitalistic space are shaped both within the realm of the commodity, in which everything is equivalent, and within the realm of the State, in which everything is controlled' (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p. 233), everything is policed, everything is believed to be counted and accounted for.

Otávio das Chagas and his family inhabited for more than 30 years in the Ilha da Madeira, one of the hundreds of islands of Xingu. Inhabiting maybe is not the better way to describe the relationship between human and environment in these ways of life. Important though is to point out that an analysis of this relationship is not about romanticising traditional peoples' ways of life, but about discussing in which terms those lives manifest dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one (Rancière, 2001) through the ways in which they perceive and configure its proper space. So, Lefebvre's conception of space as produced from a body works together with Rancière's conception of dissensus once it opens room to see the political agency of displacees, which has been neglected to them since the space of Belo Monte began to be conceived. Lefebvre's insistence in the plurality, heterogeneity and variegation of space as *conceived, perceived, and lived* — as I have articulated as *representations of space*, *spatial practices*, and *spaces of representation* — work to place *space* as a stage. A stage *from* which, *through* which and *within* which polemic scenes of dissensus can be enacted. That is, a stage where the supplementary part makes evident the existence of 'two worlds in one', and the violence of the abstraction of this space as homogeneous as the development project of Belo Monte does as a wrong within, a tort.

When expelled from their islands, which they call 'house', to the 'street' — the name agro-extractive riverines of various Amazonian regions give to the

category of 'city' — people like Otávio das Chagas loose not only a lot or parcel of space for the reproduction of their ways of life but also spaces of intervention. That is, spaces where political claims were made in terms of belonging, not of occupying, because occupation is contingent while belonging is not: 'the hands, the head... the thought, all is here. It's belonging' (Antônia Melo, El País, 14 September 2015). The space of the home, the island, was conceived and grabbed as an exchangeable portion of the State space. This privatisation not only produced the killing of a space for intervention into the public, because the space of the island was taken over as 'space of the sovereign State' from which these people have been expelled from, but also the 'death' of the home. For this reason, home will be treated, in the next section, as an illustrative case of the heterogeneity of space as a conception that operationalises Rancière's idea about dissensus as 'two worlds in one'. That is what I turn now to, *the politics of home*.

4.2.1
The Politics of Home

Let me first return to Rancière. As seen, what we believe to be the political democratic realm of the public is actually a space constantly privatised by oligarchic interests. If the logics of electoral system turns popular representation into a representation of dominant interests through corruption schemes, as exposed by Operation Carwash regarding Belo Monte, and elections in a device destined to consent, oligarchies shrink the space of the public pushing to the private realm the spaces and the possibilities of intervention of non-state actors. This implicates that public sphere is not actually public, not a space of equal terms, but increasingly limited and reserved for the play of institutions and of the ones who run their machinery. That is evidenced for example in the case of hydroelectric projects when, as a state institution responsible for watching over displacees interests and rights, Ibama's presidency was shifted at the time of the controversies regarding of how the licensing of Santo Antônio and Jirau Hydroelectric Plants would impact the reproductive cycle of Amazonian Catfishes, one of the most consumed and sold products of riverines and Indigenous peoples.

To the people what was left was to negotiate resettlement and compensation options directly with the representatives of the private consortium operating Belo Monte. With the endorsement of the State, the space and the category of the *home*, which most if not all displacees lost, are conceived as a private issue. It explains how home is such a private issue that it worth the

treatment of a technical matter, which could be discussed case by case, under no supervision of a public defender or a representative of displacees before the state. Police order simply does not read *home* as a political object. The seemly 'freedom' of choosing the compensation which would best suit their interests is no freedom at all, it is the unequal domination of the ones who hold the immanent powers of society, the power of wealth:

> In the second negotiation conversation, my husband went awry. We ended up accepting 23 thousand reais. This was a robbery, not a negotiation. Our dream was a letter of credit to buy an area, not a resettlement at the Travessao 27. We do not raise cattle. And there's only grass there. We catch fish. What he offered us was not what we wanted then nor what we want today. (Raimunda Gomes da Silva, interview to the MPF/PA Inter-Institutional Inspection Group, 2015, p. 35) [Translation mine]

With each negotiation and each time her husband, João Pereira da Silva, returned from the company's office he 'died a little', said Raimunda. Mr. Silva was extremely upset and nervous about the offerings that were made until he suffered a stroke, and today he is completely dependent on his wife. The violations of people's dignity and housing rights in the whole process of building Belo Monte Dam could not be more varied than in respect to house compensations. Years of life, work and affect invested in one place that was pitiably paid back to the people in different ways. There was no organised or systematic procedure to evaluate the improvements along with the value of the terrain or to observe the way of life which had to be recomposed by the terms of the EIA agreement — let alone from the perspective of the people who would be removed. The separation between public and private is blunted when the category of the *home*, expelled from the public space, reintroduces itself when displacees show how this division asserts not the representation of the people, but the double domination of oligarchies both in State, the displacing authority, and in society, for which the category of the home has only one universal meaning.

The matter here is that spaces for development are conceptualised as absolute space by State and its partners allowed to intervene over the territory through PPPs, and these conceptualisations miss or in fact leave on the outside other configurations of space. Edvaldo Soares, one of the affected people, informed to the Inspection Group (2015, p. 33) that in the place he used to dwell there were other four families and that, after negotiations were over, it was clear that each one of them received a different treatment and consequently a different fate. Even if they used to live in the same space, the technical language read their rights in different ways and disarticulated that little community. By resettling the affected people in very different ways and places — some got letters of credit,

some were paid for both houses, some were only compensated for the city house — the company shut communication between them. The implications of this are that what could have been discussed in terms of the community, of the 'little political communality', and what therefore could have been claimed in terms of equality was turned into apolitical, in search of consensus. After all, once those 'groans or cries expressing suffering, hunger, or anger' emerged as 'actual speeches demonstrating a shared comprehension' (Rancière, 2001, Theses n°8) of *what is home*, Norte Energia S.A. would have to either acknowledge the bilocal pattern of residence and reimburse people for both places or just do not carry on the forceful removals.

To criticise and reject absolute space then is simply to refuse a particular representation, or one way of partitioning the sensible: 'that of a container waiting to be filled by a content, i.e. matter, or bodies' (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974], p. 170).

> We do not kill a culture. Culture is intrinsic, you constitute it… you can… an Indigenous can go there to Christ the Redeemer, he will have the Indigenous characteristic, he will have his traditions, he may want to adapt it, but the culture, it will never be killed. What do we need? [We need] to get him out of a certain place and give to him a place equal to which they had. That will be done, because culture is here [pointing to the heart], not where they live. (*At the Margin of Xingu: disregarded voices,* Damiá Puig (dir.), 2011) [Translation mine]

This statement from a Norte Energia S.A. representative, which is significant of how the sensible has been distributed in Belo Monte and how it has produced violence, can be understood in light of the conception of space as homogeneous, interchangeable and 'commodifiable'. This conception, which I have been treating as *police order* way of organising the space, does not (ac)count for the multiplicity of experiences related to space.

Following Lefebvre, according to these representations of space, '(formal) content and (material) container are indifferent to each other and so offer no graspable difference'. Which means that anything may go in any 'set' of places in the container; or that *home* may go in any portion of the national territory, be it the river banks of Xingu or an inner lot of land near the Trans-Amazonian Highway: 'any part of the container can receive anything'. This indifference becomes separation, in that contents and container do not impinge upon one another in any way (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974], p. 170). This idea expands the conceptual work of bridging Rancière's and Lefebvre's contributions because it makes very clear how the separation of the private from the public (seen in details in Chapter Three when I discussed the representations of the displaced) is useful to the commodification of space, that requires a certain homogeneity of its conception. Once the indifference between police order (our common understanding of politics) and the

State is asserted as the 'natural' order of society, this indifference becomes separation because the attributes of political subjects are very specific and, therefore, very limited. The 'purification' of the public debated in Section 4.1 is precisely dedicated to guarantee that contents (private issues) and container (public space) do not impinge upon one another in any way.

But this separation from public and private in representations of space (conceived space) only guarantees that what is framed as private remains so, while preserving the universal character of the container. If the container is 'home' it means that police's conception of home (be it in the words of the State, Norte Energia S.A., its technicians or any other agents who gives 'home' a universal meaning) is abstracted in order to be commodified, sold, reacquired, displaced and replaced without further losses. That is to say that space has to be homogeneous not only for its sale but also for effects of displacing people. If Norte Energia S.A. and the State authorities were to conceive Xingu space as political, contingent and constantly (re)produced both by its users and from the bodies, it could not find ways to legitimise or justify anti-democratic practices — or 'demonic' practices — against its people. People who, as I have showed, do not fit into the nation-State scheme of development thinking and policy since Amazonia is a supplement to that schema both in terms of State mode of production, which has been outsourcing Amazonia since colonial times, and in terms of conceptions of home.

4.2.2
Domicides

Part of the current process of building hydroelectric dams and other infrastructural works in the State mode of production is to point to the fear of not having enough energy supply to develop the country in its way to the after-crisis. Global crisis is in everyday news, followed by headlines about the highest unemployment rates in years and the striking recession. The Ministry of Mines and Energy, in the FAQ section of its webpage, when inquired about the real need to build Belo Monte Complex replied that the annual growth targets of 5% of GDP over the next 10 years could be compromised if the energy supply was not increased. Just after mentioning 'growth', it suggested that in order to guarantee 'poverty eradication and better income distribution' efforts, it would require the country to install, each year, about 5,000 MW of additional capacity. Certainly, no one would be against measures to eradicate poverty, decrease inequalities and provide better life for children. However, abstract representations of space as 'needed resources' make

these kind of controversial practices possible, displacing populations that dwell those areas in already pitiable conditions, further impoverishing them, producing major imbalances in ecosystems, nearby cities and so forth.

Rachel Pain (2009), discussing the contributions of 'fear' literature, suggested that the concept of 'globalised fear' has focused on the macro-level of global scale, to what feminist literature importantly contributes by rethinking scales. Although fear might be a globalised 'emotion' it has very different implications between classes, gender, age, place. Pain's argument revolves mainly around security issues, but it opens a window to think the conversion of fear into something material and real, grounding and localising fear, rather than only discursive. This move is crucial to comprehend that, at odds with what economy conceives as a threat to be feared (i.e., limitations to economic growth), people experience fear very differently. The 'right' to feel fear is indeed a privilege, as Pain notes, if we look beyond the physical spectre. In the case of Belo Monte Complex, two geographies of fear are written at the banks of Xingu River: a national (and global) one which sits in privilege to justify the project as a way out of global crisis, and the local one which fears the development itself. It is not unusual to read riparian and Indigenous statements saying that they feared 'the moment when development would arrive'.

Those fears are not spatially contained in different scales but rather they are entangled, symbiotic and perform realities between each other. Pain notes that this understanding 'means moving between scales, and keeping a critical eye on their construction' (2009, p. 473). As fear is always 'named, known, privileged and spatialized in certain ways by the powerful', it tends to 'affect the poorest and most marginalized people the most' (2009, p. 473). As seen with the analysis on how the representation of the displaced is done in terms of sustainable development, one of the implications of thinking about displacees as resilient subjects is that they are not allowed to feel fear. Julian Reid (2013) suggests that development has not only functioned to create a global division between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' populations, but also functioned to reduce the life of the underdeveloped to a matter of merely economic improvement (2013, p. 107); as can be seen in respect to the idea of bringing development to populations in the Xingu River region.

As discussed in Chapter Three, the rationality which governs sustainable development is resilience. If it is to be inquired whether Brazilian government advances a sustainable development agenda, FAQ to Ministry of Mines and Energy informs that the government institution sees the execution of great

infrastructure works like Belo Monte Complex as part of the Plan for Sustainable Regional Development of the Xingu (Xingu PDRS). The dispossessed, therefore, must be resilient subjects which should not allow themselves to feel fear — though being taken from home and thrown into the unknown are among the scariest things. So, the logic is that fear serves as a means of motivating individuals and communities to become resilient, rather than being seen as a condition to be avoided. In this way, sustainable development disciplines poor and vulnerable people to give up on states as sources for protection and improvement of their well-being, being 'taught' to take responsibility and rely upon themselves. Self-reliantly in their communities, rebuilding their cultures and ways of life whether in the Xingu, on other inner areas or even 'at Christ the Redeemer' because 'culture is intrinsic', 'not where people live', as the Norte Energia S.A. representative stated.

This is really interesting, in part because families and local communities feature so heavily as units of resilience in the discourse, as opposed to society or the state, and yet in practice the experiences of the lived by displacees in Xingu tell a different story. They may take many years to adapt traditional ways of living to new ones when and if possible, to re-learn its own rhythms, its own seasonality, to rebuilt disrupted social relations, mothers may take years to get together again with their sons, producers and buyers are no longer a walkable distance from each other, the terrain (the earth itself) is no longer so humid, greeneries do not grow the same way, there is no river to fish, eating habits are no longer the same. Pretty much everything has changed and still fear is not taken into account in the abstracted spaces of resilient subjects: 'yet it is the quietest fears, with little political capital but more immediate materiality, which have the sharpest impacts' (Pain, 2013, p. 473). Among other interviews reported by MPF/PA, this one is worth quoting at length:

> The dispersion of her family was described dramatically by Ms. Rosineide, illiterate, who signed blank the Option Agreement [to choose between reallocation or indemnification] presented by Norte Energia S.A. With the amount she received as indemnification, she has acquired a lot in Travessão dos Araras, the place where she lives today, isolated and treated with medication for depression. [She] reported that, before [the dam], she saw her mother every day. When she wanted to talk to her mother, she just walked a few meters down the trail, on the same island [the bayou]. Now her mother and her father are too far apart, at [a place known as] the 'branch of coconuts', where you can only get by car and she does not have one. [She] really misses the family life and the life they left behind. [She] cries a lot while telling her drama [...]. (MPF/PA, 2015, pp.10-11) [Translation mine]

In this sense, 'fear' is an entry concept to think about the killing of the home that was silenced in Belo Monte project. Katherine Brickell (2012) points to the interactive and entangled nature of domestic life and geopolitics. Home is not what it is left outside of politics, in the private sphere, but in her analysis it takes part into

the place and space of warfare. So, she contests place and space 'beyond the straight-jacket of conflict' (2012, p. 577). Significantly, her concept of 'domicide' might be read also through the words of Hélio Alves da Silva. He describes himself as 'a fisherman without river'. Mr. Hélio had to learn a new occupation and, in the words of its interviewers, "he cries when he talks about life in [the island of] Santo Antônio and the way in which his community was 'destroyed' by the process of forceful removals in Belo Monte. Today, he lives alone in an urban property": 'I want to tell you that I do not live there. I occupy that place, but my mind is still in here' (referring to the bayou he used to dwell, in opposition to the concrete house built in the urban settlement) (Mr. Hélio, interview to the Inspection Group, MPF/PA, 2015, p. 10). The Consortium and the State, through the PBA (Basic Environmental Plan), have considered that the restitution of housing rights would be enough to mitigate the violence contained in the process of dispossession.

Interestingly enough, PBA is a document which contains the specifics of the mitigating and compensatory measures to be adopted by the entrepreneur to minimise environmental and social impacts identified in both the Environmental Impact Study (EIA) and its respective Environmental Impact Report (RIMA). So, PBA is a very import document once it states what must be done as *conditionings* to license a certain project; that is, they are presented in the language of 'rights'. But it is called *environmental* plan. The 'rights' of the people which should be the object of protection are then the rights of the container, i.e., the rights of the abstracted space. This explains the interesting place the 'category of people' occupy in the search instruments of Brazilian Committee on Dams (CBDB). CBDB presents its analysis of 'people relocated' and 'Indigenous communities' as subsections of 'Environmental Data'[51]. The resulting violence of erasing other configurations of space lies in the limited rights of abstracted spaces. Rights which, in reality, do not correspond or are not enough to contain the experiences of the lived: 'The Xingu river is our home, depriving us of it is violence' (Sheila Juruna, *Belo Monte: Announcement of a War*, André D'Elia (dir.) 2012). Beyond the displacement of the 'home', Belo Monte was able to displace, to dislocate, to detach the live actually lived from the life described in the official documents. Life was abstracted as a concept. It was conceived as something that could be rebuild somewhere else by its 'resilient' bearers. But that is not all.

Literature which works with the framing of Xingu homes, or similar cases, exclusively in terms of violent dispossession leaves the people in question 'out

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[51] An example of this can be seen at: http://www.cbdb.org.br/informe/img/54geral2.pdf

from the realm of complex and multifaceted human and into the realm of abstraction whether these are martyrs, refugees, or simply victims' (Harker, 2009, p. 329 cited in Brickell, 2012, p. 577). What I have been aiming to point out with a political reading of displacement is that framing displacees as subjects of rights and socially excluded is in fact a move of *political* exclusion, because it contains the possibilities of demanding equality. Contemporary liberal systems are based 'precisely on the normative conception of law as the possibility to anchor the achievements of struggles for equality'. Rancière's thought highlights the perversity of what he has called the 'juridification of the social', which amounts to 'the complete reduction of the legal to the factual' (Deranty, 2003, paragraph 36). Juridification of the social then makes law concerned with what is actually the case rather than interpretations of or reactions to it.

The mere fact that the category of 'home' has been (ac)counted in the PBA and other legal documents sufficed to meet the 'right to housing' which is seen as a fundamental, universal and human right. If democracy is subsumed fundamentally to a matter of building an institutional political structure — such as Ibama, MPF/PA, the Federal Constitution, or any other entity due to present and guarantee that the builder consortium will meet the legal conditionings — then the access to democratic practices and democratic political institutions is restricted in terms of agents and procedures. The access of displacees to rights becomes mediated through the legal field and its legal agents. There are two problems with that. The first one is that in the conceived world of the law in Brazil, public defenders are entitled to take care of vulnerable and poor people's rights. This way of distributing the sensible leave these people dependant on these agents and procedures to make their cries heard as actual voices. So, in every public binding work which involves people being impacted there should be at least one public defender, but in the real world that is not always the case:

> When he was expelled in 2012, Otávio das Chagas signed with his finger papers that he was not able to read. His children signed papers for him that they could not read. They received 12,994.02 reais as a compensation. His house was not considered a home. It did not fit into the entrepreneur's concept of home. When the 'removal' of the inhabitants of the islands, the banks and the baixões, as well as of the rural lands, was determined, *there was no public defender in the region.* The Government of Dilma Rousseff abandoned the population of the Xingu without any legal protection in the largest work of the electric sector of the country, at the mercy of the lawyers of Norte Energia S.A. Otávio and his family were thrown into one of the most violent neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Altamira, where they paid a rent that, along with the illness of one of their daughters, devoured the compensation money in only months. (Eliane Brum, El País, 18 July 2016)

Likewise, as seen in Chapter Two, the Federal Constitution, in its Article 231, third paragraph, states that the use of water resources in Indigenous Lands

can only be carried out with 'authorisation from the National Congress, after hearing the affected communities'. But, from the actual practices of the company, not all the communities which would be affected were heard. The mere fact that *some* communities have been heard — the communities which were (ac)counted for as the ones to be affected — was enough to meet minimum legal requirements, but certainly far from enough to account for the actually affected. Moreover, by 2005 a Legislative Decree (n° 1,785/05) authorising the implementation of Belo Monte Hydroelectric Power Plant, was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th of July. A week later, the Senate also approves the bill (turning it into PDS n° 343/05) authorising Belo Monte's deployment. It became a Legislative Decree, n°788/05, so it was now 'part of the law'. Again, it followed for promulgation without hearing the nine Indigenous peoples which could be seriously hit by the HPP's impacts. Furthermore, the Statement of Authorisation for Sustainable Use (TAUS), a document issued by Union's Assets Department (SPU) in 2010, was supposed to help guarantee the rights of use of the space by the people who lived in the areas where the TAUS was issued. For Norte Energia S.A., however, these legal instruments were but pieces of papers being waved in the air by the people of Xingu, since it had decrees on its favour. All was contained in law.

The second problem with the juridification of the social in Belo Monte is that it is accompanied by the worrying trend to replace justice by ethics. Following Deranty's reading of Rancière (2003), the normative system of values expressed in laws is now simply the reflection of a particular lifeworld. A lifeworld into which system of values home has one universal meaning of a place where the subject or the family occupies and that can be exchanged or displaced at no expense of further losses. In this sense, it is a worrying trend because 'it enables the most powerful to ascertain their own particular cultural values as rights, and to represent the imposition of those values on others as transcendent justice' (2003, paragraph 36). In the words of Rancière (cited in Deranty, 2003, paragraph 36):

> In the one corner, the world of good: that of consensus eliminating political litigation in the joyous harmonising of right and fact, ways of being and values. In the other: the world of evil, in which wrong is made infinite, and where it can only be a matter of war unto death.

War unto the death of one of the parts in litigation, or one of the lifeworlds trying to juxtapose over the other. If not physical death, then, death of the home.

From this, Belo Monte has produced the deliberate destruction of the home which in its 'extreme' form involves 'major, planned operations that occur rather sporadically in time but often affect large areas and change the lives of considerable numbers of people' (Brickell, 2012, p. 577). As communities in the

Global South being integrated into the global economy, the peoples of Xingu have witnessed growing threats to homes as a result of land grabbing for State development. These are 'everyday' forms of *domicide* that Porteous and Smith (2001, p. 106) surmise as occurring 'continuously all over the world' and which come about from the 'mundane operation of the world's political economy' (cited in Brickell, 2012, p. 580). Simon Springer (2011), discussing the impacts of modernisation's salvations speeches over bodies, pointed that once these suddenly 'backward' peoples enter a space that has been conceptualised by the Western imagination, their distinct histories quickly vanish. So, I suggest that a rights approach which sees Xingu people as dependent on State as the rights' guarantor considerably impacts and contains their possibilities to, in the words of Springer, 'invent local futures' (2011, p. 95). Futures in which 'home' is more than occupation, meaning belonging.

4.2.3
Home as Dissensus

Summing up, land dispossession for 'state development' produces forms of domicide, since home entails more than a roof and four walls, but comprehends 'a space heavily invested with sentimentality'; it is a lifeworld 'constituted by relatively stable associations, relatively known and shared histories' (Bhabha, 1994, p. 42 cited in Brickell, 2012, p. 577). Xingu populations' homes were violently dispossessed and dissolved not only by the practices of a private company, assigned to build a giant hydroelectric dam in the heart of the Amazon, but also because of a constitution of the law as simply the reflection of a particular lifeworld, from the factual imagination of what is actually a home. As Brickell notes, "indeed, 'the confrontation of powerful global corporations with vulnerable localities does not look promising for place and home'" (Porteous and Smith, 2001, p. 240 cited in Brickell, 2012, p. 581). Not only feeling fear, but feeling at home is also a privilege; a privilege of the lifeworld that writes the law. In spite of all the accumulated violences, the symbolical and the material, the violence of abstraction and the violence of juridification, displacees disrupt the division of what can be heard, what is worth of being protected and what is contemplated by law.

Internally displaced people by Belo Monte do it both by returning to the areas from which they have been expelled, reinscribing the home physically into the excluded spaces, as well as by putting forward claims over the protection of home in terms of rights to equality. More, their inscription in new poor places, or

their occupation of those spaces where they do not belong, denouncing the new pitiable conditions as *wrongs within* the Belo Monte project and their invisibility, make them appear in stages and scenes which seemed inexistent. The MPF/PA inspection report confirms the existence of a circular displacement of riparians, with the possibility of occupation of risky places at the margins of the Xingu river, in precarious and vulnerable conditions, certainly worse than those held before their removal. It is pointed out yet the existence of a process of marginalisation in which riparians build small dwellings in kinsfolks land in the urban centre of Altamira, with what remains of the amounts received for their possessions on the islands (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 10) [Translation mine]. This has not been (ac)counted for in the distribution of places and the calculation of parts in the Belo Monte project. Displacees return to home is political because it makes evident that there is actually a supplementary part that was missed in calculation.

In recent years, Brazilian media and society — on social media and virtual networks but also on more traditional medias and even cable TV channels — have been paying considerably more attention to the cause of the forceful removals and internal displacement of people, especially in Amazonia. The increasing attention to the cause of displacement has led to a series of electronic petitions with hundreds of thousands of signatures delivered at the National Congress to stop the licensing of another HPP in the Brazilian Amazon (the Tapajós HPP, which will be addressed in Chapter Five) on the basis of the wrongs done in Belo Monte. So far, it has been successful in braking the beginning of activities for this new 'Belo Monster'. This can be attributed, in part, to how the category of *the home* is a construct from which collective action may be stimulated (Brickell, 2012, p. 582). So, home is theorised by Brickell as a physical place but also as an imaginary that is 'not separated from public, political worlds but is constituted through them: the domestic is created through the extra-domestic and vice-versa' (Blunt and Dowling, 2006, p. 27 cited in Brickell, 2012, p. 575). The *politics of home* then can suggest that home is not 'where the story ends up', where the victims are created by the — yes, very real and grotesque violations of dignity to say the least — tort, but that it is also where history emerges from (Brickell, 2012, p. 576). That is, the politics of home presents a stage from where groans are made to be heard as actual voices and from which future mobilisations can happen, as will be discussed in Chapter Five.

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From the discussions of Chapter Three I have stablished that displacees are read in a politically more productive way as *subjects of wrongs* instead of *subjects of*

rights, to what the bulk of the literature on IDPs stands for. Subjects of wrongs dispute identities based on verifications of equality, therefore on a principle of universality. The tort of being sociologically dominated and democratically equal is what makes her/him political, not the given inscriptions of institutions like the law. Accordingly, the question this chapter articulated is not *if* internally displaced people are, ought to be configured, or must be empowered as political agents but *how* are they (already) political. Following the works of Jacques Rancière, *politics* always means two things at the same time. In the wide sense, the common sense we talk about it, it is understood as a form of distribution of the sensible, where places, roles and parts are attributed for every counting part of the social. That is what Rancière, and I following him, have called *police order*. Politics in the strict sense, however, discusses a specific construction of a stage of interlocution, a way of constructing a scene of opposition of equality to inequality. Therefore, this chapter showed how *space* is both a critical category to displacement, once it evidences the crisis (the limits) of this concept, and a means through which new scenes can be enacted, creating new 'stages of interlocution'.

This helps to understand *the politics* of development-induced displacement because this kind of analysis of space problematizes the abstracted spaces where development is put into practice by reading it as political space. And does so from the perspective of corporealised spaces (lived spaces) where it seemed to be no meaningful speakers, only landscaped people. With the support of Henri Lefebvre's theoretical contributions of thinking space as a phenomenon with multiple dimensions and implications, I have pointed to the conversion of space into something not limited to the dominion of the house and rights to housing. Police logic, through the subsumption of the experiences of the lived to the law, contains the possibilities and meanings of what can be dislocated, 'destituted' and 'restituted'. The category of the home, then, is presented as a disruptive space and disruptive concept once it is not limited to claims for rights, but yet for the whole space of the everyday life. In the core of political struggles 'is an acute conflict over space and, in space, the opposition between the space that has become the value of exchange and the space that remains the value of use, of multiple uses of the space lived by the population' (Becker, 2012, p. 127) [Translation mine].

Curiously, at first, many people who have been resettled liked their new dwellings, only to leave shortly after realising that these tiny little 63 m^2 houses were poorly constructed and absurdly expensive to maintain. Especially since, far from the river, most of people who used to work in or with fishing related activities not only lost their sources of income but also have now to pay for many goods,

some which they had for free in the islands (such as fruits and vegetables), and also have to pay for energy. What an irony. Democratic ideals seemed to have been wiped out along with the 'poor stilts' which have not been considered proper houses by the contemporaneous coloniser. But since democracy is simply the radical assertion of radical equality, any struggle arising from within the social field becomes political as soon as the particularistic demands are transformed into demands summoning the fundamental principle of radical equality, including the politics of the home (Deranty, 2003, paragraph 28).

Finally, this chapter has added weight to scholarship that establishes how any divisions we still hold between the public sphere of political life on the one hand and the so-called 'private' sphere of everyday life, on the other, are largely fictive (Brickell, 2012). It makes, therefore, a point for the main objective of the analysis which is to look beyond the obvious cruelty of the social exclusions produced by development-induced displacement, pointing to them in fact as political exclusions. The concluding remarks will tie the argument in this direction, as well as propose not the undoing of the political problem, once it cannot be solved, but the possibilities through which the sensible can be redistributed towards different and more socially just configurations of part-taking, through what Rancière understood as 'inscriptions'. Possibly, those new configurations will understand better that life is not an abstracted concept. 'Life is'. As a matter of fact, those conclusions were not mine but have been proposed by displacees themselves. I am only seeing, listening and adding my voice to theirs.

5
Conclusions

Maria Francineide Ferreira dos Santos used to hold the oar. Today she is holding the microphone. She almost screams. She is a woman on the edge. In the 11th of November 2016, as the public hearing with Norte Energia S.A. representatives in the convention centre of Altamira (Pará) heads towards it end, Maria Francineide senses that there may be no conclusion, and the fear increases. After that, she, like so many others, had nowhere to return to. It was a public hearing to ensure that the riparian people affected by the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant would have a life. But what is at stake at this moment is that 'life' is not an abstract concept, 'life is'. This is the cry of Maria Francineide. While for some, those who have a home to return to, life can be discussed and even philosophised, for Maria Francineide and other hundreds of people life urges because hunger urges, because death urges. The despair of Maria Francineide is that those who have the power to decide about their lives do not understand — or pretend they do not understand — that life is not something only about what is spoken. Eliane Brum, a journalist whose career has been dedicated to resonate the voices of 'the unheard', has told this story.

What my analysis has tried to show is that internally displaced people by the building of Belo Monte Complex are equal political beings whose words and stories told have been, for years, only heard as cries and noise. The people like Mrs. Francineide that engage in political struggle do not do so on account of their identity as victims or 'traditional peoples', as most literature articulates their status. They do so on account of their being in between two or more identities. Political subjects take hold of the 'wrungness' of the situation and are therefore themselves wrung. They are defined sociologically as dominated and democratically as equals but it is this contradictory nature that makes them possible as political subjects (Deranty, 2003, paragraph 8). So, as Rancière would state it, if there is something 'proper' to politics it consists on a relationship which is not a relationship between subjects, but one between two contradictory terms through which a subject is defined. In the case of Belo Monte, they would be the Brazilian citizen and the sacrificial person, which is infringed on her/his rights and forced to leave her/his home to give way for a development project.

So, displacees are subjects of the wrongs done to them by the elite of decision-makers ruling Brazilian State and the private representatives of State's interests; which I have called, following Rancière (2005), *oligarchies.* Francineide,

Raimundo, José Arnaldo, Francisco, Iolanda, Manuel, Rita, Dedé, Rosa, João, Edvaldo, Fátima, Hélio, Raimunda, Antônia, Raoni and so many others who have been cited or not in these pages, have been subjects of wrongs both because they are identified as contained in State space, over which State is sovereign and has the duty to develop and care for, and because they speak against it in terms of equality: 'we, Indigenous peoples, are human beings too, we are all human beings… we respect the white man and demand to be respected in return' (Abacamu Kamayurá, in *Belo Monte: Announcement of a War*, André D'Elia, 2012). Or, as Hélio states, 'what we *have* is the right to our rights. Our rights have been injured. We want this steamroller which comes over us today to have a brake' (MPF/PA, 2015, p. 72). Or, yet, as in the open letter of the Movement Xingu Forever Alive[52]:

> We, *representatives of indigenous peoples, river bank dwellers, gatherers of forest products, family farmers, urban dwellers, social movements, and non-governmental organizations of the Xingu basin* met in the Xingu Forever Alive encounter, in the city of Altamira, Pará state, Brazilian Amazon, between May 19 and 23, 2008 to discuss, recognize, and repudiate the threats to the river which is ours, *and of which we are part*, in order to reaffirm the type of development that we want for our region.
>
> […]
>
> We are also concerned about the construction of Small Hydroelectric Dams (PCHs), on the rivers at the headwaters of the Xingu. Some have already been built and others have been authorized, without any evaluation of the impacts that these dams will cause to the 14 indigenous peoples living in the Xingu Indigenous Park. These dams profane their sacred sites and can destroy the fish which nourish them.
>
> Therefore, **we, Brazilian citizens**, publicly communicate to *our* society and to *our* federal, state, and local government authorities our decision to defend *our rights and those of our children and grandchildren* to live with dignity, to keep our homes and our territories, our cultures and ways of life, honoring our ancestors as well who left us a healthy environment. We will not accept the construction of dams, large or small, on the Xingu and its tributaries, and *we will continue fighting against the imposition of a development model which is socially unjust and environmentally destructive*, and which today is represented by the increase in the illegal grabbing of public lands, by illegal logging operations, by clandestine gold mines which kill our rivers, and by the expansion of agricultural monocultures and extensive cattle ranching which cut down our forests. [Emphasis added]

They, therefore, make evident the wrong within citizenship, pointing to its paradoxical constitution: if the citizen is the one who takes part in ruling and being ruled and politics is the ruling of equals, who then are the displacees? I have argued that they are precisely the constitutive people who needs to remain 'outside', *the demos*, which police order excludes from political ways of being: the part with no-part. A political exclusion, therefore, not only social.

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[52] The full version of the letter, written on Monday, 26 May 2008, is available at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/xingu-forever-alive-3168. Accessed in: 17 February 2017.

Politics, then, is not the exercise of power but it is an *event* born in this specific form of part-taking: an event which reveals the 'thing' outside which is already inside. This equivalence of being political to being a citizen is therefore disjunctive and reductionist. The literature on citizenship that sought to understand precisely the phenomenon of citizenship centred on alterity, and on an alterity beyond the external frontier of national states, acknowledging the 'others' who populate their own political belonging, identifies three forms of otherness: *strangers*, *outsiders* and *aliens* (Isin, 2002). I suspect, however, that none of them are capable of reading otherness in development. Development-induced displacees are not aliens, (a) because they do not constitute the external frontier of identity (they do not suffer a legal exclusion and thus do not participate in the logic of exclusion, but of alterity), and (b) because they are not enemies, they do not threaten the way of life of those who are inscribed into citizenship. Nor are they outsiders or strangers, because they do not share the city space with the dominant group. On the contrary, development governance is carried out at a distance, through non-direct contacts. Displacees dwell river banks, inner lands, forests, long-time abandoned areas, so there is no clash by the presence of development-displacees in the same space as the dominant group.

The centrality of the excluded in development practices may not fit into any of these categories because development is a technology of government, as seen in Chapter Four with the representations of space in the state mode of (re)production. Technology that allows elites to govern characteristics of the population (such as lifeworlds and access to resources) for the strengthening of state government. Unlike friend/enemy, citizen/non-citizen, insider/outsider, this hitherto unnamed category is not part of an open discourse of exclusion. This unnamed category does not refer to the riverine as it refers to the immigrant, or to the terrorist, but reintroduces itself subversively through the names of political technologies such as territory and space, and reveals itself in the boundaries — in Becker's concept of politically flourishing *frontiers* — between legible and illegible ways of governing the living. Furthermore, *displacement* (from which came the category of *the displacee*) is actually a policed form to refer to people who have forced to migrate. As I said in the Introduction, I have chosen to keep this nomenclature to also use it to make the case of how literature and the policies of representation of displacees are, in fact, police representations who seek consensus, avoiding references that can provoke or induce to dissensus; to political actions. This difficulty in articulating a terminology, a language to talk about

the ones who take part in development-induced displacement, then, is very indicative of the invisibility that this problem experiences.

In this sense, I tried to advance the category of unnamed alterity of the internally displaced not merely and as present problems — i.e. problems on how to resettle families, how to reduce the socio-environmental impacts of future projects, how to reduce the 'human cost', in other words, problems while phenomena that demand solutions and reactions — but also as referential sources of problematisations, which render them affirmative resources for *action*. Thus, DIDPs also constitute a problem in the epistemological sense (as a knowledge-generating theme), insofar as they provide us with elements to question development practices, categories, law, equality and so forth. When a condition has no name, what are the chances or how often will it be talked about? So, as a first direction for future research, the issue of the displacees categories might inquire whether the creation of categories is something easy or desirable. The complexity of the reasons for people's movements makes category creation a risky exercise. To fix the condition of displacement by implications of development policies in a concept is to make an option to favour a type of induction for the displacement and a certain image of the internally displaced. It is, therefore, a police activity of partitioning the sensible.

According to the Muggah's (2015) exercise to establish typologies of internal displacement in Brazil, violence-induced and development-induced displacements are much more entangled than the linguistic boundaries of their nominations suggest. So, categories are in themselves ways to divide the sensible. But questioning them can hurt strategic essentialisms of struggle by those who bring these categories 'inscribed' on their bodies and histories. This discussion emerges, for example, when the former Xingu inhabitants that have been expelled by development arrive in the city of Altamira and find forms and patterns of violence with which they were not used to, then choosing to migrate to other peripheries of Pará, of the Federation, or even cross Brazilian borders. In spite of categories, identifying a part with no-part requires not to look at distinctive, particular, peculiar characteristics, but rather to perceive how in relationships, in contact, claims of rights and of participation arise. Relationships and contacts that take place between the supplement and the dominant social groups blossom the minority as a political force, aware of the possibilities of full rights and at the same time aware of the limitations imposed on them.

Meanwhile, what we call *democratic regimes* or just *democracies* and that Rancière points out to be precisely the opposite of democratic assertions of radical

equality, must exclude dissensus so that the consensus needed to rule a certain amount of people (the nationals) can be achieved by the absence of a void; a nation without a lack. That is, the logics of police order, where all the parts have been (ac)counted for, or are (supposedly) represented in our modern republics. 'Order and Progress' is the national motto of the Federative Republic of Brazil. At the time it was conceived, in 1889, the expression was inspired on the basis of positivism. So, it was actually an abbreviated form of the positivist religious motto formulated by the French philosopher Auguste Comte: 'Love as a principle and Order as the basis; Progress as the goal' (in the original French: *L'amour pour principe et l'Ordre pour base, le Progrès pour but*). According to positivistic ideals, *love* must always be at the beginning of all individual and collective actions, *order* consists in the preservation and maintenance of all that is good, beautiful and positive, and *progress* is the consequence of the development and perfecting of the order[53].

It is really not difficult to remember those two words written in Brazil's national flag — which are now, by the way, the slogan of Michel Temer's Federal Administration — while looking at the ways in which the wrongness and 'wrungness' of a social order hierarchically funded are presented as naturally ordered; and ordered to progress through/towards development, both a means and an end-goal, both practice and science. From Jacotot, Deranty (2003) suggests, Rancière has borrowed the metaphor of society as a gravitational order where objects always end up falling to their proper places. As social order admits different entitlements to rule, the 'inequality on birth', what police order ends up doing is reflecting on the seemingly 'pure political' the very same unequal structures that organise social life, which distribute opportunities (including opportunities to study in the schools which prepare a person to play the role of the one who can speak in behalf of the whole), places, legitimacy, law, rights and every other form of representing the space of the social and the space of the political; as has been debated at length in Chapter Three.

This torsion of translating the social inequality to the police order as a natural order of things, which is only legitimate on the basis of a radical equality of anyone to anyone, is only possible because it is funded over a tautology: those who rule, who hold the power to begin with, have no other reason to rule if not the

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[53] Auguste Comte, Système de politique positive (1851-1854). In: TREMBLAY, Jean-Marie, Système de politique positive: extraits des tomes II et III publiés entre 1851 et 1854, 2002, p. 19. Available at: http://anthropomada.com/bibliotheque/COMTE-auguste-Systeme-de-politique-positive.pdf (accessed 10 August 2017)

simple fact that they rule, that they are taking the lead. Conversely, those who obey are also justified by the fact that they obey, that they are counted as *demos*, as the ones who are not supposed to take part in the 'common', and who do not have the right to speak. Representative democracies like Brazil have for principle the idea that every citizen is represented in parliament (the place of the *'parlement'*, of speaking) through systems such as elections, and in law through texts like the Federal Constitution. So, there is an ordering principle of equivalence between society and representations of society. What police enforces and politics suspends is this way of partitioning the sensible. The essence of politics resides in modes of 'dissensual subjectification' that reveal the difference of a society to itself (Rancière, 2001, Theses n°1).

The essence of consensus is not peaceful discussion and reasonable agreement as opposed to conflict or violence. Its essence is the annulment of dissensus as the separation of the sensible from itself, which is, the annulment of surplus subjects, of excesses which can make evident the un-correspondence between the whole and the belief of the whole. The implications of pointing out the reduction of the people to the sum of the parts of the social body, and of the political community to the relationship of interests and aspirations of these different parts, is to put in check the sovereignty which funds State reason to be. So, back in 1889, positivism believed in the resolution of social conflicts by stimulating social cohesion and the natural evolution of the nation. Even though Brazilian society, philosophical thought and the ruling elites have changed since the XIX century, the logic of consensus is still the reduction of politics to the police. In other words, "it is the 'end of politics' and not the accomplishment of its ends but, simply, the return of the 'normal' state of things which is that of politics' non-existence" (Rancière, 2001). To build things like Belo Monster, the surplus could not be counted as part once it would expose the fraud of the social cohesion and natural evolution of the country.

5.1
Actions and Inscriptions

This is, in short, the theoretical problem of inequality in part-taking, in what is believed to be a democratic State, that explains the empirical case of Belo Monte. With this political reading of displacement, I have showed, then, that Belo Monte displacees do not take part on (solely) a social exclusion, but that they are the supplementary part that must be annulled once they are subjects of wrongs who

can disrupt the natural ontology of social order in a moment. Politics, is not the exercise of power but it is an *event* born in this specific form of part-taking: an event which reveals the 'thing' outside which is already inside; the supplement, which has been discussed by Bertha Becker's view of Amazonia as a frontier. Underneath the seemingly pacified order of development, the political moment is the revelation of a structural twisting, of the misunderstanding of a 'natural evolution' of society presented in positivistic mottos and beliefs of Order and Progress. Politics in the Rancièrian intuition is only 'proper politics' in a negative sense: as the *negativity* which disrupts natural ontology of the social order, i.e., which denaturalises the *positivity* of order, progress, development and such. Politics is an intervention in progression. From that, my main point with the analysis is to tie up *displacement* as a political practice of negativity.

Likewise, in discussing politics, democracy and mobility, Aradau and Huysmans (2009) indicate that mobility itself is not seen as a political practice, let alone a democratic political one. Migrants crossing the Mediterranean, for example, are not understood as making a political claim but are represented as destitute and frustrated people driven by economic and/or humanitarian needs. 'Their mobility seems to remain largely apolitical in the sense that they do not intentionally seek to renegotiate the structures of power and authority through their mobility' (2009, p. 586). What I have discussed as the 'juridification of the social' in Chapter Four is an attempt to guarantee precisely that mobility (in my case contained inside national borders) can be governed through democratic processes and "that the *demos* does not become the 'mob' or a conflictual crowd, but remains an ordered audience, public or electorate" (2009, p. 588). This correspondence of the factual to the law, being law a way to distribute the sensible by counting parts and assigning 'rights holders' and 'rights givers', however, limit what can be counted as rights since it is informed by a lifeworld which does not count other lifeworlds. This miscalculation of law produces, among other things, what I have discussed in Chapter Four as *domicide*.

From that, framing those people's actions of renegotiating their resettlement rights as 'political' is not pointing out their resistance as much of the literature on empowering displacees as political agents propose, but their resilience, which is not what politically they do to disrupt the status quo, because their status quo is and has been for a long-time resilience. They have been resilient in their economies of abandonment since colonial times: '[the consortium builder of Belo Monte] is the coloniser and we are the colony. And I revolt myself against it, and I feel outraged by that. Why the state of Pará and Amazonia have been and

will always be a colony!?' (Don Erwin Kräutler, Bishop of the Xingu Prelature, *At the Margin of Xingu: disregarded voices*, Damiá Puig, 2011). So, I have argued against this kind of literature which frames displacees as subjects of rights that the question is not *if* they resist, or not *if* they are political, but *how*. What I have highlighted is not that law does not have a fundamental role in the protection of vulnerable people, but how the representation of displaced people within the scholarly, policy, and legal frameworks as subjects of rights renders them dependent on the very state that displaces them.

By recurring to universal principles of rights from which they have been excluded, and verifying their equality based on the condition of equal human beings, displacees polemically appear as an actual mass which is both a problem for and a constitutive force of democracy. Following Aradau and Huysmans (2009), law processes social inequalities in order to achieve a more just social order in conformity with the universal principles enshrined in it. In spite of that, 'the processing of social wrongs in the judicial field is limited inasmuch as law offers to replace a system of institutional power which is found to be oppressive with another system of institutional power (rule of law) which is less oppressive' (2009, p. 601). Social inequalities are processed in the light of an attainable equality of anyone to anyone before the law. But, as seen in the case of the rights to housing, or of the division between IDPs and refugees' categories, 'drawing on law and rights significantly limits the way in which equality can be politically enacted and particularly experienced' (2009, p. 601). Unlike the judicial realm where equality is a goal to be achieved or a formal perception of its subjects, in politics equality works as a maxim of *action*.

The politics of the displaced claims equality through actual mobilisation from outside the law precisely for and by those who are excluded from the formal principle of legal equality because they do not have a status (Aradau and Huysmans, 2009). There is simply no legal regime in Brazil that has advanced the status of the displaced as a subject whose particular rights should be guaranteed, nor in which terms these guarantees should be made, i.e. there is no punishment to companies which violate people's rights other than the ones Ibama or MPF decide to investigate and issue. So, those who are excluded by the particularisation of universal rights can enter the political field as soon as the particularistic demands are transformed into demands summoning the fundamental principle of radical equality (Deranty, 2003); hence, when their claims are done through collective movement. In accordance with Aradau and Huysmans (2009, p. 602) 'the recourse to rights and law and the recourse to the force of the mob are both

democratic practices that supplement each other and supplement their mutual limitations'.

To be clear, looking at the ways the juridification of the social limits the recourse to law does not turn *law* into a less important or 'evil' instrument of the social order(ing). Let alone the system of parliamentary democracy. All the analysis has tried to show is that any form of division of the sensible will leave something un(ac)counted for, that is, there will always be an excess, and the wrong, the tort, begins by not taking that into account. So, Rancière does not reject parliamentary democracy but recognises the force of law and the constitutional recognition of rights as powerful weapons and undeniable achievements in struggles for visibility (Deranty, 2003). Law plays an important symbolic role in emancipatory movements along with institutions. They serve as *inscriptions*, as references and symbols that are commented upon and appealed to, in the ever-arising struggles for equality. Rancière's suspicion towards the State admits that the political can inhabit State institutions, *but it is simply not reducible to it* (Deranty, 2003, paragraph 27). In the same way, human rights are not reducible to constitutional rights.

From that, claims of equality are possible given the inscriptions of equality, as they appear in the founding texts contemplating the universal right to housing, as the 1988 Federal Constitution (Article 6a, *caput*) and in several international diplomas:

> Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 25, paragraph 1:
> Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, *housing* and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. [Emphasis added]
>
> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 17:
> 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, *home* or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
> 2. *Everyone* has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. [Emphasis added]
>
> International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 11, paragraph 1:
> The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and *housing*, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent. [Emphasis added]
>
> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 4, Point 7:
> In the Committee's view, *the right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or restrictive sense* which equates it with, for example, the shelter provided by

merely having a roof over one's head or views shelter exclusively as a commodity. Rather it should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity. [Emphasis added]

Even if those texts indicate that 'house' might have multiple meanings, that *everyone* is entitled to housing rights, even if it observes that shelter is no mere commodity, still, legal interpretations, legal regimes and yet legal conflicts unavoidably end up leaving some part on the outside. In the beginning of *Hatred of Democracy*, Rancière says that 'politics is always around with limited totalities' (2014 [2005], p. 19). This holds true when the legal dispositions — or comments — about forced evictions foresee that those prohibitions do not apply to the ones carried out by force in accordance to the law, and as long as the State does what it believes to be necessary to guarantee full assistance to the displaced:

> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 7:
> [Point 3] The term 'forced evictions' as used throughout this general comment is defined as the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, *without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection*. The prohibition on forced evictions *does not, however, apply to evictions carried out by force in accordance with the law* and in conformity with the provisions of the International Covenants on Human Rights. [Point 8] Moreover, this approach is reinforced by article 17.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [cited above] which complements *the right not to be forcefully evicted without adequate protection*. [Point 9] *States parties should therefore review relevant legislation and policies to ensure that they are compatible with the obligations arising from the right to adequate housing and repeal or amend any legislation or policies that are inconsistent with the requirements of the Covenant.* [Emphasis added]

Are left outside, then, the cases in which the State is the perpetrator of the evictions and at the same time does not offer complete guarantees, or does not provide personal, or does not assure that the FUNAI (National Indian Foundation) and the environmental control agencies are present in the region, or does not create a national registry of the affected, outsourcing then the fulfilment of these rights to a private company which has no commitment to the totality of the 'nationals' as the State does.

With that in mind, in line with Aradau and Huysmans (2009), as equality is enshrined in legal and political texts, 'it can be subsequently translated, displaced and maximised in everyday life'. Equality cannot be specified a priori, since the totality of the legal text can unavoidably leave or allow a part to be left outside but '*happens* through the mobilisation' of the part with no-part against the limitations of the judicial system (2009, p. 603). The politics of displacement then works both "as a 'check' upon the democratic practices of rights (by challenging who is a subject of rights and which agents and institutions are allowed to be rights mediators) and as an 'invention' of democratic practice" (2009, p. 603). One way

they challenge the agents and the institutions that are allowed to mediate rights, the second direction for future research, is by claiming a specific legislation to watch over their particular situation. It is major, for the stated reasons, that displacees have some form of inscription to appeal to, because the representation backed as *human rights* was made very vague it their case. One possibility in the case of internally displaced people by development works in the context of the PAC is to institutionalise Ordinance n°317 of July 18, 2013 of the Ministry of Cities.

This ordinance follows the contributions of World Bank's Operational Manual (OP) 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement[54]. The Bank's experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe economic, social, and environmental risks: production systems are dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to environments where their productive skills may be less applicable and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are diminished or lost. Every single one of these risks can be verified as already occurred in the consequences of Belo Monte Complex building. More, OP 4.12 says that 'involuntary resettlement should be *avoided* where feasible, or minimized, exploring all viable alternative project designs' [Emphasis added]. So, 'Ordinance 317' has taken on OP 4.12 precedent by stating that:

> Art. 2: The works and services linked to the programs and actions under management of the Ministry of Cities included in the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) should be preceded by a diagnosis and preparation of an alternative study to *avoid* or minimize the need for involuntary displacement of families and identify better economic, technical and socially sustainable and effective solutions. [Emphasis added]

The effort that can be done is to advance this ordinance to a federal legislation. Ordinances are issued by the Executive order, so they can be changed according to the administration, while legislations are a priori timeless. So, by suggesting Ordinance 317 to be turned into a law means that it will cease to be a 'government policy' to become a 'State policy' to which people can appeal to. An inscription, therefore, specific to the matter of 'forced eviction'. Another possibility is to make C169 a statutory instrument. The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), known as C169, was ratified by Brazil, therefore has 'force of law' because it has a binding character. Even though ratified, C169 has not been

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[54] World Bank Group Operational Manual for Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.12, is available in full at: https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822f89db.pdf. Accessed in: 20 February 2016.

regulated. Its regulation can aid Indigenous people to refer to it in issues such as the obligation of consultations and hearings of Indigenous peoples in anything that concerns their lands, the way these consultations should be carried out, which are the proper procedures to consult people in accordance with their own societal structures of leadership, what does it even mean to consult Indigenous peoples (once it is not a loosen thing to do), and so forth.

This, certainly, does not solve the problem of development-induced displacement once it is a political problem to begin with. The recourse to rights and law is not enough, nor the recourse to the force of the mob, but they are both democratic practices that supplement each other and supplement their mutual limitations. The 'problem' of inequality in part-taking cannot be solved, otherwise there will be no politics at all. The theoretical problem is an aporia: the sensible will never not be partaken, i.e., there will always be a part-taken from the 'totality'. But, also, there is no such thing as radical alterity. There is a multiplicity of alterations. This means that at a certain moment the scene has changed, not out of a decision or out of a radical rupture, but the scene has changed out of a multiplicity of small displacements. So, the effort of the displacees, of 'vulnerable people', of the mob, is a constant displacement of parts, representations, roles, it is, in the end, the constant activity of democracy itself, of *politics*. A *politics of displacement* in a twofold sense: resisting development-displacement through a constant displacement of parts. The multiplicity of small displacements people affected by Belo Monte have produced has reached the country and has provoked many to add their voices to theirs.

That explains how, despite the power of oligarchies, the licensing process for the Tapajós Complex (in the Tapajós River basin) has been braked in the National Congress by hundreds of thousands of signatures collected virtually and in person. The Xingu people have added their voices to the people of Tapajós and have displaced their representation of 'victims' as well as mobilised the discourses of the loss of their homes to stand for the part with no-part, since there is a multiplicity of them. But the collective action of the people needs to be supplemented by law. The Munduruku, an Indigenous group that is in the line of succession to be the part-taken in a hydroelectric power plant project, have put their own signs in their lands, which they demand to be demarcated, copying the ones used by the government to demarcate lands in other Indigenous places. They have 'created' the law where it was none. If government invisibilised and unheard the Munduruku people for decades, they have displaced parts, redistributed roles and 'played' government. By trying to prevent the building of Tapajós HPP, they

wrote signs both in Munduruku and Portuguese. With that, they have disrupted the partition of the space, of the political and, ultimately, of the words that can be heard and written as meaningful words. Munduruku words speaking the law.

Figure 4: Munduruku Indigenous child holding a self-demarcation sign.

Photo: Marcio Isensee e Sá

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