Are international organizations subservient to member state interests or are they endowed with sources of power and authority? For a long time, debates between mainstream theories in International Relations did not consider their capacity as actors and neglected the autonomy of such arrangements. Based on functionalist and utilitarist premises, institutions were perceived as mere arenas for dispute resolution or instruments of collective action among states. Reality, however, does not always coincide with theoretical assumptions. In fact, an increasing number of international organizations seem to shape their own mandate, moving away from the instrumental pattern which is normally assigned to them. International human rights regimes and, more precisely, international human rights courts provide an interesting entry point into the discussion on institutional autonomy. Based on a new institutionalist approach and choosing as object of investigation the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, this dissertation tries to expose how certain institutions, once created, gradually emancipate themselves from state interests - and mainly from state control - and attain a considerable degree of autonomy in exercising their mandate.