

6

Glossário

As definições abaixo foram elaboradas com base em dados do Departamento de Estado (Estados Unidos da América, Departamento de Estado, s.d.), de Jones et al. (1998) e de Sokov (2003). As figuras foram gentilmente cedidas pela Federation of American Scientists, pela Global Security e pela Air Force Technology.

Armas nucleares estratégicas – Armas nucleares de longo alcance e / ou de grande poder de destruição.

Armas nucleares táticas – Durante a Guerra Fria, a expressão referia-se a armas nucleares de curto alcance, especialmente destinadas ao uso em campos de batalha. Hoje, inclui os mísseis de cruzeiro lançados do mar – que a Rússia considera sistemas estratégicos – bem como armas nucleares de bombardeiros médios, ou seja, todas aquelas que não foram incluídas nos limites do START I. Uma expressão mais apropriada seria “armas nucleares não-estratégicas”.

Bombardeiro pesado – Bombardeiro com alcance superior a 8.000 km e / ou equipado com mísseis de cruzeiro nucleares de longo alcance lançados do ar.




Figura 6 – Bombardeiro B-52 Stratofortress




Figura 7 – Bombardeiro B-2 Spirit

Controle e redução de armas (*arms control*) –

Qualquer medida unilateral, bilateral ou multilateral tomada a fim de controlar ou de reduzir qualquer aspecto de um sistema de armas ou de forças. Ela pode afetar o tamanho, o tipo, a configuração, a produção ou o desempenho característicos de um sistema de armas, bem como a organização, o equipamento, o desdobramento e o emprego de uma força.

Defesas antimísseis balísticos –

Geralmente compostas por radares, sensores, lançadores e interceptores, visam a interceptar e a destruir mísseis balísticos ou seus veículos de reentrada em voo. Nesta dissertação, a expressão “defesa antimísseis” é usada com maior frequência em referência aos sistemas de interceptação e de destruição de mísseis balísticos de longo alcance ou de seus componentes. Abaixo segue o conceito de operações da Defesa Nacional Antimísseis:




Figura 8 – Conceito de operações do NMD

Desdobramento (*deployment*) –

Colocação de armas, pessoal ou equipamento em posição de prontidão para combate.

Forças nucleares estratégicas – Mísseis balísticos com base na terra e com alcance superior a 5.500 km, mísseis balísticos lançados de submarino e bombardeiros pesados.

Míssil balístico – Míssil cuja carga útil atinge o alvo por meio de uma propulsão inicial e, então, de um voo livre ao longo de uma trajetória em forma de arco. Parte do voo de um míssil balístico de longo alcance pode ocorrer fora da atmosfera e envolver a reentrada de ogivas ou do próprio míssil.

Míssil balístico intercontinental (*intercontinental ballistic missile, ICBM*) – Míssil balístico com base na terra e com um alcance superior a 5.500 km.




Figura 9 – ICBMs – EUA e URSS (1960-1990)

Míssil balístico lançado de submarino (*submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLBM*) – Míssil balístico com alcance superior a 600 km, carregado a bordo e lançado de um submarino.




Figura 10 – SLBMs – EUA (1960-1990)

Míssil de cruzeiro – Veículo autopropelido não-tripulado que sustenta o voo por meio do uso de empuxo aerodinâmico ao longo da maior parte de sua trajetória. Ele pode carregar ogivas convencionais ou nucleares.

Ogiva – Parte de um míssil, projétil, torpedo, foguete ou outra munição que contenha ou um sistema nuclear / termonuclear, ou sistemas explosivos, ou agentes químicos / biológicos a fim de provocar dano.

Veículo de reentrada (*reentry vehicle, RV*) – Parte de um míssil ou foguete que reentra na atmosfera da Terra, na porção terminal da trajetória.

Veículos de reentrada múltiplos independentemente direcionáveis (*multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, MIRV*) – Dois ou mais veículos de reentrada carregados por um único míssil, dirigíveis para alvos distintos e separados. Na figura abaixo, em que observamos as partes de um míssil MIRVado, o Peacekeeper, os RVs são os cones alaranjados. As ogivas W87 estão contidas nos RVs:




Figura 11 – MX Peacekeeper (veículos de reentrada)

Na figura, o interior de um veículo de reentrada termonuclear:




Figura 12 – Veículo de reentrada (interior)

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ESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMÉRICA. Constituição (1787). Artigo II. Seção 2. Cláusula 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. **The United States Constitution**, Washington, D.C., s.d. Disponível em: <<http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html>>. Acesso em: 11 set. 2004.

_____. Artigo II. Seção 2. Cláusula 2. He [The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. **The United States Constitution**,

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8

Anexos

Abaixo seguem os textos de dois documentos importantes, examinados no decorrer desta dissertação: o próprio SORT e a resolução de conselho e consentimento para a ratificação do tratado.

8.1.

O Tratado de Moscou

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,

Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,

Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

8.2.

A resolução de ratificação do SORT

Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND DECLARATIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8, in this resolution referred to as the “Moscow Treaty” or “Treaty”), subject to the conditions in section 2 and declarations in section 3.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding on the President:

(1) report on the role of cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance.—Recognizing that implementation of the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility of each party, not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on February 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report and recommendations on how United States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the current year. The report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form.

(2) annual implementation report.—Not later than 60 days after exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States and the

Russian Federation. This report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form and shall include—

(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;

(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year;

(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other party's continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification measures, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009;

(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that may call into question the intent or the ability of either party to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty; and

(G) any actions that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to address concerns listed pursuant to subparagraph (F) or to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty.

SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:

(1) treaty interpretation.—The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

(2) Further strategic arms reductions.—The Senate encourages the President to continue strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States.

(3) Bilateral implementation issues.—The Senate expects the executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings, including consultations before meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on any implementation issues related to the Moscow Treaty. Such briefings shall include a description of all efforts by the United States in bilateral forums and through diplomatic channels with the Russian Federation to resolve any such issues and shall include a description of—

(A) the issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, within 30 days after such meetings;

(B) any issues related to implementation of this Treaty that the United States is pursuing in other channels, including the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; and

(C) any Presidential determination with respect to issues described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(4) nonstrategic nuclear weapons.—Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of—

(A) establishing cooperative measures to give each party to the Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by the other party; and

(B) providing United States or other international assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

(5) achieving reductions.—Recognizing the transformed relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation and the significantly decreased threat posed to the United States by the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal, the Senate encourages the President to accelerate United States strategic force reductions, to the extent feasible and consistent with United States national security requirements and alliance obligations, in order that the reductions required by Article I of the Treaty may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

(6) consultations.—Given the Senate's continuing interest in this Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty.