The analysis aims at comparing the institutes of súmula vinculante in the Brazilian legal system and stare decisis in the U.S. legal system. Assuming that there has been a reception of the theory of legal precedentes by the Brazilian system, a comparative constitutional law approach presents us the most important differences between the two mechanisms. This appoach allows us to analyze the súmula vinculante as a judicial precedent with a peculiar binding authority and as an interseccion between the civil law and common law systems. Comparison is key to the critical portion of the analysis because the latter is utimately based upon the major diferences between the institutes. The spotting of such differences works as evidence for the argument that the Brazilian mechanism promotes a deeper aristocratic blokage of democratic force of revolutionary innovation. In the first chapters, the tension between constituent power and constituted powers, as well as the opposing political options of conflict versus supression of conflict; and of appealing to the people versus establishing the courts as the bulwarks of a limited constitution will be presented. The aforementioned tension is further explored with the aid of the theory of Professor Mark Tushnet on weak and strong form judicial review. Departing from his classification of the U.S. system of judicial review as a strong form judicial review, the Brazilian system of judicial review, composed of the súmula vinculante among other institutes, is identified as a super strong form of judicial review due to its promotion of an exacerbation of the tension between the judicial power to enforce constitutional limitations and democratic self-governance.