PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: from the decisionist isolation to the collaborative activity between the powers in constitutional application aims not only to present the three best-known instruments for controversy’s solution between the Constitution and Law indicated in the title, such as studying the debate involving the legitimacy of judicial review of constitutionality up against the democracy and point the main solution has already put into practice in other jurisdictions: the institutional dialogues. Demonstrate by means of doctrinal studies and foreign law analysis which they characterized as tools that better reconcile democracy and protection of fundamental rights rather than an decisionist isolationist by a single state power, which is characteristic of social parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review. This work demonstrates that the dialogical model emerged in contemporary constitutionalism, specifically within the Commonwealth, it reveals as a kind of mechanism of controversy’s solution supported by a weak judicial review. In it, there is no identification of a supreme body of constitutional interpretation, but it seeks not to incur in the questions’ panorama of democratic legitimacy of currently experienced by the constitutional court, especially in countries like Brazil and the United States, dominated, under questioning, judicial activism. It is concluded that dialogic venture aims to emphasize the strength of the rights themselves, not the jurisdiction’s exercise, making it through the ombudsman for a collaborative activity between political and judicial powers, posture that better aligns with a current view of democracy that overcome the focus predominantly political.