The subject of this work is the conceptions of language and communication in Wittgenstein and Habermas. The starting- point of the comparison is the different methodological attitudes adopted by both authors. The objective is to show how these different orientations lead to different conceptions of language and communication. Habermas`s formal pragmatics and pragmatical theory of truth are planned as methodological solution to the problem of a pragmatically oriented analysis of language, which does not give up a theoretical explanation of the constitution of the linguistic meaning. This work intends to show, however, that Habermas`s conceptions do not allow us to work with the problems faced by Wittgenstein in his rule-following considerations, in an attitude strictly antitheoretical. From the Wittgensteinian remarks can be extracted a notion of communication basically different from the reflexive communication by which Habermas is guided. On the other hand, it is considered the philosophical sense of a strictly pragmatical analysis of language, as we can find in the work of the later Wittgenstein. How can one legitimate in practice an analysis of language turned to the expliciteness of pragmatic presssupositions without any type of theoretical foundation?